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I Articles I
Terror at the Emperor's Birthday
Party: An Analysis of the Hostage-
Taking Incident at the Japanese
Embassy in Lima, Peru.
Dr. Ranee K. L. Panjabi*
I. Introduction
Does the end ever justify the means? This question confronts
and haunts the student of modem terrorism and revolution. In the
first part of this century, Mahatma Gandhi, leading India in a non-
violent struggle against British imperial rule, argued eloquently that
violent means are never justifiable, no matter how noble the end.
He convinced Indians to struggle for independence non-violently on
the basis that "[t]ruth never damages a cause that is just."1
Leading this unique revolution, Gandhi provided a moral founda-
* The author holds a law degree with Honors from the University of London
(England) and teaches History and Human Rights at Memorial University of
Newfoundland, Canada. She has published extensively in the fields of human
rights and international environmental law. Her book, THE EARTH SUMMIT AT
Rio: POLITICS, ECONOMICS AND THE ENVIRONMENT was published in 1997.
1. MOHANDAS K. GANDHI, NON-VIOLENCE IN PEACE AND WAR, (1948), in
INTERNATIONAL THESAURUS OF QUOTATIONS 70 (Rhoda Thomas Tripp ed.,
1987).
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tion for dissent by insisting that the methodology to be pursued in
fighting injustice be as pure as the goal to be reached.
Living in the far more complicated second half of the twentieth
century, rebels and rulers argue the reverse, that violence and even
cruelty are acceptable in certain conditions. For dissenters, the
logic of this position is that when there are no legitimate safety
valves in society, resort to violence is the only answer. Those who
form the establishment use the logic of law and order to justify
their repression of such dissent. This collision of two opinions or
ideologies leads to an escalation of violence and terror, which
primarily afflicts the innocent. Unfortunately, the majority of
twentieth century revolutions have been violent in nature; many of
them have resulted in brutal and bloody civil wars and the creation
of repressive totalitarian dictatorships. The history of this century
has proven that violence breeds retaliatory violence, and such
tainted means eventually corrupt the goal. It is imperative that at
the end of this turbulent century we evaluate our recent past and
ponder the age-old question of the connection between means and
ends. When we view the end, we cannot but realize that it has
been shaped, developed and formed by the means used, and hence,
the means are as important as the ultimate goal to be achieved.
Aristotle suggested that "[w]hen we deliberate it is about means
and not ends."2
There are no clear and easy answers to the political riddles of
our time. The teacher of modern history confronts more dilemmas
than solutions. A few years before the outbreak of the Second
World War, Aldous Huxley criticized the mindset of his era in his
book Ends and Means, saying: "We insist that ends which we
believe to be good can justify means which we know quite certainly
to be abominable; we go on believing against all the evidence, that
these bad means can achieve the good ends we desire."3  In
December 1996, these troubling riddles of modern life again
perplexed the world as a group of Peruvian rebels, members of the
Tupac Amaru, led by Nestor Cerpa Cartolini, seized the Japanese
Ambassador's residence in Lima, Peru, during a gala celebration of
Japanese Emperor Akihito's birthday and took a large number of
international diplomats, Peruvian government officials and
members of the press hostage. While most of the hostages were
2. ARISTOTLE, NICHOMACHEAN ETHICS, Tr. J.A.K. Thomson, in THE
INTERNATIONAL THESAURUS OF QUOTATIONS 393 (Rhoda Thomas Tripp ed.,
1987).
3. ALDoUS HUXLEY, ENDS AND MEANS 28-29 (1937).
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released over the next few days and weeks, the ordeal for approxi-
mately 70 men continued for 126 days. News of the violent end to
the Emperor's birthday celebration reverberated across the world
due largely to the extensive communications networks which now
span our planet. The liberation of the hostages four months later
was equally violent-Peruvian elite forces stormed the Embassy,
killed all the hostage takers and rescued the dignitaries. Excluding
the guerrillas, the death toll included one hostage and three
soldiers.
This article will provide a detailed analysis of the events of the
hostage-taking incident in Lima, along with some observations on
the incident's impact both nationally in Peru and internationally
with respect to world public opinion about this act of terrorism.
Extensive research into primary sources revealed a complex human
drama in which the rebel leader and the President of Peru were
pitted against each other in a deadly confrontation, each individual
totally committed to the rectitude of his position. Given the
international composition of the hostages, both men played a
dangerous game of brinkmanship for very high stakes. In the end,
the President won insofar as the military operation was concerned.
However, there is far more to this hostage-taking crisis than its
military particulars.
This is also a human rights story exposing the appalling
conditions of prisons in Peru and the inhuman treatment of
political prisoners in that country. It is a tale of opposing causes
and viewpoints, of different concepts of justice and governance. It
is a classic saga of poverty against wealth, of dispossessed, alienated
sections of society seeking a foothold within the established
structures and being destroyed for having such expectations. It is,
above all, a human tragedy. Journalist Linda Diebel aptly com-
mented, "[I]t's a thriller, a love story about a rebel leader fighting
to get his comrade wife out of jail and an international blockbuster
about money, power and intrigue."'
II. History
A. Peru: Brief Particulars
Peru is a Pacific Ocean nation in South America, bordered on
the north by Ecuador and Colombia, on the south by Chile, and on
4. Linda Diebel, Summit Tackles Nightmare, THE TORONTO STAR, Jan. 31,
1997, at A19.
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the east by Brazil and Bolivia. Approximately half of the citizens
"live in poverty, 85 percent of workers do not have full-time jobs
and an estimated 93 percent of children do not have access to
school books."5 Census figures for 1993 showed a population that
was 70.1 percent urban out of a total of 22,048,356.6 The financial
newspaper Gestion estimated in June 1997 that 19 percent of
Peruvians suffer extreme poverty, "without sanitation, water,
electricity or gas.",7 In 1991, there were approximately 100,000
Peruvians of Japanese descent! Lima, the venue of this hostage-
taking crisis, is a city of approximately 8 million people.9
At the time of the hostage crisis, Peru was just recovering from
a lengthy civil war during which about 27,500 people were killed
and about 5000 "disappeared.' 0 The political impact of this civil
war has been a reversion to authoritarian-style governance under
democratically-elected President Alberto Fujimori, who came to
power in 1990. Economically, the nation had been devastated by
warfare between guerrilla insurgents and security forces backed by
the Peruvian military.
Fujimori's economic plans stabilized some sectors of the
economy, provided huge prosperity for the wealthy, and demon-
strated some benefit for the middle class. However, the result for
the poor thus far has been unemployment, chronic hunger and
severe deprivation. Overall, in terms of living conditions for the
majority of the population, Peru has not fared very successfully,
despite Fujimori's much publicized reforms which include the rapid
privatization of dozens of state enterprises." Although the
economy was booming for some time, the impact of the liberaliza-
tion schemes on the poor was largely negative. In the early 1990's,
a conference of Peruvian bishops concluded that the economic
5. Calvin Sims, Peru's Growth Leaves Poor Behind, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 29,
1996, at 1 [hereinafter Sims, Peru's Economic Plan].
6. THE STATESMAN'S YEARBOOK 1996-97 1028, (Brian Hunter ed., 1996).
Projected population figures for the year 2000 are 28 million. PERU: A COUNTRY
STUDY, xvi (Rex. A. Hudson ed., 1993).
7. Diana Jean Schemo, Peruvians May Have Had Enough of Fujimori, THE
GLOBE & MAIL (Toronto) June 11, 1997, at A7 [hereinafter Schemo, Peruvians
May Have Had Enough].
8. THE STATESMAN'S YEARBOOK 1996-1997, supra note 6.
9. Linda Diebel, 225 Hostages Set Free by Peru Rebels, THE TORONTO STAR,
Dec. 23, 1966, at Al [hereinafter Diebel, 225 Hostages Set Free].
10. Linda Diebel, Peru's Rebels With a Cause, THE TORONTO STAR, Dec. 28
1996, at A2 [hereinafter Diebel, Peru's Rebels].
11. Alex Emery, Hostage Hold Up Spotlights Social, Political Crises Facing
Peru, THE CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Dec. 23, 1996, at 6 [hereinafter Emery,
Hostage Hold Up].
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reforms had pushed an additional five million people into extreme
poverty.12 Governmental policies had "curbed runaway inflation
and fuelled huge growth ... but ha[d] so far failed to produce new
jobs, higher wages or better social conditions for poor Peruvi-
ans."13 In 1996, "the legal minimum wage was only 71 percent of
what it had been in 1990."14 This, coupled with the fact that 4 out
of every 5 Peruvians lack steady employment,15 had eroded the
popularity of the government.
Despite the negative aspects of Peruvian economics, it must
also be noted that when Fujimori took office in 1990, inflation was
7,650 percent.1 6  By December 1996, it had fallen to a more
respectable 10 percent.1 7 The economic growth rate was 12 per-
cent in 1994, the highest in the world that year.1 It dropped to
7 percent in 1995,19 and by 1996 had fallen to about 2 percent. 2
The lack of adequate social services and basic facilities for the
poor exacerbates their plight particularly since the trend in favor of
privatization in the cause of economic efficiency has led to unem-
ployment for hundreds of thousands of workers in both the public
and private sectors. The cost of these reforms has been distributed
very unequally, with the poor bearing the heaviest burden.1 On
the other side of the issue, it is also true that the economic maneu-
verability of the Peruvian government is fairly restricted with
respect to public expenditure for social services, because Peru is
one of the most indebted countries in Latin America.22
The poor in Peru have suffered not just economically, but also
in terms of health. The infant mortality rate is one of the highest
12. Bill Fairbairn, One of the Worst Right Violators in the World, THE GLOBE
& MAIL (Toronto), Apr. 16, 1992, at A19.
13. Sims, Peru's Economic Plan, supra note 5.
14. Hugh O'Shaughnessy, Name From the Past Haunts Peru's Rulers, THE
IRISH TIMES, Dec. 19, 1996, at 11.
15. Emery, Hostage Hold Up, supra note 11.
16. Sims, Peru's Economic Plan, supra note 5.
17. Id.
18. Paul Knox, Crisis Masks Fujimori's Mistakes, THE GLOBE & MAIL
(Toronto), Feb. 24, 1997, at A12 [hereinafter Knox, Crisis].
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Sims, Peru's Economic Plan, supra note 5. The unequal distribution was
calculated by Pedro Sainz, an economist with the United Nations Economic
commission on Latin America and the Caribbean. Id
22. Id. In 1992, the foreign debt of Peru was U.S. $21.6 billion. PERU: A
COUNTRY STUDY, supra note 6, at xviii.
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in the hemisphere, with 63 per 1000 live births.2 The United
Nations Development Program has estimated that the per capita
daily calorie supply in Peru is among the lowest in the world.24 In
1990-1991, approximately 1200 children died every week from
malnutrition, which along with starvation is a leading cause of
illness in Peru.25
The Economist, examining the plight of Latin America
generally, commented incisively with language which is appropriate
to define the situation in Peru:
Social realities remain much as they were: poor Latin Ameri-
cans now have the right to vote but still, too many of them, not
the right to eat, let alone to decent housing, health care or
schools... the past ten years' swing to free-market economics,
which promises to benefit both rich and poor, in the short term
is widening the gap between them and indeed making some of
the poor not just relatively but absolutely poorer than they
were.
26
B. Terrorism and Terrorists in Peru
The political, economic and social environment of Peru has for
years been a breeding ground for revolt, terrorism and revolution.
A wealthy minority controls the apparatuses of government and the
economy and effectively subdues the economic expectations and
aspirations of a large majority, part of which is reduced to living in
stark and horrifying poverty. The resulting chasm in society, in
conjunction with the lack of strong democratic safety valves for the
venting of grievances by the disaffected, force the truly angry to
express themselves in violence aimed at destroying the fabric of a
system which by its very nature is exclusive rather than inclusive.
Social alienation breeds terrorism, which in turn breeds a siege
mentality among the privileged. The result is a nation rampant
with human rights abuses and systemic violence practiced by both
the State and by those opposed to it.
As in many other countries around the world, the trend toward
economic liberalization has wrought havoc on those at the bottom
of the social system while raising the overall efficiency of the
economy. It will be some years before the emphasis on capitalism
23. Bill Cormier, Shantytowns Around Lima Held Hostage to Deep Poverty,
THE OTTAWA CITIZEN, Jan. 5, 1997, at A6.
24. Knox, Crisis, supra note 18.
25. PERU: A COUNTRY STUDY, supra note 6, at xvii.
26. A Victory in Peru, THE ECONOMIST, Apr. 26, 1997, at 15.
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brings benefits which trickle down to the very poor elements of
society. The witches' brew of political, economic and social
injustice is poison to the survival of democratic institutions in states
like Peru.
In Latin America, "despite the end of the cold war and strides
toward democratization that have calmed the revolutionary fires,
enough hot embers remain to remind the hemisphere that some of
the conditions that feed extremist activities still exist. '2 7 It is a
region "that has the worst rich-poor income gap in the world,
flagrant discrimination against indigenous populations, and political
restrictions that have continued despite democratic transitions."'
In the war against mainly Marxist rebel groups practicing
terrorism, Latin American governments have had some success.
Guerrilla groups in a number of Latin American countries have
been neutralized, either through violent destruction by the ruling
authorities or through legitimate incorporation into the political
process. The effort in Peru to subdue guerrilla groups involved the
authorities in a prolonged civil war which (estimates vary) took
over 30,000 lives,29 and caused $25 billion in damage.3" Peruvian
rebels, though significantly weakened, continue to exist and strike
sporadically at the establishment. Their survival despite brutal
police and military efforts to destroy and eliminate them testifies
to the determination motivating these rebels. The fact that they
continue to recruit, particularly among the young, is very disturb-
ing, for "[t]errorism has frequently been called the politics of
desperation, the last refuge of the weak.
31
The two most prominent Peruvian rebel groups in recent years
have been Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path) and the MRTA
(Movimiento Revolucionario Tupac Amaru32), also known simply
as Tupac Amaru. Of these two groups, the Maoist Shining Path was
generally considered more brutal, more assertive and more deadly
27. Howard LaFranchi, Rebel Groups Like Peru's Still Pester Latin America,
THE CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Dec. 20, 1996, at 1.
28. Id.
29. Peru Rebels Raid Envoy's Home and Seize Hundreds of Hostages, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 18, 1996, at Al.
30. Emery, Hostage Hold Up, supra note 11.
31. Edward F. Mickolus, Negotiating For Hostages: A Policy Dilemma, in
CONTEMPORARY TERRORISM 207, 217 (John D. Elliott & Leslie K. Gibson eds.,
1978).
32. Allan Thompson, Embassy Attackers Have Violent Past, THE TORONTO
STAR, Dec. 19, 1996, at A20.
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in its policies, and reportedly included 10,000 fighters at its peak.33
Thpac Amaru has never attracted as many followers as Shining
Path and may have included only about 1000 guerrillas at its
height,34 although, again, estimates vary. However, the MRTA
hacked out a nefarious history of terroristic activity which bred fear
and intimidation throughout the country. Journalist Hugh
O'Shaughnessy commented that "[t]he name of Tupac Amaru is
enough to send a chill of fear into any Latin American govern-
ment."3 Because of the. activities of guerrilla groups, the 1980's
were "a tortured decade for Latin America.,
36
The Tupac Amaru derived its name from an Indian revolution-
ary, Jose Gabriel Condorcanqui,37 who claimed Inca descent and
who nearly overturned Spanish colonial rule in Peru.38 He staged
his uprising in 1780 and was executed by the Spaniards a year
later.39 His nom de guerre, Tupac Amaru II, was adopted from
the last Inca ruler prior to the Spanish conquest.4°
One of the "longest-surviving guerrilla groups in Latin Ameri-
ca, '41 the Tupac Amaru is ideologically indebted to the brand of
Marxism popularized by Castro's Cuban revolution,42 and inspired
by the prominent Latin American revolutionary Ernesto (Che)
Guevara.43 The group is thought to have been formed by univer-
33. Raid Marks Rebels' Comeback, THE VANCOUVER SUN, Dec. 19, 1996, at
A12.
34. Isabel Vincent, Ending Democracy to Save Democracy, THE GLOBE &
MAIL (Toronto), Apr. 14, 1992, at A9. Clifford Krauss estimated that the number
of members may have been 3000 during the late 1980's. See Clifford Krauss, Peru
Troops Rescue Hostages, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 23, 1997, at A6 [hereinafter Krauss,
Peru Troops]. The Shining Path has been compared to Cambodia's Khmer Rouge
in terms of its propensity to brutality. Peru Rebels Raid Envoy's Home and Seize
Hundreds of Hostages, supra note 29.
35. O'Shaughnessy, supra note 14.
36. RICHARD CLUTrTERBUCK, TERRORISM AND GUERRILLA WARFARE:
FORECASTS AND REMEDIES 126 (1990).
37. Linda Diebel, Peru's Tupac Amaru Rebels, THE TORONTO STAR, Dec. 23,
1996, at A23 [hereinafter Diebel, Peru's Tupac Amaru].
38. O'Shaughnessy, supra note 14.
39. Thompson, supra note 32; and Roy Gutman, Rebels Stage Horrifying
Comeback, THE TORONTO STAR, Dec. 20, 1996, at A29.
40. Gutman, supra note 39. Tupac Amaru translates to Royal Serpent in
Quechua. Kevin Fedarko, Gala at Gunpoint, TIME, Dec. 30, 1996, at 67.
41. Clifford Krauss, Diplomats in Peru Shuttle to Talks to Free Hostages, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 20, 1996, at A6 [hereinafter Krauss, Diplomats].
42. Peru Rebels Raid Envoy's Home and Seize Hundreds of Hostages, supra
note 29.
43. James Brooke, The Rebels and the Cause: 12 Years of Peru's Turmoil, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 19, 1996, at Al [hereinafter Brooke, The Rebels and the Cause].
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sity radicals in 1983." Its recruits are drawn from the urban
middle class and comprised the youth groups of various Marxist
parties which joined ranks.45
Its main operational base is in the forested upper Huallaga
Valley of Eastern Peru. 6 According to terrorism expert Richard
Clutterbuck, Peru grows about half the planet's coca and in the
early 1990's the Upper Huallaga Valley was "probably the world's
biggest single source of cocaine."'47 This crop and the demand for
it in North American cities would ironically become the economic
wellspring of guerrilla activity in Latin America.
Taking up arms in 1984,4 the Tupac Amaru allegedly raised
funds from cocaine dealers in the region.49 The group has alleged-
ly also received financial assistance from Cuba and possibly
Nicaragua and Libya.50 It also built international ties with like-
minded groups, joining Battalion America, "an umbrella group that
included the M-19, one of Colombia's largest guerrilla groups.1
51
The Tupac Amaru also developed links with the Sandinistas of
Nicaragua and the FMLN of El Salvador.52
Beginning its violent criminal activities in 1984, the Tupac
Amaru shot at the U. S. Embassy, attacked a guard post at the
Lima Naval Hospital, seized a radio station and machine gunned
the home of the former Minister of the Economy.53 Tupac Amaru
operations also deliberately targeted American businesses in Peru,
such as the blowing up of two Kentucky Fried Chicken outlets and
the bombing of Texaco Corp.54 It also attacked Citibank and
44. Gutman, supra note 39; Diana Jean Schemo, A Born Revolutionary's Path
to a Living 'Tomb' in Peru, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 4, 1997, at Al [hereinafter Schemo,
A Born Revolutionary's Path].
45. Leftist Peruvian Terrorist Group Rooted in Revolution, THE EDMONTON
J., Dec. 19, 1996, at A4.
46. Calvin Sims, Guerrillas in Peru Threaten to Kill Hostages, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 19, 1996, at A6 [hereinafter Sims, Guerrillas in Peru].
47. Clutterbuck, supra note 36, at 90-91.
48. Peru Rebels Raid Envoy's Home and Seize Hundreds of Hostages, supra
note 29.
49. O'Shaughnessy, supra note 14.
50. Thompson, supra note 32, citing Extremist Groups, U. S. publication
produced by the Office of International Criminal Justice.
51. Alex Emery, Hostage Takers in Peru Seen as Vanishing Breed, THE
CHRISTIAN SC. MONITOR, Dec. 30, 1996, at 1 [hereinafter Emery, Vanishing
Breed]. In 1988, M-19 signed a peace treaty with the government and has since
become a major political party. Id.
52. Id.
53. Mark Hume, Rebel Group Rose From Ashes in Peru, VANCOUVER SUN,
Dec. 20, 1996, at A12.
54. Id.
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Kodak." According to Americas Watch, the Thpac Amaru also
dynamited a Pizza Hut, several Mormon churches and the U. S.
Peruvian institute.56 The Tupac Amaru's attacks on American
targets in Peru "imbued them with a mystique among some
Peruvians somewhere between Robin Hood and Rambo."57
Clearly, their activities were "propaganda oriented."5
Gordon McCormick, an expert on Peruvian guerrilla movements,
commented on the theatricality of their actions. With respect to
the chicken outlet he said: "'First they would invade the place,
scare off the patrons, shoot up the restaurant and then put a
grenade in a chicken bucket and blow up the Colonel Sanders
insignia. They took great joy in doing it, too."'5 9  They also
delighted in distributing stolen food among the poor,6 and termed
themselves "social liberators" of Peru's poor population.61 Their
search for publicity motivated the dramatic aura surrounding these
operations. Realistically, they were aware that their actions could
not lead to the overthrow of the establishment, although they may
have hoped to "act rather as the tiny prick of conscience to a
society that is sometimes prone to forget how the great bulk of the
population lives.,
62
Other Tupac Amaru activities include attacking Western
embassies, robbing banks and kidnapping businessmen.63 Tupac
Amaru rebels assassinated Peru's Defence Minister General
Enrique Lopez Albujar in January 1990.' Tupac Amaru "sullied
its Robin Hood image when it staged several high-profile kidnapp-
ings, such as mining executive David Ballon Vera, who was later
55. James Brooke, For Revolutionary Group, an All-Out Offensive Turns Into
Disastrous Defeat, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 23 1997, at Al [hereinafter Brooke,
Disastrous Defeat].
56. AMERICAS WATCH, INTO THE QUAGMIRE: HUMAN RIGHTS AND U.S.
POLICY IN PERU 30 (Sept. 1991).
57. Todd Lewan, Who Are Those Masked Rebels?, WINNIPEG FREE PRESS,
Jan. 6, 1997, at B3.
58. Federal Bureau of Investigation, Terrorism at Home and Abroad: the U.S.
Government View, in THE POLITICS OF TERRORISM 356 (Michael Stohl ed., 1988).
59. Gutman, supra note 39.
60. Emery, Vanishing Breed, supra note 51.
61. Lewan, supra note 57.
62. Richard Gott, Tupac Amaru Pricks the Conscience of a State Ignoring the
Cost of Its Actions, THE IRISH TIMES, Dec. 31, 1996, at 8.
63. Leftist Peruvian Terrorist Group Rooted in Revolution, supra note 45.
64. Tim Johnson, Once Thought Wiped Out, Tupac Amaru Proves to Be Alive
and Dangerous, THE OTTAWA CITIZEN, Dec. 19, 1996, at A6 [hereinafter Johnson,
Once Thought Wiped Out].
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found starved to death and scarred by torture."'65 Their activities
within Peru included the temporary take-over of towns and
communities, although "these occupations consisted of locking up
the local police in their barracks, convening community meetings
and finally organizing soccer games, parties and dances with the
residents."'  They were also inclined to invite television crews to
broadcast their victories across the nation.67
lipac Amaru made vigorous efforts to distinguish itself from
the Shining Path and the "two groups have often been at logger-
heads."'  In the colossal death toll provoked since the early
1980's by guerrilla violence and police reprisals, Amnesty Interna-
tional estimates that half of the over 35,000 deaths can be attribut-
ed to Shining Path. However, the Tupac Amaru has been connect-
ed to less than 300 deaths,69 fitting the observation that "terrorists
want a lot of people watching, not a lot of people dead."70 The
difference between the two groups is that "where the Tupac Amaru
took hostages for ransom or publicity, the Maoists of the Shining
Path simply shot their enemies. Where the Tupac Amaru invaded
the Lima offices of foreign news agencies to force transmission of
their manifestos, the Maoists killed journalists, either by stoning,
shooting or garroting.
7 1
However, prominent Peruvian author and former presidential
candidate Mario Vargas Llosa was more critical of the Thpac
Amaru, admitting that he may have been affected by a Tupac
Amaru commando's attempt to assassinate him and his family
during an election campaign. Vargas commented:
It is true that the Shining Path have killed many more people,
but this is not because the MRTA are more benign-they are
just not as numerous, and have a more limited capacity for
destruction. Even so, the MRTA's record, since it was founded
in 1983 to the present, is laden with innocent blood and corpses,
assaults, kidnappings for ransom, all sorts of extortions, and an
organic alliance with the drug traffickers of the Huallaga
65. Emery, Vanishing Breed, supra note 51.
66. Id.
67. DEBORAH POOLE AND GERARDO RENIQUE, PERU: TIME OF FEAR 184
(1992).
68. Thompson, supra note 32.
69. Gutman, supra note 39.
70. B.M. Jenkins, The Future Course of International Terrorism, in CONTEMPO-
RARY RESEARCH ON TERRORISM, 581, 583 (Paul Wilkinson & Alasdair M.
Stewart eds., 1987).
71. Brooke, The Rebels and the Cause, supra note 43.
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Valley-to whom, in return for substantial remuneration, they
have been supplying armed protection for many years.72
Vargas Llosa asked a pertinent question: "If these people are the
moderates of terror, what can the extremists be like?,
73
However, in his enlightening analysis of hostage taking, Clive
Aston argued the reverse, that "terrorists differ. By classifying all
of them together, we run the risk of creating a self-fulfilling fallacy.
It is as impossible for two terrorist groups, let alone two terrorists,
to be as precisely the same in motivation as it would be for any two
individuals. "
President Fujimori had pledged to destroy the various Peruvian
guerrilla groups and terminate the violence by the end of 1995, but
he was only partially successful.75 In the early 1990's, the govern-
ment managed to capture Abimael Guzman (alias Chairman
Gonzalo76), leader of Sendero Luminoso, and sentenced him to
life in prison.77
The Peruvian government had also captured Victor Polay
Campos,78 leader of Tupac Amaru, but he managed to escape in
1990,'9 with 48 guerrilla comrades who together dug a tunnel in
Lima's maximum security Canto Grande Prison ° and used it to
regain their freedom.
Victor Polay, now in his mid-forties, was re-captured by
Peruvian forces in 1992, and is presently serving a life sentence in
solitary confinement at a naval base just outside Lima." He is
72. Mario Vargas Llosa, When Governments Try to Fight Fire with Fire,
INDEP., Dec. 28, 1996, available in 1996 WL 15215614, at *15.
73. Id.
74. Clive C. Aston, Hostage-Taking: A Conceptual Overview, in CONTEMPO-
RARY TERROR: STUDIES IN SUB-STATE VIOLENCE, 75, 80 (David Carlton &
Carlos Schaerf eds., 1978).
75. LaFranchi, Peru Crisis, supra note 27.
76. O'Shaughnessy, supra note 14.
77. LaFranchi, Peru Crisis, supra note 27.
78. In his youth in Paris during the 1970's, Victor Polay's college roommate
at the Sorbonne University was Alan Garcia. Emery, Vanishing Breed, supra note
51. Later, Garcia chose the route of political service and became President of
Peru while Polay drifted into violent opposition to the established structures of
Peruvian society. Sims, Guerrillas in Peru, supra note 46.
79. O'Shaughnessy, supra note 14.
80. Johnson, Once Thought Wiped Out, supra note 64. Audaciously, the rebels
videotaped their escape. Leftist Peruvian Terrorist Group Rooted in Revolution,
supra note 45. That daring and dramatic escape in July 1990 occurred days before
Alberto Fujimori's inauguration as President of Peru. Brooke, The Rebels and the
Cause, supra note 43.
81. Calvin Sims, New Attention to Harsh Conditions in Peru's Prisons, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 31, 1996, at A3 [hereinafter Sims, New Attention].
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reported to be in very poor physical and mental health and passes
his days talking to himself. 2 Victor Polay has apparently lost 60
pounds in captivity and "has difficulty seeing as a result of spending
nearly all his time in a dim cell."' 3 His mother has called him a
"'human ghost."'" His wife Rosa and their three children live in
Europe.s" His lieutenant-in-arms, Peter Cardenas, is similarly in
prison. 6
Hundreds of Tupac Amaru guerrillas surrendered to author-
ities under President Fujimori's amnesty program during the early
1990's.8' Buoyed by his successes at capturing the guerrillas and
persuading them to give themselves up, President Fujimori told a
foreign journalist in 1993 that "[n]o one here in Peru any longer
doubts that the M.R.T.A. will be defeated this year.,
8 8
Following a 1995 police raid on a Tupac Amaru safehouse, it
was widely assumed that the movement had been quelled. Twelve
rebels were arrested at that time,89 and one of the group's leaders,
Miguel Rincon, surrendered.' Later, 13 more rebels were arrest-
ed.91 The charges against the guerrilla group were based on an
alleged plan to raid and capture the Congress building in Lima.92
By early 1996, Fujimori described Tupac Amaru as "practically
irrelevant.
9 3
Estimates placed the active armed membership of Tupac
Amaru at a few hundred when the Japanese residence was attacked
in December 1996.9' Although small in numbers, the Tupac
Amaru was able to mount its highly successful operation against
the Japanese Ambassador's residence because its guerrillas-many
between the ages of 16 and 20-had trained intensively for six
82. Id.
83. Laurie Goering, Torture Systematic in Peru's Jails, THE EDMONTON J., Jan.
2, 1997, at H6 [hereinafter Goering, Torture Systematic].
84. Id.
85. Schemo, A Born Revolutionary's Path, supra note 44.
86. Peru Rebels Raid Envoy's Home and Seize Hundreds of Hostages, supra
note 29.
87. Id.
88. Brooke, The Rebels and the Cause, supra note 43.
89. Raid Marks Rebels' Comeback, supra note 33.
90. Gutman, supra note 39.
91. Sims, Guerrillas in Peru, supra note 46.
92. Rebels Raid Japanese Ambassador's Residence in Peru, Hold Hundreds
Hostage, Facts on File, Dec. 19, 1996, at 930.
93. Johnson, Once Thought Wiped Out, supra note 64.
94. Peru Rebels Raid Envoy's Home and Seize Hundreds of Hostages, supra
note 29.
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months in the jungles of the Amazon.95 Peruvian anti-terrorist
police sources indicated that the operation was financed with a
$1,000,000 fund, gained from part of a larger ransom after the
kidnapping of a Bolivian businessman, Samuel Doria Medina, who
was held by the Tupac Amaru for 46 days.96 However, The New
York Times reported that the ransom for Medina, who was a
former Economy Minister, was only $200,000.9'
C Nestor Cerpa Cartolini
The leader of the 1996 operation to capture the residence of
the Japanese Ambassador in Lima was Nestor Cerpa Cartolini. A
textile union official during the 1970's, Cerpa98 came from a
working class family and enjoyed something of a mythic reputation
in Peru for his ability to evade capture by the police. 99 His initial
venture into active dissent began about two decades before the
attack on the Japanese residence. In 1977, Cerpa, then a young
union official, tried to prevent the closure °° of the bankrupt
Cromotex textile factory in Lima."' Cerpa and a number of
employees at the doomed plant were led by a revolutionary
guerrilla fighter named Huertas," who was Cerpa's mentor."03
Armed with sticks and stones, the unionists battled a well-armed
police force; six workers, including Huertas, and a police captain
died in that conflict.104 Cerpa was thrown in prison for almost a
95. Minister Cleans Bathroom as Hostages Share Chores, THE IRISH TIMES,
Dec. 25, 1996, at 7.
96. Ransom Cash Funded Rebel Raid: Police, THE TORONTO STAR, Dec. 26,
1996, at A29.
97. Clifford Krauss, Guerrillas in Peru Release One of Six Hostage Envoys,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 27, 1996, at A6 [hereinafter Krauss, Guerrillas Release One of
Six].
98. Rebel Leader Took Part in Past Standoff, THE GLOBE & MAIL (Toronto),
Apr. 23, 1997, at A12. Cerpa was born in August, 1953. Id.
99. Calvin Sims, Peru's Rebel Leader: An Able Talker and Terrorist, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 23, 1996, at Al [hereinafter Sims, Peru's Rebel Leader].
100. Guerrilla Leader Surprised Experts, THE IRISH TIMES, Dec. 24, 1996, at 9.
According to another account, the year of the Cromotex uprising was 1978. See
Rebel Leader Took Part in Past Standoff, supra note 98.
101. Linda Diebel, Rebel Captivates World, THE TORONTO STAR, Dec. 23,1996,
at A23 [hereinafter Diebel, Rebel Captivates World].
102. Guerrilla Leader Surprised Experts, supra note 100.
103. Id.
104. Id.
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year."' After his release, he reportedly became a guerrilla
fighter."°
His nom de guerre was Commandante Evaristo (also Comman-
dante Huerta ° ) and he used his alias to make his demands
known after capturing the hostages at the Japanese residence."c
He was 43 years old at the time of the attack and described himself
to one hostage as "an ordinary working man.
'1°9
The Peruvian police termed Cerpa a "vicious killer" who
became a rebel because of frustration with his post as a union
official.1 ° Although police considered him "poorly educated,"
the hostages in the Japanese mansion found him "intelligent and
well-informed.""' Additionally, they noted that he did not
appear villainous or mean.'12 He did not display unnecessary
aggression and maintained a courteous but firm demeanor with the
hostages.1 13  One could argue, with a degree of cynicism, that
because of his long participation in guerrilla warfare, Cerpa realized
that the "most effective operations have often been the least
violent."' 1 4 Ramiro Validivia, one of the hostages released early in
the ordeal, described Cerpa as "a very professional person.""
n5
One of the Canadian hostages, Kieran Metcalfe, an engineer,
commented that Cerpa was very intelligent, dedicated and
committed; in short, "'an impressive personality.""' 6  Metcalfe
also felt that social inequality was a major preoccupation of the
Tupac Amaru rebels."7
Cerpa, who helped to found the Tupac Amaru and had
previously served as its Military Commander, became leader of the
group after Victor Polay was imprisoned by the government in
1992.118 The authorities regarded him as the prime organizer of
the numerous kidnappings of Peruvian and Western businessmen
105. Id.
106. Sims, Peru's Rebel Leader, supra note 99.
107. Diebel, Rebel Captivates World, supra note 101.
108. Calvin Sims, Rebel Leader Relies on Vanishing Act, THE GLOBE & MAIL
(Toronto), Dec. 23, 1996, at A12 [hereinafter Sims, Vanishing Act].
109. Diebel, Rebel Captivates World, supra note 101.
110. Sims, Peru's Rebel Leader, supra note 99.
111. Id.
112. Sims, Vanishing Act, supra note 108.
113. Id.
114. J. BOWYER BELL, TRANSNATIONAL TERROR 55 (1975).
115. Rebel Leader Took Part in Past Standoff, supra note 98.
116. Linda Diebel, Canadians Tell of Hostage Hell, THE TORONTO STAR, Dec.
24, 1996, at A25 [hereinafter Diebel, Hostage Hell].
117. Id.
118. Sims, Vanishing Act, supra note 108.
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undertaken by the MRTA and held him responsible for the 1990
tunnel escape of the Tupac Amaru rebels, including leader Victor
Polay. 9 Accordingly, Cerpa was the most wanted man in Peru
long before he organized the attack on the Japanese party in
December 1996.1"
Nestor Cerpa also had a personal reason for undertaking this
deadly operation. His wife, Nancy Gilvonio, has been imprisoned
in one of Peru's most infamous jails, Yanomayo Prison, since
1995.12' At the time of the hostage-taking incident, she was
reported to be incarcerated in a "small cell, her lips blue with cold,
her fingers bleeding."" 2 Gilvonio and Cerpa reportedly have two
children."z In an interview given to two Spanish newspapers, El
Pais and La Vanguardia, Cerpa admitted that he had been motivat-
ed to seize the Japanese residence after his wife was sentenced to
life in prison, saying, "'I cannot deny that it was a great impulse,
because I love her and I am aware that our children need their
mother."' 24  His two children are reported to be living in hid-
ing"z with Cerpa's mother in France.1"
The successful attack on the Japanese residence was obviously
the result of excellent intelligence about the party, extensive
military training for the guerrillas and ample funding which enabled
each rebel to be equipped with arms sufficient to hold off a much
larger police force and ensure the compliance of the enormous
number of hostages. All this was apparently accomplished by a
rebel group that supposedly had breathed its last. Terrorism expert
Brian Jenkins commented that "[it is] always perilous writing
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Diebel, Summit Tackles Nightmare, supra note 4.
122. Linda Diebel, Japanese Tighten Screws on Peru's President, THE TORONTO
STAR, Feb. 2, 1997, at A14 [hereinafter Deibel, Japanese Tighten Screws].
123. Diebel, Summit Tackles Nightmare, supra note 4.
124. Peter Bate, Fujimori Forced to Retreat From Earlier Optimism Over Siege,
THE IRISH TIMES, Feb. 3, 1997, at 11.
125. Sims, Peru's Rebel Leader; supra note 99.
126. Slain Rebel Leader 'More Political Than Military,' THE TORONTO STAR,
Apr. 23, 1997, at A16. In a very revealing letter to his son, written on April 13,
1997, shortly before his death, Cerpa wrote: "'you need her [Nancy Gilvonio-his
wife] by your side and there is no other way of getting her out of jail.'" Slain
Rebel Leader Wrote to Son Before Dying, THE TORONTO STAR, Apr. 30, 1997, at
A21. He continued, "'[a]nd if I ever leave this Japanese residence, it will be
because I achieved what you are waiting for and dreaming of: having your mommy
outside prison, being able again to see her, touch her, play with her and be
surrounded by her arms.'" Id.
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epitaphs for terrorist organizations."127  Despite tough govern-
mental measures to curb the impact of both Sendero Luminoso and
Tipac Amaru, the groups have not been eliminated. Peruvian
sociologist and terrorism expert Raul Gonzalez commented that
Tupac Amaru "'is proving that, despite government intelligence
and tough action in the past against them, they are still able to
mount a very well-planned and well-executed operation. '
D. Peruvian Prisons
This particular act of terrorism evoked and aroused a measure
of understanding, if not sympathy, in the international media
largely because it was partially motivated by an issue dear to the
hearts of human rights activists worldwide. The treatment accorded
to political prisoners is so severe and harsh in a number of
countries that this issue has provoked complaints from human
rights groups globally. Prison conditions are very much a human
rights concern today and hence this article must consider the
linkage between the instant hostage-taking situation and the 'cause'
which was said to be the main reason for the terrorist attack on the
Japanese Ambassador's mansion.
In a strongly-worded editorial, The New York Times comment-
ed that "[wialking through a prison in Peru is like stepping into a
Hieronymus Bosch triptych of hell," and explained that conditions
are particularly harsh for those accused of political crimes.129 The
Editorial deplored the methods used by the guerrillas in the
hostage taking incident but agreed that "their diagnosis of prison
life in Peru is on the mark."1"
Spittle rains down from the third-floor cells. Prisoners stick
their arms and legs through the bars and beg by lowering bowls
on strings. Inside the cells, the floors are covered with slime
and filth. Men are crammed into the cells, sitting on the floor
or on concrete bunk beds with no mattresses.
131
Peruvian prison conditions have provoked complaints by
international human rights activists for a number of years. There
127. Raid Marks Rebels' Comeback, supra note 33.
128. LaFranchi, Peru Crisis, supra note 27.
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are 22,210 inmates in Peruvian prisons.132 Of these, approxim-
ately 4000 to 5000 were convicted or accused of terrorism.'33
Anne Manuel, Deputy Director of Human Rights Watch/Americas,
commented that "'[t]here is a unique punitive regimen for people
accused of terrorism and treason, a charge which is very loosely
defined in Peru."' 1  Many of the prisoners languish in jail
awaiting trial.135
In a 1996 report on human rights conditions in Peru, the U.S.
Department of State concluded that prisoners convicted of
terrorism are exposed to "'particularly inhuman treatment,"'
including "'torture and brutal treatment of detainees." '9 36  Al-
though prisons are generally deplorable, conditions for alleged
terrorists tend to be far worse than for regular criminals.13 7 There
are special jails for terrorists "where food is scarce and often
inedible and clothing and blankets are not provided. Prisoners are
given only a gallon of water a day to drink, wash and flush." 3
Inmates are provided one meal per day mainly of rice or potatoes
with a stew occasionally "flavored with chunks of rat meat, accord-
ing to former prisoners.""' A bit of bread is provided twice a
day."4  Former prisoner, Magno Sosa, a journalist, vividly and
gruesomely described his six month jail term in Peru and admitted
to still becoming queasy as he remembered "the rodent's head,
'whiskers and all,' and the tiny feet with claws mixed with the foul-
smelling jailhouse slop" which guards made him eat."' Condi-
tions in Peruvians prisons are so appalling that "prisoners are said
to be trapping rats to feed themselves." 42
Following the MRTA attack on the Japanese residence in
December 1996, Peruvian authorities inflicted further reprisals
against Thpac Amaru prisoners. Family visits were restricted and
the amount of food contribution families could provide for inmates
132. Sims, New Attention, supra note 81.
133. Id.
134. David Aquila Lawrence, In Latin America, Revolting Jail Life, THE
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Apr. 14, 1997, at 6.
135. Sims, New Attention, supra note 81.
136. Ex-Prisoner in Peru Tells of Being Forced to Eat Rat For Dinner, THE
VANCOUVER SUN, Mar. 3, 1997, at A7.
137. Sims, New Attention, supra note 81.
138. Id.
139. Goering, Torture Systematic, supra note 83.
140. Id.
141. Ex-Prisoner in Peru Tells of Being Forced to Eat Rat For Dinner, supra
note 136.
142. Kevin Fedarko, Gala at Gunpoint, TIME, Dec. 30, 1996, at 66.
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was halved."4 3 Calvin Sims of The New York Times examined the
plight of imprisoned rebels:
Conditions at Peru's terrorism prisons are notoriously harsh.
Inmates live in cold, damp, concrete cells that have no running
water or toilets except for a hole in the floor. Former prisoners
have said that guards mistreated them and that they did not
receive adequate nutrition, exercise or medical attention.'"
The leaders of Peru's two terrorist groups are housed in
isolation in a naval prison in Callao.45 Their cells are 2 meters
wide, with a 15 centimeter skylight for illumination."4  Cerpa's
wife, Nancy Gilvonio, is reported to be detained in Yanamayo
Prison where the cells are unheated, windows have no glass and
temperatures fall below freezing. 47
Prisoners serving terms for terrorism are not allowed visitors
for the first year of their incarceration. 8 Thereafter, they can
see relatives for half an hour each month.149 Imprisoned mothers
are only allowed to see their children through a glass partition once
every three months.5° Female prisoners who give birth have
their babies removed to state orphanages. 5 Exercise breaks last
for only thirty minutes per day.52 Medical treatment for the out-
breaks of AIDS, tuberculosis and cancer are inadequate. 53 The
prisoners are not allowed any newspapers, radios, television or even
writing materials." 4
Although the government has been inclined toward improve-
ment of conditions, "[a]fter many years of harsh conditions inside
terrorist prisons, many inmates try to commit suicide by repeatedly
throwing themselves against iron bars and concrete floors. These
inmates are typically kept heavily sedated."
'"55
143. Knox, Crisis, supra note 18.
144. Calvin Sims, Growing Optimism For Peaceful End to Crisis in Peru, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 30, 1996, at Al [hereinafter Sims, Growing Optimism].
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There are allegations of torture. Susanna Villaran, Executive
Secretary of Peru's National Co-ordinators of Human Rights, has
condemned prison conditions as "'very inhumane,"' and alleges that
"'[t]orture is very systematic but covered up. "'156 Peruvian
journalist Magno Sosa, a former prisoner, recounted "beatings by
club-swinging guards who walked on the backs of naked prisoners
lying face-down on cold concrete." '157  Peruvian Opposition
Congressman Jose Barba Caballero commented during a legislative
debate: "Unfortunately, we live in a country where evidence is
often extracted by means of torture."' s
It is interesting to note that not all prisoners involved in
terrorism suffer so painfully. The Christian Science Monitor
reported that "[P]olitically connected terrorists are spared Peru's
hard-line. In 1994, a death squad connected to the military was
convicted of murdering nine university students. They went to a
comfortable jail for a short sentence." 5 9
The Fujimori government was apparently compelled by a spate
of internal and international condemnation of its human rights
violations to free 110 prisoners in October 1996.16 Eighty more
prisoners were to be released in December 1996, a process which
came to an abrupt halt with the Tupac Amaru attack on the
military installations for terrorism had been raped in recent years." Id. The report
detailed one tragic case of a fifteen year old girl who had unknowingly married a
Tupac Amaru rebel. Id. A member of the Security Forces which captured and
incarcerated her, raped her and infected her with AIDS. Id. Although she was
eventually released, she received no medical treatment and her rapist was not
punished. Id.
156. Goering, Torture Systematic, supra note 83. Journalist Paul Knox of THE
GLOBE & MAIL vividly recounted the experience of one man caught in the
Peruvian system of justice. See Knox, Crisis, supra note 18. Eugenio Bazan
Ventura, a community leader in the village of Araqueda in Catamarca department
had worked at a gold and silver mine before turning to farming and construction
work. Id. In his spare time he coached a soccer team and assisted the villagers
in obtaining a generator for electricity. Id. Peruvian police, searching for
terrorists who had planted land mines, descended on the village and found some
wire from the electrification project at Bazan's home. Id. Bazan was arrested,
allegedly tortured and made a confession which he retracted when he was
presented before a judge. Id. A year and a half after his arrest, he was sentenced
by a 'faceless' judge to 30 years in prison. Id He spent four years in jail, despite
petitions from neighbors testifying to his innocence. Id. He was eventually
pardoned but his criminal record remained. Id
157. Ex-Prisoner in Peru Tells of Being Forced to Eat Rat For Dinner, supra
note 136.
158. Knox, Crisis, supra note 18.
159. Lawrence, supra note 134.
160. Goering, Torture Systematic, supra note 83.
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Japanese mansion."' Peruvian human rights activists complained
that the hostage-taking at the Japanese Ambassador's residence in
Lima had made it more difficult for them to pressure the govern-
ment about its human rights violations.162 Journalist Paul Knox
explained the situation:
Under pressure from human-rights defenders inside and
outside Peru, Mr. Fujimori last year acknowledged that some of
the 4,000 people jailed in the anti-terrorism fight were innocent.
A commission composed of justice minister Carlos
Hermoza Moya, ombudsman Jorge Santistevan and Hubert
Lanssiers, a priest and long-time human-rights activist, was
struck to investigate and propose action.
Of more than 1,800 claims received so far, 110 people have
been freed by Mr. Fujimori on the commission's recommenda-
tion.163
However, after the December 17, 1996, MRTA attack on the
Japanese residence, the commissioners held off "for fear that hard-
liners in the military would draw a link between the freeing of
innocents and the MRTA's demand for the release of its own
prisoners. ' ' "6
E. Alberto Fujimori, The President of Peru
Calvin Sims of The New York Times commented that "[p]ower
in Mr. Fujimori's government is said to be concentrated in three
factions: the President, the intelligence service, and the mili-
tary."1" President Fujimori, Mr. Vladimiro Montesinos (chief of
security) and General Nicolas Hermoza Rios (head of the armed
forces) constitute "Peru's governing 'triumvirate."'''  Together
they have had a profound impact on Peru's political system, its
economy and its social structures.
On the surface, the leader of the triumvirate is clearly the
President, whose commanding personality has generated both
praise and criticism among Peruvians. Alberto Fujimori's parents
161. Id.
162. Knox, Crisis, supra note 18.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Calvin Sims, As Peru Talks Begin, Fujimori Casts Some Blame, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 25, 1997, at A8 [hereinafter Sims, Peru Talks Begin].
166. Sally Bowen, Uphill Task For Peru's Instant Hero, FIN. TIMES, Apr. 24,
1997, at 10 [hereinafter Bowen, Uphill Task].
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worked as farm laborers in Japan before migrating to Peru in
1934.167 Although he is of Japanese descent, Alberto Fujimori is
inappropriately nicknamed El Chino (or El Chinito 16 ) by Peruvi-
ans but he is said to love the misnomer. 69 He reportedly likes to
refer to himself as Peru's 'President-Manager,'17 ° although his
detractors refer to him as "Emperor."17' A mathematician and
agronomist by education, Fujimori served as a rector at an agrarian
university before entering politics.7 a He also hosted a television
program for two years which dealt with Peru's social and economic
problems.
173
In 1990, he entered politics with the catchy slogan, "honesty,
technology and work."174 In a race for the presidency, he defeat-
ed Peru's well-known author Mario Vargas Llosa who was backed
by Peruvian conservatives 175 and whose expensive 176 campaign
was expected to succeed. 177
In 1990, when he assumed power, Fujimori lacked the support
of a well-organized efficient political party and a parliamentary
majority and therefore turned to the military.17 This induced
Diego Garcia Sayan, Executive Secretary of the Andean Commis-
sion of Jurists (a human rights group) to comment that the
"'government has gone for military control over society when
what's needed is civilian control over the military.""' 179  The
influence of the military increased dramatically under Fujimori's
167. Sebastian Rotella, President Fujimori Reconquers Peru, THE TORONTO
STAR, Apr. 24, 1997, at A23 [hereinafter Rotella, Fujimori Reconquers].
168. Isabel Vincent, Seeking Democracy Where None Exists, THE GLOBE &
MAIL (Toronto), Apr. 13, 1992, at A7.
169. Gabriella Gamini, Hard Man of Lima Rejects Japanese Calls For Compro-
mise With Guerrillas, THE TIMES (London), Dec. 21, 1996, at 12 [hereinafter
Gamini, Hard Man].
170. David Adams, President Salvages Iron-Man Image in Dramatic Flourish,
THE TIMES (London), Apr. 24, 1997, at 17.
171. Vincent, supra note 168.
172. Fujimori Remains Enigmatic as Ever, THE IRISH TIMES, Dec. 24, 1996, at
9; and Calvin Sims, Fujimori Again Proving Himself to Be Man of Iron Will, THE
GLOBE & MAIL (Toronto), Dec. 27, 1996, at A8 [hereinafter Sims, Iron Will].
173. Michael Reid, Peru's Vote Seen as Victory For the Center, THE CHRISTIAN
SCI. MONITOR, Apr. 11, 1990, at 4.
174. Fujimori Remains Enigmatic as Ever, supra note 172. The slogan has also
been cited as "Work, Technology, Honor." Reid, supra note 173.
175. Gott, supra note 62.
176. Sims, Iron Will, supra note 172.
177. Fujimori Remains Enigmatic as Ever, supra note 172.
178. Michael Reid, Fujimori's Austerity Plan Shakes Peru's 'Populace, THE
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Aug. 12, 1990, at 5.
179. Id.
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regime. By the middle of 1991, 56 percent of the population and
42 percent of Peru's territory fell under emergency rule, which
implied military control.'80 "In short, the situation under Fuji-
mori was one of de facto military control, not just of the emergency
zones, but of the areas of government that the military perceived
to be its domain."'8 1
While insisting that he is "100 percent Peruvian," Fujimori
stressed his ability to encourage Japan to provide economic aid and
investments to Peru.1" His Japanese ancestry was emphasized as
the unique asset which would assist Peru in resolving its financial
woes. Richard Gott has analyzed Fujimori's early success:
When he came unexpectedly to power, Mr. Fujimori was a
political orphan. He had no internal powerbase outside the
ramshackle coalition that had elected him to keep out Mr.
Vargas Llosa. He had no foreign friends. After years of
guerrilla violence and government corruption, Peru was
regarded by the international community as a basket case. So
Mr. Fujimori turned to the Japanese for help ....
Japan became Mr. Fujimori's great trump card, providing
him with the investment the country desperately needed, a
channel of easy communication, and a way of dealing with
bilateral. relations quite unlike that of the United States-
Peru's previous foreign godfather. Peru was not in Japan's
backyard, and the Japanese had no sense of racial condescen-
sion."83
The President vigorously cultivated a tough image, and
reinforced it in December 1996, when he showed no weakness
facing the most serious crisis of his political career. His governing
motto might well be his oft-repeated statement: "first you act, then
you inform."" Although there have been notable successes in
Peru since his take-over, his governing style has aroused some
apprehension. Professor David Scott Palmer commented on
"Fujimori's personalized approach to decision making and the
democratic process.' ' "5
180. Bill Fairbairn, 'One of the Worst Rights Violators in the World,' THE
GLOBE & MAIL (Toronto), Apr. 16, 1992, at A19.
181. PERU: A COUNTRY STUDY, supra note 6, at 232.
182. Cameron W. Barr, Peru Hostage Crisis Pits Japan Against West's Steadfast-
ness, THE CHRISTIAN SC. MONITOR, Jan. 31, 1997, at 1.
183. Gott, supra note 62.
184. Fujimori Remains Enigmatic as Ever, supra note 172.
185. David Scott Palmer, 'Fujipopulism' and Peru's Progress, CURRENT
HISTORY, Feb. 1996, at 75.
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In April 1992, Fujimori suddenly staged an 'autogolpe' or 'self-
coup' during which he dissolved Congress, revamped the judiciary
and installed a "national rebuilding government."' 86 Insisting that
he needed special powers to deal with drug traffickers and terrorist
groups, on April 5, 1992, Fujimori suspended the 1980 constitu-
tion,"8 imposed censorship and arrested members of the Peruvian
opposition." He dissolved the Court of Constitutional Guaran-
tees."8 The judicial system fell under his control and a "constitu-
tional court" ensured that his laws could not be vetoed."l He
"began to rule by decree."' 9' Those accused of terrorism were
deprived of the right to habeas corpus until after their trials."9
A 1992 Apoyo Opinion y Mercado poll conducted in Lima showed
a support of 71 percent for Fujimori's coup and 89 percent of
Peruvians were in agreement with his judicial and constitutional
changes.193 A new constitution, approved by Peruvians in a
referendum, was promulgated on December 29, 1993.1" This
document centralized power within the Executive branch of
government. 19  The Executive continues to be the primary
element of Peruvian government.
In the subsequent 1995 presidential elections, 64 percent of
Peruvians supported Fujimori.' 6 Following a vigorous program
of deficit reduction, economic deregulation and privatization, the
186. Fujimori Remains Enigmatic as Ever, supra note 172. The military
leadership of Peru supported the self-coup and has been steadfastly loyal to the
President. Calvin Sims, Peruvian and Japanese Leaders to Meet to Discuss Hostage
Crisis, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30, 1997, at All [hereinafter Sims, Leaders to Meet].
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developed countries renewed their aid to Peru and foreign invest-
ment returned.' 97
Despite a dramatic reduction in guerrilla violence, the authori-
tarian legislation remained in place and human rights violations by
agents of the state continued to mar President Fujimori's image of
success. Carlos Basombrio, Director of Peru's Legal Defense
Institute (a human rights group), commented: "'The legacy of Mr.
Fujimori's coup [1992] is that the Peruvian Army now has more
autonomy than any military in Latin America, the judiciary is less
independent and has more Draconian laws on the books, and there
is no real political party system to speak of "'19  Basombrio
grimly concluded: "'Democracy before the coup was very weak in
Peru ... but [now] I am convinced it's even weaker."' 199
Americas Watch alleged that "[a]mong the victims of unfair
terrorism and treason prosecutions have been journalists, human
rights monitors, environmentalists, academics, peasant organizers,
doctors, lawyers, and political opponents of the government, as well
as individuals who have had minimal contact with guerrillas, or who
provided some small collaboration under threat."'  At the time
of the guerrilla attack on the Japanese Ambassador's residence,
about one-third of Peru was under emergency rule.2°"
The Peruvian President's measures against terrorism were met
with mixed reviews, as the international press was quick to expose
the extraordinary actions taken by Fujimori. When confronting
guerrilla opponents, Fujimori's inclination is to crack down rather
than conciliate.2 °2 He passed a law on June 16, 199 5 ,2 03 which
virtually granted amnesty to members of the police and armed
forces (as well as civilians o) who committed atrocities "during
antisubversion operations."' 5  The amnesty which extended to
personnel under investigation or imprisoned for human rights
violations "emboldened the military and released members of the
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armed forces who participated in the country's most notorious
death squad."'  Normal legal guarantees were suspended, and
within the justice system anonymous, faceless judges "observe
defendants through one-way mirrors and speak through voice-
distorting microphones. ' '2' An Editorial in The Globe and Mail
outlined the conflicting reactions:
Mr. Fujimori's unyielding approach to terrorism is one of the
reasons that Peru was able to attract foreign investment in the
first place. After becoming President, he put a single general
in charge of antiterrorism, built up the intelligence service and
set up special 'faceless courts' to try suspected terrorists, thus
protecting judges from intimidation. The campaign was some-
times brutal and often arbitrary; more than a few innocents
were swept up in the antiterrorist dragnet.
But the results were impressive. °s
According to David Scott Palmer, political violence in 1994
was only about 20 percent of 1990 levels.' The faceless military
courts had a conviction rate for alleged terrorists of 97 percent.
210
However, referring to Peru's anti-terrorist legislation, Bill Fairbairn,
South America Coordinator for the Inter-Church Committee on
Human Rights in Latin America, commented that "'[e]very interna-
tional human rights organization has criticized Peru for this
sweeping legislation."'211
The harshness of Fujimori's anti-terrorist measures were
somewhat mitigated by a government amnesty promised exclusively
to guerrillas who laid down their arms and assisted in the capture
of their comrades. 212 This combined carrot and stick approach
certainly succeeded in diminishing the extent of terroristic violence
in Peru. The repentance laws were in effect between 1992 and
1994 and resulted in the surrender of 5516 Senderistas and 814
Tupac Amaristas to the government.
23
Fujimori's various anti-democratic measures were denounced
by his political opponent, defeated presidential candidate Mario
Vargas Llosa, who bluntly commented, "The fact is that when the
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state adopts terrorist methods to combat terrorism, the terrorists
are already the winners, for they have managed to impose the logic
of their game, and have deeply wounded the institutions of
democracy." '214
One of President Fujimori's closest confidantes and most
controversial advisors is Ivan Vladimiro Montesinos, who has
allegedly played a crucial role in the destruction of guerrilla groups
in Peru.215 Mr. Montesinos administers Peru's intelligence servic-
es and "President Fujimori admits that he rarely makes major
decisions without him." '216 Calvin Sims of the New York Times
reported that, "Mr. Montesinos is said to have performed an
important service during Mr. Fujimori's 1990 campaign by resolving
tax-evasion charges that could have blocked Mr. Fujimori's
election., 217  According to Clifford Krauss of the New York
Times, Montesinos is a "cashiered army captain," and "former
lawyer of drug barons.,
21 1
President Fujimori was quoted as stating that he would put
his hand through the fire for his security chief and is reported to be
guided in his hard-line approach by Montesinos. 29 Although it
was thought that Montesinos was in trouble following the Tupac
Amaru attack on the Japanese residence in December 1996, it was
soon obvious that his political star had not waned.2' Indeed,
reports suggested that Montesinos had masterminded the successful
military attack in April 1997 which liberated the hostages.22 As
if to emphasize his contribution, he made a rare public appearance
at the Japanese compound after the attack.' = Enrique Obando,
a Peruvian expert on military matters, dubbed Montesinos "the
man of the hour."'
The military wing of government is controlled by General
Nicolas Hermoza, who enjoys "widespread support of the armed
214. Llosa, supra note 72.
215. Signs of Movement Seen in Hostage Crisis, THE GLOBE & MAIL (Toronto),
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forces," and who has served as Army Commander since 1991.224
News reports during the hostage crisis indicated that Mr. Fujimori
wanted to replace General Hermoza but could not do so because
of the Commander's popularity with the military.2 s Opposition
Congresswoman Lourdes Flores Nano of the Popular Christian
Party commented wryly that "Fujimori and the military were
partners in the coup d'etat-they made a pact to govern together
and keep each other happy."2'
F The Japanese Target
Since Fujimori's election in 1990, the large Japanese immigrant
and expatriate community in Peru has been singled out for terrorist
attacks. During the 1990's both the Thpac Amaru and the more
violent Shining Path kidnapped and killed Japanese businessmen
and aid technicians and targeted the Japanese embassy with a car
bomb.2' Writing two years before the Tupac Amaru attack on
the Japanese Ambassador's residence, Richard Clutterbuck
commented that "Japanese business people overseas are ... a
popular target as 'international capitalists' for revolutionary
movements in Latin America, especially in Peru."2
The strong Japanese economic presence in Peru generated
considerable hostility among Peruvian rebel groups and it is
entirely possible that this was one reason for the selection by the
Tupac Amaru of a Japanese diplomatic target for the 1996 raid.
Cerpa and his band were quick to highlight their opposition to
Japanese involvement in Peru and even made use of the hostages
to publicize this message.229 One of the hostages released soon
after the attack brought out a message from the rebels.' This
statement complained about the "constant meddling of the
Japanese government in Peru." 1  When asked by one of the
guests at the party why the Japanese residence was targeted, rebel
leader Nestor Cerpa Cartolini commented that this was an
"'extreme measure in protest at the constant interference of the
224. Sims, Peru Talks Begin, supra note 165.
225. Id.
226. Sims, Fujimori's Peru, supra note 198.
227. Many Peruvians Feel Threatened, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 2, 1997, at A6.
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Japanese government, which has supported neo-liberal economic
policies and violations of human rights."' 2  Such rhetorical
flourishes aside, the selection of a Japanese target occurred for a
variety of reasons. The guerrillas had singled out the Ambassador's
residence, "because Japan has been a staunch ally of Mr. Fujimori,
whose family is part of a large Japanese immigrant community
here." 3 Further, Japan has exhibited a keen interest in furthering
the political ambitions of President Fujimori. As journalist Paul
Knox commented, "Alberto Fujimori is the only head of govern-
ment of Japanese ancestry ever elected outside Japan."'
President Fujimori had also been a frequent visitor to
Japan, 5 and had met Japanese Prime Minister Hashimoto on
various occasions. The latter's official visit to Peru in August 1996
netted the Fujimori government nearly $600 million in loans from
Japan. 36  Besides being Peru's second largest trading partner,
Japan donates considerable foreign aid to Peru, partly because that
nation has a large minority of Japanese descent.37 Ironically, this
generous foreign aid has provoked some hostility largely because
of a perception that its benefits do not even reach the ordinary
Peruvian citizen, much less the poorest and neediest of the slum-
dwellers of Lima and the surrounding countryside.
Another factor of significance in the selection of the Japanese
target was the Tupac Amaru's probable realization that Japan has
a history of making deals with terrorists. In 1977, after a civilian
airplane was hijacked, Japan released six leftist prisoners and paid
a $6 million ransom in exchange for the passengers. 8 Columnist
and political analyst Gwynne Dyer bluntly stated that "Japan is
chicken," and continued to state that, "the country that nurtured
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kamikazes 50 years ago has become the most timid of all the major
powers, preferring always to buy its way out of trouble rather than
fight its way out." 9 The selection of a 'soft target' like Japan
may have appealed to the guerrillas, but they overlooked the
obvious fact that their actual target in the instant hostage-taking
was not so much Japan as the Peruvian government under
Fujimori, and it would be inappropriate to accuse Fujimori of being
soft on terrorism.
The Tupac Amaru therefore had a multiplicity of reasons to
select the Japanese Ambassador's mansion during that special
birthday gala celebration. "It wasn't just the list of important
diplomats who were present, it was the Japanese connection that
made the party irresistible.",
240
G. Previous Warnings
An eyewitness to the hostage-taking incident, journalist Sally
Bowen commented that "Peruvian forces seemed ill-prepared for
the attack."241 This lack of readiness for the assault was inexplic-
able in view of the numerous warnings to Peruvian authorities from
a variety of sources concerning the imminence of a guerrilla opera-
tion.242  These warnings came from captured documents which
included plans for such a raid and word from informants in contact
with guerrillas.243 John Caro, former head of Peru's anti-terror-
ism police, blamed the success of the raid on authorities who could
have acted in time to prevent its occurrence, commenting: "The
government's intelligence-gathering has failed because this could
have been prevented.
',21
III. The Attack on the Embassy
A. The Party
Japanese ambassadors outdo themselves in celebration of their
Emperor's birthday each year. Ambassador Morihisa Aoki,
stationed in Lima, was no exception. As journalist Kevin Fedarko
239. Gwynne Dyer, Peruvian Guerrillas' Desperate Gamble Will End in Failure,
THE TORONTO STAR, Dec. 22, 1996, at B3.
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commented: "In recent years, Aoki's receptions have enjoyed an
enviable acclaim, thanks to the munificence of his banquet table
and glitter of his guest lists."'245
One could imagine the luxurious surroundings, the hospitable
ambience and the warm reception which greeted guests as they
assembled shortly after 7:00 p.m.2' on December 17, 1996, at the
home of Ambassador Aoki in the upscale San Isidro district 247 of
Lima, Peru. A number of foreign embassies are located in this part
of Lima.2' Estimates on the number attending ranged as high as
600 guests of the 1200 invited,249 although the Japanese Ambassa-
dor was reported to have said that there were actually 800
invitees.' Reportedly, "[a]t least 25 nations and prominent
political figures [were] represented."' 1 Sebastian Rotella of the
Los Angeles Times indicated that the hostages represented a
veritable "Who's Who of Lima's Latin American, Asian and
European diplomats. ' ,1 2 A special tent was erected in the gardens
to house the overflow of guests 5 3 Canadian Ambassador Antho-
ny Vincent commented about both the guests and their captors, the
guerrilla gate-crashers: "'You could not conceive a richer, a more
important catch of people than they managed.
'2 4
Among the throng of guests enjoying the food and champagne
was John Illman, the British Ambassador, who was fortunate
enough to leave shortly before the terrorists seized the build-
ing.55  His colleague, Deputy Head of Mission Roger Church,
was not that lucky and was taken hostage.56 He was eventually
released.57  Ambassador Dennis Jett of the United States of
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America and his Deputy Chief of Mission were at the function but
left just half an hour before the attack.25' Also at the party and
taken hostage were Anthony Vincent, Canadian Ambassador to
Peru, and Herbert Woeckel, Ambassador for Germany. 9 These
two diplomats were later released to play a significant role in the
attempts to resolve the incident peacefully. Ambassadors of Brazil,
Bolivia, Cuba, South Korea, Austria, Venezuela and various other
nations were also in attendance, as were about six officers from the
Embassy of the United States of America.26
Japan's close commercial and financial aid ties to Peru guaran-
teed that a large number of Peruvian dignitaries would attend this
function. "Among the hostages were so many of Peru's senior
diplomatic staff that the foreign ministry was left without top
officials., 261  Peruvian Foreign Minister Francisco Tudela, Peru's
Anti-terrorist Police Chief General Maximo Rivera, and State
Security Director Guillermo Bobbio were among the guests at the
Japanese residence.2 62  Additionally, the Peruvian Minister of
Agriculture,26  several Peruvian legislators, justices and the
President of the Peruvian Supreme Court were present.
a64
President Fujimori was expected at the function but did not attend
because he was delayed returning from a trip. 65 The President's
family was represented by his mother, Matsue Inomoto,2 6 his
sister Juana26' and his brother Pedro.26s President Fujimori's
mother and sister were released on the first day with all the other
women69 but his brother's ordeal as a hostage continued until the
liberation assault 126 days later. According to a Peruvian govern-
ment source, the rebels did not realize that they held the Presi-
dent's brother until ten days into the crisis when his name surfaced
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in the local media as one of the captives. 270 President Fujimori
insisted the fact that his own brother was a hostage was immaterial
to his handling of the crisis: "'Even if my brother is there, and my
brother-in-law also is hostage,"' he declared, "'that doesn't change
.. the approach.'
' 271
It was inevitable that so important an occasion in Japan's
calendar would draw numerous Japanese residents of Peru. A
large number of the celebrants were Japanese businessmen
stationed in Peru by their corporations.272 As Nicholas D. Kristof
of the New York Times reported, "Peru has become one of the
biggest recipients of Japanese foreign aid in Latin America, and 24
Japanese businesses have set up operations in the country. Many
of their Lima-based executives are now hostages as well."'273 The
group of Japanese guests taken hostage included the three chief
executives of Mitsubishi Peru as well as six employees of Mitsui
Mining and Smelting Co. 274 Also present were executives from
Ajinomoto Co., Toyota Motor Corporation, Nissan Motor Corpora-
tion and Matsushita Electric Co.
2 75
B. The Attack on the Ambassador's Residence
Attacks against foreign embassies were all too common a
terrorist activity during the 1970'S,276 but as diplomats became
more expert in security and embassies became more fortified, these
attacks diminished. Hence, the Tupac Amaru attack came as quite
a shock to the world community and particularly to the Peruvian
government. Terrorism expert Fernando Rospegleose commented
that "'[tihis is the most spectacular advance by terrorists in the
history of Peru's civil war. Not only did they capture the home of
the Japanese, which are a major Fujimori ally, but look at the way
they did it. They walked right through the front door,""'2
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launching what was aptly termed "possibly the single most auda-
cious act in the history of terrorist hostage taking." '278
Although the number of guerrilla fighters was initially thought
to be large, the media eventually reported that there were approxi-
mately twenty Tupac Amaru revolutionaries involved in the
operation.279 Freed Canadian hostages estimated the number of
rebels at fifteen, including two women.' However, it is signifi-
cant that the Red Cross indicated on Christmas Day that it could
not account for seven of a large group of 225 released hostages."1
This led to speculation that some rebels may have slipped away
during the release.' At the end of the ordeal, it was ascertained
that there were 14 guerrillas involved in the operation.3
The Tupac Amaru rebels infiltrated the Japanese diplomatic
celebration in the guise of waiters carrying champagne, food and
flowers.' News reports indicated that the attack commenced at
8:05 p.m.' with one "large explosion and two minor ones as they
took control of the embassy compound."' 6 It was a two-pronged
attack: infiltration as disguised waiters and a second front in which
masked guerrillas dynamited a hole in a fence from an adjacent
house.' Peruvian television later displayed a meter-wide hole
utilized to gain entry to the house.' The guerrillas announced:
"'This is the Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement. Obey and
nothing will happen to you.'""
Lucie Vincent, wife of the Canadian Ambassador to Peru,
"thought she was going to die when the attack started.",21 Mrs.
Vincent explained in a later interview that at approximately 8:00
p.m. the guests heard a bomb, but given the realities of life in
Lima, they thought little of it. She was in the garden talking to a
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lady when the shooting started and she immediately dove under a
table.291
Another eye-witness account of those dramatic early hours
was provided by Sally Bowen,292 who wrote:
It promised to be a routine diplomatic reception. By 8 p.m.,
several hundred guests at the Japanese ambassador's residence
in Lima were sipping pisco sours-the favourite local tip-
pie-and crowding round the sushi buffet.
Suddenly a heavy explosion, possibly caused by a rocket
hitting an outside wall, stopped the small talk. Moments later,
heavy gunfire started up close to the marquee where guests had
gathered to celebrate Emperor Akihito of Japan's birthday.293
Ms. Bowen continued to describe the ordeal: "The guests dropped
to the ground. For the next 40 minutes we lay terrified as heavily
armed guerrillas stalked among us, brandishing automatic rifles,
pistols, shouting 'Don't lift your head or it'll be shot off.' 294 The
rebels exchanged a volley of gunfire with the police while the
frightened guests lay on the ground, bullets flying overhead.295
The wife of a Peruvian diplomat described her reaction: "'I was
shaking uncontrollably because I thought I was going to die.
' '296
News reports stated that because of gunfire, "police and news
crews were pinned down around the building.' ,2' A witness from
a neighboring building reported seeing armed men near bushes in
the ambassador's residence and guests lying face down on the
floor.298 News reports also indicated that two hostages and one
rebel were wounded in the initial assault.29 The police captured
five rebels during the initial gun battle.3°
Meanwhile inside the building, in those early moments of the
assault, prominent dignitaries were ridding themselves of identifica-
tion which might make them easy targets for the rebels.
30 1
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Fernando Andrade, Mayor of Miraflores, a section of Lima,
managed to escape by climbing out of a washroom window.
3 2
He reported that identifications were being flushed down toilets by
the guests inside.31 Some officers ripped the stripes off their uni-
forms.3 1 Manuel Torrado, a pollster by profession, said, "'[E]ach
one made himself a little less important than he was. I said I was
a press attache. The dean of a university said he was a profes-
sor.,
305
Ambassador Aoki, the host, was ordered by one of the rebels
to use a megaphone and tell the police to hold their fire. "'Please
respect the integrity of my guests and stop shooting,"' Aoki
pleaded with the police.c 6 In a further attempt to calm the
situation, Aoki telephoned a Lima radio station to announce:
"'There are no injured, nothing, and we are safe."' 3  He added
that for the moment he could not speak freely.3°  In a later
telephone call to Japanese station NHK, the Ambassador explained
that the rebels were "completely armed" and wanted to negotiate
with President Fujimori about the conditions for the release of the
hostages.3" Ambassador Aoki also had a telephone discussion
with his Foreign Minister, Yukihiko Ikeda.31°
Widely admired for his skill as a negotiator, Ambassador Aoki
requested the rebels to release all the hostages while retaining him
alone in captivity.311 "'Let these people go,"' he pleaded with the
guerrillas and added, "'They've got nothing to do with this. I,
alone, am important enough for you to bargain with.' 312 Later,
he was reported to have attempted to cheer his guests by stating
repeatedly: "'This is the longest cocktail party I've ever organ-
ized.' 313 Through the long 126-day ordeal which would follow
his party, Ambassador Aoki exhibited remarkable generosity, grace
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agronomist, called Aoki "amazing," and added that the Ambassa-
dor shared his food, his liquor, his clothing, "absolutely every-
thing."314 Aoki remained positive throughout and attempted to
impart cheer to his colleagues in captivity,315 even singing for
them, provoking loud cheering applause.3" 6
C The Demands of the Hostage-takers
Nestor Cerpa Cartolini chose in the initial hours of the assault
to use the alias "Commandante Huerta." '317 After taking the
residence, he announced that his men had mined the grounds and
stated, "What we are asking is the liberation of all of our comrades,
who are being mistreated and tortured in the dungeons of the
various prisons."31  The entire operation was overtly aimed at
the liberation of hundreds of Tupac Amaru guerrillas who were
languishing in the horrifying terrorist prisons of Peru. However,
there was considerable confusion about the precise number of
Tupac Amaru prisoners being held by Peruvian authorities. The
captors were said initially to have referred to about 400 to 500 such
individuals."9 It is conceivable that they were simply not certain
about the numbers involved.
The guerrillas' plan was to exchange the guests at the party for
the prisoners from Peruvian jails.3" Ever mindful of the necessity
for publicity in this operation, the hostage takers asked for a
cameraman and made a video of their demands to be broadcast on
television.32 One of the rebels telephoned the demands to a
local radio station: "'We are clear: the liberation of all our
comrades, or we die with all the hostages."'322 The rebels threat-
ened to execute the hostages if the government did not give in.3"
Also included in their demands was the release of Lori
Helene Berenson, an American citizen from New York, jailed for
life for treason related to alleged terrorist activities in Peru.324
314. Diebel, Hostage Hell, supra note 116.
315. Id.
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Berenson was convicted in 1995, by a secret military tribunal and
jailed at the infamous Yanamayo Prison."~ She was accused of
assisting the Tlipac Amaru with its abortive plan to raid the
Peruvian Congress but "has maintained her innocence." 3" Her
parents, who are college professors," indicated after visiting their
daughter in jail that Berenson's hands were "perpetually purple and
swollen by the cold" because the mountain prisons have open
windows.
328
Also among the prisoners on the guerrillas' agenda for release
were 89 women,329 including Nestor Cerpa's wife, Nancy Gilvo-
nio.33  Once their jailed comrades were freed, the hostage-takers
wanted to be able to return to their jungle hideouts in Peru.331
Additional demands included economic programs to assist the poor
in Peru and payment of a 'war tax. '332 The rebels expressed their
dissatisfaction with the economic reforms instituted by President
Fujimori and wanted to "change Peru's free-market economic
policy. '333 Throughout the ordeal the Tupac Amaru reiterated its
demand that the government improve the standard of living of
Peru's poor, who constitute almost half the population. 3' De-
spite a few news reports to the contrary throughout the crisis, the
lipac Amaru insisted that there was no ransom demand on their
agenda.335 On January 9, 1997, in response to government claims
about possible monetary buy-outs, the Thpac Amaru posted a sign
in a window of the residence stating: "Do not lie, Mr. Fujimori.
Money does not interest us. The demand is freedom of our
prisoners., 336  The Tupac Amaru rebels also asked that their
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"sympathizers in Bolivia's jails be freed," and held the Bolivian
Ambassador to Peru as a hostage.337
It was clear that the rebels were prepared to wait for a resolu-
tion that would bring freedom to their imprisoned comrades.
Cerpa apparently believed time was on his side; this would
ultimately be his most tragic miscalculation. He underestimated his
adversary, the Peruvian government, which utilized the time very
effectively to prepare for a counter attack on the mansion. Cerpa
probably had also calculated that long captivity would fray the
nerves of the hostages and impel a settlement from the govern-
ment. He reportedly told one hostage, "[W]e came physically and
mentally prepared to stay for a long time. You all just came for a
cocktail party.,
338
The Peruvian perpetrator of this hostage-taking and his adver-
sary, the Peruvian President, both had political and personal
considerations in mind as they squared off against each other in the
following long months of deadly confrontation. "The guerrilla
leader [was] fighting for his movement and his wife, the president
[was] fighting for his credibility and his brother.,
339
D. Criticism of Security at the Embassy
In the wake of the successful take-over of the Japanese
Embassy, severe criticism was levelled against the Japanese govern-
ment and against Peruvian forces for allowing so dramatic an
assault on a foreign diplomatic compound. Japanese journalists
wondered about the lax security at the reception held in a building
which in international law constitutes Japanese territory.3"
Professor Enrique Obando, one of Peru's foremost authorities on
terrorism and the military, complained that "[t]he security forces
were sloppy and overconfident. This attack could have been
prevented with the same measures that any airline takes when
passengers go onto an airplane."'"
Japanese Ambassador Morihisa Aoki confirmed that although
there were many security guards at the embassy, none had been
posted at the back wall, over which some of the guerrillas apparent-
337. David Marcus, Range of Ways to End Peru Siege Studied, THE WEEKEND
SUN (Vancouver), Dec. 21, 1996, at A10.
338. Hammer & Larmer, supra note 316.
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ly climbed into the compound.' However, the Foreign Minister
of Japan insisted that "lax security was not to blame." 3
The Japanese Ambassador's residence covered an entire block
and was protected by a four and a half meter high concrete wall
under a three meter electrical fence." Inside, windows were
protected by bars and thick wire mesh. 5 Normal security at the
residence consisted of "three Japanese police officers, several
guards from a Japanese security company, and two Peruvian police
cars."" Ironically, the residence in Lima was the "most-guarded
of Japanese diplomatic missions overseas" following damage to the
building from car bombs in 1991 and 1992."47 However, security
was not increased for the party.
34
On February 23, 1997, while the hostages were still in captivity,
President Fujimori joined the chorus of condemnation against his
intelligence and police services for their negligence in not prevent-
ing the attack by the Tupac Amaru.349  The Peruvian President
alleged that his agents were aware the guerrillas were transporting
weapons from their jungle outposts to Lima-an indication of a
major operation-but the police did not act on the information.35
He indicated that a security investigation was underway and would
result in action against police and intelligence officials who had
been negligent.351
E. The Release of Women and Elderly Hostages
Apparently, it soon dawned on the rebels that they had captured
too many hostages for a viable operation. Their obvious solution
was to unburden themselves of the women and elderly guests as
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quickly as possible. A little over two hours after the assault, the
initial release of hostages began.352
Unfortunately, just as this beneficial action got underway,
Peruvian police threw tear gas into the building.3a3 This had no
adverse impact on the guerrillas who were equipped with gas masks
but caused considerable discomfort to the hostages "who choked
and spluttered for half an hour.' '3m They grabbed handkerchiefs
and napkins while President Fujimori's mother, with a bowl of
water in hand, walked from guest to guest to moisten the kerchiefs
and ease the ill effects of the tear gas. 355  Ms. Lucie Vincent
recalled that the burning in the hostages' eyes and the inability to
breathe was "quite painful.
356
This first release meant freedom for approximately 170
hostages. 357 Among this group was Rosa Elva, President of the
Peruvian-Japanese Cultural Association.8 She commented on
the calm manner of the rebels who were laden with weapons and
were apparently ready "'to give up their lives.' 359 The guerrillas
were well-prepared with armaments for a long operation and came
equipped with grenades, pistols, explosives and rifles with telescopic
night vision sights.
3 °
The deadly gun battle at the Japanese residence evoked
horrifying memories for many Peruvians who had believed that
such guerrilla terror was a nightmare of the past for their country.
One Peruvian taxi driver told a reporter: "'It's just like something
out of a movie. Only Bruce Willis hasn't showed up to save us
yet.
36 1
Not all of the women were willing to be released. True to her
journalistic instincts, Sally Bowen asked to stay but was refused by
the guerrillas.
362
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IV. Captivity
There was considerable confusion about the precise number of
hostages in captivity after the initial release of women, elderly and
ailing people and some diplomats freed by Cerpa to negotiate on
behalf of the rebels. The Peruvian government initially estimated
that there were between 200 and 300 hostages. However, in a
faxed message to relatives signed by hostages, the figure stated was
490."6 Ambassador Vincent estimated the number at about 400,
commenting "'[tJhey're packed in."' 3  Cerpa must have realized
that the size of the Japanese residence would not hold the large
number of people he had captured. Although he gained much
propaganda benefit from sporadic releases, it is possible that the
real reason for freeing many of the dignitaries was to have a
feasible number of captives that his small guerrilla band could
safely handle.
The hostages were eventually separated on the basis of their
professional status. 365 Hostages considered of greater significance,
such as government officials, military officers, politicians and
diplomats, were apparently housed on the second floor of the
mansion with heavier security.36  Journalists, businessmen and
intellectuals were held on the first floor.367
A decision by the Peruvian government to cut off water and
electricity to the residence created considerable difficulty for the
hostages who found the heat inside a problem.36 The cessation
of electricity, telephone and water to the residence met with pleas
from the hostages for return of these vital services.369 "Neither
handwritten signs thrust at a residence window requesting water,
electricity and telephone service in four languages, nor reports of
worsening health appeared to move President Alberto Fuji-
mori.'37 Hostage demands that services be restored were ig-
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nored.371" On December 21, 1996, the Red Cross took the
initiative of supplying two large water trucks for the hostages
because the cramped environment had also become dirty.
372
Associated Press reported that power and water were eventually
restored to the mansion but the power was cut off again.3 The
running water could not function without electricity,374 and the
hostages had to endure the discomfort of living without two of the
most precious conveniences of modem life. President Fujimori's
decision to deprive the compound of water, electricity and
telephones "likely brought more discomfort to the hostages than to
the jungle-trained rebels,, 371 who were accustomed to a more
hardy existence.
As a result of the gunbattle on the first night, the once-
luxurious mansion was now riddled with bullet holes.376 Inside,
living conditions were deplorable.3' The four bathrooms were
inadequate for such a large crowd 378 (without running water, the
hostages were unable to bathe379) and there were no beds on
which they could sleep.3' Eventually, some mattresses were
provided.3" After he was released, Canadian hostage Andre
Deschenes (Poverty Consultant with the Canadian International
Development Agency) described the horror of eighty people using
one bathroom without water or power.3 2 Deschenes recounted
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that he had learned from an American hostage how to sleep
standing up.383
After some time, rudimentary bathing arrangements using
buckets of cold water were made available.3 ' However, life
continued to be uncomfortable, tedious and stressful. As Cecile
Baux of the Red Cross wryly commented, "'[I]t is no party.""'3 5
Although physical discomfort was now the lot of diplomats and
dignitaries used to a life of luxury, they adjusted with a remarkable
degree of calm and strength of will. As one news service aptly
commented: "Deprived of liberty, privacy and the authority and
respect they normally command, the ambassadors and jurists and
congressmen and businessmen being held hostage have been forced
to focus on simple necessities.
31
The age of many of the hostages ranged between forty and
sixty years.3" Inevitably, there were requirements for daily
medication and for other essentials of life. One hostage, Moises
Pantojo, President of Peru's Supreme Court, was said to suffer from
severe heart trouble.3s The Red Cross reported that some of the
hostages were suffering from "diarrhea, diabetes, ulcers and heart
problems., 3' Francisco Sagasti, one of the hostages who was
released after a few days, commented that sleep was difficult
because "'there were a few heavy snorers.
' ' 39°
Some hostages clung desperately to normal routines to keep
their spirits up. A hostage named Mr. Higashi recounted that he
washed his face and donned a tie every morning as though he was
going to work, all in an effort to ward off depression.391
True to professional form, the captive diplomats began to
negotiate and hold their own discussions with the rebels, a sign that
was perceived as positive in terms of an eventual resolution:"
"Faced with what is expected to be a long standoff, 'I think
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everyone is starting to get situated,' said one foreign diplomat in
Lima.
, 393
The outcome of these deliberations was beneficial. Physicians
were allowed in to attend to the hostages and provide them with
tranquilizers and other medication.394 The list of hostage require-
ments expanded to toothbrushes and changes of clothing brought
by their families. 395 The rebels also allowed messages between
hostages and their families, and for the captives and their anxious
relatives outside, these brief written messages became a psycholog-
ical life-line during the long ordeal.
It was fortunate for all that the hostages were able to engage
in this dialogue with their captors from an early stage of the crisis.
Their mutual discussions may have softened the attitude of the
rebels and may well have been pivotal in ensuring that the rebels
did not execute any of them throughout the 126-day ordeal.
Peruvian political commentator Francisco Sagasti, a critic of the
Fujimori regime, was taken hostage and eventually freed during
one of the releases.39 6  He provided interesting insights into
conditions at the residence during his captivity. Sagasti described
the relationship between hostages and captors as "respectful and
cordial.",3' He continued, "'It was kind of unusual in that we
were never beaten or mistreated and we could move around and
speak to each other freely in the rooms where we were held.'
398
According to Sagasti, debates occurred between rebels and
hostages.399 There was an attempt by the guerrillas to convert the
hostages but this was apparently unsuccessful.' However,
Nestor Cerpa and Octavio Mavil, a leading Peruvian businessman,
engaged in a two-hour debate on economic development." The
verbal exchange "included a lot of talking and laughing."'
Hostages also engaged in seminars expounding on their areas of
expertise "ranging from economics and polling to Andean and
Japanese food. A Peruvian insurance executive held forth on the
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intricacies of a product that all of them found intensely interesting:
kidnapping insurance."'
However, a more frightening account of their life was provided
by hostage Congressman Gilberto Siura, a strong supporter of the
military.' According to Siura, the rebels regularly pointed guns
at the hostages and pretended to throw grenades in an effort to
prepare and practice for a military attack on the mansion. 5
As their captivity dragged into weeks and months, the medical
condition of the hostages inevitably worsened. Physicians in
regular attendance on them commented that almost all the hostages
suffered "from ailments that require daily medications and regular
monitoring, including hypertension, heart disease, digestive
disorders and depression."'  Fear of the possible violent out-
come of this hostage situation exacerbated their medical problems.
Supreme Court Judge Moises Pantoja complained in a letter to his
family that his arthritis made it difficult to walk because his feet,
hands and fingers had become hard.'
Although captivity was harsh and a real test of endurance for
the hostages, most of whom came from privileged lifestyles as
government officials, businessmen and diplomats, they adjusted
with remarkable fortitude.' The hostages spent some of their
long, boring days engaging in vigorous bouts of cleaning the
mansion, particularly the bathrooms.4°9 A released hostage, Jose
Carlos Mariategui, an official in the Peruvian Foreign Ministry,
provided vivid descriptions of the democratic job-sharing society
which emerged among the hostages. 410  "'We practiced a real
democracy,"' he said and added that various duties were designat-
ed, a system of shift work was established and there were "'no
distinctions of rank, profession, nationality or race."4 11 One of
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the first to pull bathroom cleaning detail happened to be Peruvian
Foreign Minister Francisco Tudela.412 The almost spontaneous
formation of a democratic society bred a strong team spirit among
the hostages; after the ordeal was over, some of the freed captives
commented about the camaraderie which had arisen among them.
Congressman Carlos Blanco said that "'there was never ever any
altercation of any kind among the hostages."'413  Indeed, they
made a determined effort to create a social life within the confines
of the mansion. Bolivian Ambassador Jorge Gumucio explained
that on occasion the diplomat hostages "'would visit the judges, or
they would invite us for lunch and sometimes we [the diplomats]
were invited by the police.'
' 414
Hostages routinely awoke at daybreak to the blare of police
sirens and the sound of staged military marches around the com-
pound.415  They received cigarettes but no alcohol.41 6  They
breakfasted on coffee, bread, jam and cheese.41 7 Lunch and
dinner consisted of cold Peruvian and Japanese food, all provided
by the Red Cross.
418
V. Reactions to the Crisis
A. The Media and Fujimori's Reaction
Political analyst Mirko Lauer commented that the "'govern-
ment is caught between a rock and a hard place.' 4 9 He added:
"'Setting free the MRTA prisoners would mean losing years of
effort and would give a dangerous second wind to armed subver-
sion. ' ,'41 On the other hand, said Mr. Lauer, "'[tihe murder of
many or some hostages would put the country into irretrievable
mourning. ' ' 2 Journalist Kevin Fedarko explained that "Fujimori
faced an appalling choice: confrontation or accommodation."
4
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It was widely believed early in the crisis that President
Fujimori would be unrelenting and unbending with respect to rebel
demands. One Western diplomat was quoted as concluding that
the Peruvian government would not "negotiate anything.",
41
That President Fujimori's public persona had been badly damaged
by the successful seizure of the Japanese embassy could not be
denied in view of criticism both in Peru and internationally. As
Alex Emery wrote in The Christian Science Monitor, "Fujimori,
who succeeded in diminishing guerrilla violence as a result of
Draconian antiterrorist measures, has seen his image as a winner
badly shaken by this turn of events.
42
In response to the crisis, President Fujimori convened his
Cabinet in an emergency meeting.42' He was reported to be in
constant touch with his Cabinet over the next few days4 but
there was an alarming public silence from him about this crisis.
There was no doubt that Fujimori faced "the most difficult choice
of his political career. '' 4' His silence in the face of the hostage
crisis was disconcerting and aggravating to Peruvians and more so
to the hundreds of media representatives from around the world
who rushed to Peru to cover the story and surrounded the besieged
compound .4  Peruvian political commentator Francisco Sagasti
expressed the frustration: "'We Peruvians deserve something more
from our President than the silence he has given us on this most
important event in the history of our nation. It is a clear case of
lack of leadership on his part.'
429
Interestingly, Fujimori's first public statement on the crisis
consisted of a letter to U.S. President Bill Clinton in which he said,
"'I want to assure your excellency that I am occupying myself
permanently and jointly with my team to achieve a solution as soon
as possible to this crisis, the principal objective being the safeguard-
ing of the health and life of those who are inside."' 4
President Fujimori was on the horns of a dilemma so complex
that it almost defied solution. Had he yielded to the rebel
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demands, he could have resuscitated terrorism in Peru. As
journalist Roy Gutman commented, by acceding to their demands,
"he may give the rebel movement a new lease on life." '431
Although some rebel groups in other Latin American countries
had progressed to pacification and eventual incorporation into the
legitimate political process, this fate, much desired by the Tupac
Amaru, was not perceived as a realistic outcome. Peruvians saw
the hostage crisis as an indication of a return to guerrilla violence
and they wanted their government to ensure that this rebel
mayhem was stamped out permanently. Despite the fact that the
Tupac Amaru message highlighted the miserable conditions of the
poor and dispossessed of Peru, the Tupac Amaru failed to garner
public support within Peru for its actions. Hence, there was little
public enthusiasm for the grant of concessions to the hostage-
takers. Former U.N. Secretary-General Javier Perez de Cuellar,
summarized the views of his countrymen when he said of the Tupac
Amaru: "'They have just shown they're beyond the limits of
democracy. It would be difficult for the MRTA to become a
political party after what has happened.'
' 432
There were also inherent dangers for the Peruvian government
in terms of public opinion. In the first place, Peruvians had
considered such terrorist actions a thing of the past, unlikely in
Fujimori's regime. As the crisis dragged on for days and weeks and
months, Fujimori would take a political beating in terms of his
popularity among Peruvians. The constant media barrage on this
crisis ensured that the Tupac Amaru reaped the benefits of
publicity and propaganda, but that same journalistic spotlight shone
simultaneously and not too kindly on the government which had
failed to prevent this crisis. Clive C. Aston, analyzing hostage-
taking, had written perceptively that
[o]f all the tactics currently employed by political terrorists,
none is as powerful or emotive as the taking of innocent
hostages .... Hostage-taking, because of its sensational and
dramatic nature, is a highly media-specific act which thereby
guarantees an audience for the terrorist to intimidate. Nothing
is more likely to polarize public opinion and potentially
undermine confidence in a government as quickly or as
penetratingly as the inability to cope with a 'hostage situa-
tion.'
433
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The Peruvian stock market fell more than 4 percent on Dec.
18, reflecting the uncertainty caused by the fact that its ruling
government was now "caught between competing political and
economic pressures. ' 44
Although the deed was done, Peruvian police belatedly made
a huge effort to make up for their failure to prevent the guerrillas
from seizing the diplomatic mansion. They literally besieged the
Japanese Embassy, stationing approximately 900 officers around the
residence to deal, if necessary, with the 15 or so heavily armed
rebels inside.435 Over the long months of the ordeal which
followed the MRTA's attack on the Japanese residence, the police
also established an elaborate system of electronic eavesdropping on
the mansion.436 Some indication of this was provided when police
sources were cited in a Peruvian newspaper, La Republica, as
providing particulars of verbal discussions inside the Ambassador's
house.4 7
B. The Japanese Reaction
The take-over of their Ambassador's residence in Lima "sent
shock waves through the Tokyo government and business.,
431
Japanese television provided extensive coverage of the story.439
Emperor Akihito agreed to a suggestion by his Prime Minister,
Ryutaro Hashimoto, that the celebration of the imperial birthday
(including the banquet"0 ) be canceled.441 The monarch similar-
ly canceled plans to open the grounds of his palace to his people
and did not read a traditional birthday message to the Japanese
public." 2 Instead the imperial palace released an official state-
ment expressing Emperor Akihito's hope that the hostages would
be released as soon as possible." 3
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The Japanese government was facing a dilemma created by its
own vacillation in the face of previous terrorist attacks. "Japan's
actions in the 1977 hijacking of a Japan Airlines jet at Dhaka
brought a wave of international criticism because the government
caved in to the terrorists' demands in exchange for the release of
the hostages."' In August 1996, Sanyo Electric Company paid
a ransom of $2 million to free its officer, Mamoru Konno, who was
kidnapped in Mexico." 5 Japan's dilemma was compounded by its
adherence during the summer of 1996 to a Declaration by the
Group of Seven [industrialized nations] to cooperate against
terrorism.46
Prime Minister Hashimoto gave his full attention to the crisis,
making twice-daily visits to the task force established at the
Japanese Foreign Ministry.447  Although the details of a ten
minute phone conversation between Prime Minister Hashimoto and
President Fujimori were not publicized, the Japanese government
quoted its Prime Minister as having asked the Peruvian President
for information because he was only receiving fragments of
news."' Prime Minister Hashimoto reportedly told President
Fujimori: "'I trust you completely."'" 9
The Japanese government stressed that the safety of the
hostages was a top priority. Nicholas Kristof of the New York
Times eloquently explained the Japanese dilemma:
As the crisis unfolds in their ambassador's residence in Lima,
Japanese officials appear to be nervously looking over the
shoulder of President Alberto Fujimori of Peru and calling for
a priority on the lives of the hostages.
Japan's first instinct in similar incidents in the past has
been to meet the demands of terrorists or kidnappers and win
the freedom of hostages. So Japanese officials seem to be
apprehensive about what to expect from Fujimori, who has
made his reputation by being tough and unrelenting toward
domestic terrorists.45
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The policy preferred by the Japanese government has been to
proceed carefully and "to negotiate as long as possible before
resorting to other measures.""45
Japanese anger about the take-over of the diplomatic com-
pound surfaced in the form of violent behavior against Peruvians
in Isesaki, north of Tokyo.452 Prime Minister Hashimoto roundly
condemned his countrymen for stoning shops and cars belonging to
some of the 15,000 Peruvians who live and work. in Japan.453
There were no injuries reported from these incidents."
C. International Reaction
World reaction was quick to condemn the hostage takers and
to urge the government of Peru to remain firm. Journalist Howard
LaFranchi of The Christian Science Monitor observed that "the
Peruvian action is a jolting reminder that some Latin American
countries are still ripe territory for extremist groups. 45 5 "The
hostage-taking brought international condemnation from the
Security Council of the United Nations,456 the Organization of
American States, Canada, the US and the EU. 4 57  Twelve
nations dispatched teams of negotiators to Peru in the event there
was a need for their services.
5 8
U.S. President Bill Clinton offered assistance to the govern-
ment of Peru, including the services of the renowned Delta Force
hostage rescue team.459  U.S. Secretary of State Warren Chris-
topher confirmed his nation's policy against making concessions to
terrorists.46°  A team of American security advisors was dis-
patched by the State Department to Peru."6 However, The New
York Times reported on Dec. 22, 1996, that American offers of
help had "been rebuffed by Mr. Fujimori who [was] closely keeping
his own counsel., 462  Journalist Clifford Krauss explained the
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situation between the United States and Peru by reference to "Mr.
Fujimori's fiercely independent streak."'  There was apparently
some clandestine American assistance to Peruvian authorities.'
Peruvian intelligence sources were reported in the press to have
confirmed that a U.S. spy plane had flown over the Japanese
residence in Lima, gathering information "in case an attack is
planned on the guerrillas."'
Canadian Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy explained his
country's policy with respect to terrorism: "'To give in to those
kinds of demands simply exacerbates or increases the prob-
lem.'""However, in the Canadian media, there was an apprecia-
tion of the complexity of the crisis and the near-impossibility of a
speedy resolution: "The stakes are enormous in the siege of the
Japanese ambassador's residence ... the options fraught with
potential disaster."'
The government of the United Kingdom dispatched its SAS
anti-terrorist forces and police negotiators to assist the Peruvian
government.' Germany's counter-terrorist GSG9 organization
was also monitoring the crisis. 9 The Pope utilized his weekly
address in St. Peter's Square to criticize the guerrillas and to urge
them to release the hostages, deeming their actions "deplor-
able. , 470
A somewhat different perspective was offered by Daniel
Ortega, former revolutionary and Sandinista President of Nicara-
gua.471 Ortega called the hostage incident a wake-up call for
governments in Latin America which had to deal with the growing
gap between rich and poor.
The hostage incident also had a detrimental impact on tourism,
which normally brings Peru $700 million per year.47 European,
Mexican, Japanese and United States travellers canceled their plans
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to travel to Peru.474 According to Gabriel Atudela, General Man-
ager of Lima Tours S.A., "[a] terrorist attack has more negative
impact on an underdeveloped country like Peru than it does in a
place like Paris.""47
One serious consequence of this hostage-taking was that it
appeared to be a revival of an earlier form of urban terrorism
which had specifically targeted embassies and diplomatic personnel.
Carol Elder Baumann's analyses of these 'diplonappings' highlight-
ed the international legal implications with respect to "threats to
the principles of diplomatic inviolability, state responsibility for
protection, political asylum, and the right of extradition.
476
D. The Involvement of the Red Cross
The Red Cross became an active participant soon after the
initial gun battle between the rebels and Peruvian police subsided.
About an hour after the attack, Red Cross workers bravely entered
the compound to verify the condition of the hostages.477 As the
drama unfolded from hours to days to weeks and months, the
international reputation of the Red Cross soared.478
Although it was assumed that the Red Cross was undertaking
a negotiating or mediating role, the Agency was quick to distance
itself from that perception. Mr. Ruben Ortega, International Red
Cross spokesman, informed the media from Geneva that the
Agency had simply handed the Peruvian government a statement
from the rebels. 479  The International Committee of the Red
Cross confirmed that the Agency was "acting only as a neutral
intermediary.'
This tragic international drama produced some unexpected
heroes. One of these was Swiss national Michel Minnig, the
recently-arrived Senior Red Cross Representative in Peru. 1
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Minnig was a guest at the Japanese reception; as soon as the attack
began, he dodged gunfire and headed for the Thpac Amaru.'
He quickly identified himself to the guerrillas, "went outside with
his hands up and shouted at the police to stop shooting,"' and
"began mediating with police outside."' Minnig was allowed to
enter the compound on December 18, 1996, and the hostage takers
later allowed Red Cross officials to provide the hostages with food
and water as well as a portable x-ray machine for the benefit of the
wounded.4" Thereafter, Minnig played a pivotal role in carrying
verbal and written messages between the rebels and the govern-
ment of Peru.' When there were fears about a police raid on
the mansion, Minnig spent a night with the hostages, offering
himself as a human shield.' The mother of hostage Naval
Captain Alberto Manuel Heredia Ugarte commended Minnig's
efforts and said "'they should build a monument to him."'"
Caring for the welfare of the large group of hostages became
an onerous task for the dedicated Red Cross workers who hauled
not just food and water but essentials like portable toilets and
toiletries' for the uncomfortable captives who were crowded
into the few rooms of the residence. It was a volatile, dangerous
situation and the Red Cross workers should be commended for
risking their lives to provide some basic necessities for the hostages.
On occasion, shots were fired, presumably by the rebels, while Red
Cross officials ministered to the needs of the hostages inside the
compound."l This sporadic gunfire surely added to the nerve-
wracking tension felt both inside and outside the Japanese com-
pound.
During the weeks of this ordeal, the Red Cross continued to
supply various items to ease the plight of the hostages, "canned
meats, greens, fruit, toilet paper, disinfectant, cards, chess sets,
dominoes and portable toilets." '491 Most important of all for the
hostages was the Red Cross' delivery of messages from fami-
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lies,4'9 many of whom pleaded for their safety on Lima television
while others (including mothers of the hostages493) demonstrated
for their release outside the mansion.' 4 The "march for peace"
drew about 3000 Peruvians. In addition, churches held prayers for
the captives.495
Eventually. the hostages were provided with blankets and
pillows, and daily deliveries of fresh clothing, bottled water and
food and messages from families."l None of this would have
been possible without the intervention of the International Red
Cross and the diplomatic tact of its representative Michel Minnig
who exuded competence and inspired confidence among all parties.
VI. Initial Negotiations
A. The Release of Ambassadors to Mediate
The next prisoners' release came at 6:00 p.m. on December 18,
1996."9 The Ambassadors of Canada, Greece, and Germany, and
the Cultural Attache of France were conditionally released by the
rebels to negotiate with the Peruvian government.498 As they left
the Japanese Embassy, the four diplomats made a joint statement
explaining their situation: "We have been liberated... to serve as
a bridge to the government and search for a negotiated solution
without bloodshed."4  A Foreign Affairs spokesman for the
Canadian government commented that it was "not a carte blanche
release. They're out there to negotiate on behalf of the hostage-
takers.""°  The, newly-freed Canadian Ambassador, Anthony
Vincent, conveyed the welcome news to anxious families waiting
outside the compound that there had been no physical violence
against the hostages who were being well treated by their cap-
tors.501 The ambassadors wanted to meet President Fujimori but
were informed that the latter was too busy. According to journalist
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Paul Knox of The Globe & Mail, "[e]ventually Mr. Vincent was
told the government didn't want mediators.""°
Canadian Ambassador Anthony Vincent had served as head
of the international counterterrorism branch at the Department of
External Affairs in Ottawa between 1988 and 1992.503 Vincent
became a pivotal figure as leader of the diplomatic negotiating
team conducting discussions with both the rebels and with the
Peruvian government."° He later served on a Guarantor Commis-
sion established to assist in the search for a peaceful resolution.
Although the diplomatic efforts at resolution were eventually
terminated, he continued to return frequently to the Japanese
Embassy for discussions with the hostages and with the rebels.
After one such visit, on December 19, Vincent commented on the
cordiality of discussions with the Tupac Amaru and indicated that
the rebels and the hostages had behaved with restraint." "'Peo-
ple are behaving magnificently,"' he said to reporters eager for any
word on the condition of the captives."° Ambassador Vincent
wryly added that the residence was in darkness when he entered
early one morning, the hostages being asleep on the floor." 7
"'The only sound I heard was of 400 men snoring,"' commented the
Canadian envoy."
Vincent continued on his own initiative to involve himself in
this situation because he was apprehensive about the fate of the
hostages, many of whom were his personal friends. The rebels
obviously trusted him because he was allowed to enter and exit the
mansion freely throughout the crisis. Although the Peruvian
government had ended the ambassadorial mediation mission,"°
he continued in an individual capacity to visit the hostages in an
effort to cheer them up and buoy their flagging spirits.
Vincent was convinced that whether or not their cause was
legitimate, the terrorist methods of the guerrillas were "utterly
unacceptable," and he remained committed to the policy of not
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yielding to terrorist demands. 510 Commenting on the operation,
he said: "'I think it was painstakingly planned, well led, well disci-
plined and an utterly unacceptable way of trying to influence events
in a country with a democratically elected government, which Peru
is. But within the narrow context of a planned operation, it was
certainly extremely effective.'
511
B. The Rebels Impose Deadlines
"'If I were a terrorist,"' said one Western diplomat, "'I would
set deadlines constantly and keep everyone on edge and push the
negotiations.' '12  The hostage-takers used this carrot/stick ap-
proach to generate a state of maximum tension both for the
hostages and for the Peruvian authorities. The rebels "oscillated
between threats to kill the hostages and promises to release them
in exchange for medicine and other concessions." '513 The New
York Times quoted an anonymous Western diplomat commenting
on the youth of the hostage-takers and on their devotion to their
cause, adding that the captors had "told the hostages that they are
not afraid to shoot them.
514
At 10:20 a.m. on December 18, 1996, the rebels contacted
radio and television stations to threaten the execution of hostages
if their comrades were not released from Peruvian prisons.
515
They threatened at noon that same day to commence the execu-
tions within twenty minutes, selecting Francisco Thdela, Peru's
Foreign Minister, as the first victim.516 However, the deadline
passed without incident. 7 In fact, shortly after noon the guerril-
las released two elderly Japanese male hostages.518 That same
day, hostages were allowed to make phone calls to their families on
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C. The Appointment of a Peruvian Negotiator
It became evident early in the crisis that the Peruvian govern-
ment was ill-equipped to handle this type of situation. In fact, Peru
lacked a trained military hostage rescue force and had in place no
experienced Peruvian negotiating team to deal with the emergen-
cy. 520
There was considerable consternation internationally at the
selection by President Fujimori of Domingo Palermo as Chief
Negotiator with the rebels. Mr. Palermo was regarded as a low-
profile member of the Cabinet.521 The concern was not so much
a reflection on Mr. Palermo, who served at that time as Peru's
Education Minister, as apprehension that the selection implied that
President Fujimori was "contemplating a commando-style raid to
free the hostages''52 and was probably not overly serious about
a negotiated solution. Mr. Palermo was known to have had no
experience in dealing with terrorists.
5
The guerrillas had initially demanded that the Peruvian
President negotiate personally with them.524  This demand was
not acceptable to Fujimori, a fact which became clear within days
of the terrorists' assault on the diplomatic compound.52
D. Arrival of Japanese Foreign Minister
Japanese Foreign Minister Yukihiko Ikeda's arrival in Lima on
December 19, 1996, provided further confirmation of just how
seriously Tokyo viewed the invasion of their Ambassador's resi-
dence.526 News reports indicated that he brought a delegation of
over 100 people with him.5" However, regardless of the timeli-
ness of Mr. Ikeda's visit to Lima, some Japanese officials had
misgivings about his trip. If Mr. Ikeda's mission was to persuade
President Fujimori to yield to the rebels' demands, this was likely
to play badly as an indication of Japanese weakness in both Lima
and Washington.528 Gabriella Gamini, writing for The Times
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(London) from Peru, stated that Ikeda "looked uneasy during an
hour-long meeting with Senor Fujimori."529  Clifford Krauss of
The New York Times deemed the Peruvian reception of Mr. Ikeda
"tepid.
,530
That there was a growing difference of opinion between
Fujimori and the Japanese government became evident shortly
after Foreign Minister Ikeda's visit to Lima. "A top Japanese
government official in Tokyo said ... there was a 'wide gap'
between the two countries on how to end the crisis., 531 Although
the disagreement was not confirmed by Foreign Ministry spokes-
men either in Lima or in Tokyo, indications of a hardline by
Fujimori seemed to emerge as a direct negative consequence to
Foreign Minister Ikeda's intervention in favor of a peaceful
resolution. On December 20, 1996, the Peruvian Cabinet formally
rejected the demand for the release of the imprisoned rebels.
53 2
Following a meeting with Ikeda, President Fujimori confirmed that
same day that Peru would not yield to the demands of the
rebels,5 3 and said that "'in Peru we have taken a tough stand
against insurgents and will continue to do so.'
' 5
The extent of Japanese private persuasion on Fujimori to
exercise restraint is unknown. That there was some such pressure
may be gauged by the fact that the Peruvian President waited until
April 1997 to storm the compound. Of course, it could also be
argued that he made effective use of the intervening period to
order the training of an elite force for that operation. Seiroku
Kajiyama, Chief Spokesman for the Japanese government, admitted
to journalists that "'Japan and Peru are very far apart on ideas'
regarding the resolution of the crisis and that there would "'be no
major progress unless those differences are adjusted.""'53 Peru-
vian frustration with Japan was reflected in a December 20, 1996,
headline in the Lima daily Ojo: "We Are Not a Colony of the
Japanese.
5 36
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E. More Releases
On December 19, 1996, the rebels released four hostages on
medical grounds.537 One was a Red Cross official, one was
identified as the Chairman of Nissan Co. in Peru, and the two
others were Peruvians of Japanese origin.53 Journalists reported
that the men looked dazed and walked slowly.539 A wheelchair
had to be provided for one of the liberated captives.' °
During the night of December 20, 1996, the rebels released an
additional thirty-eight hostages.5 41  This group included the
Ambassadors of Brazil, South Korea and Egypt along with a
number of Peruvian legislators. 2 Ian Lewis of Southam News-
papers reported that the "congressmen were apparently asked by
hostages to represent them in talks with the government."' 3 The
Tupac Amaru rebels promised more releases in return for being
allowed to talk to their imprisoned colleagues."
Conditions in the residence were reported to be dismal.
Ambassador Vincent explained the problem of "380 men of
different nationalities... confined in an area in which six people
normally live."545
On December 21, 1996, Nestor Cerpa informed a local
television station via shortwave radio that there would be further
releases in stages, explaining: "'The majority [of the hostages] who
are not tied to the politics of the government we are going to free
gradually and [for] those who are connected to government
functions everything will depend on the will of the govern-
ment. ,"
Some released hostages provided particulars of an interesting
facet of the rebel mindset. The former captives indicated that
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commandos had expressed a willingness to "lay down their arms
permanently if they could form a legal political party."' 7
F The Termination of the Ambassadorial Mediation Mission
President Fujimori was "determined to end the parallel
negotiating role being played by Vincent [Canadian Ambassador]
and three other foreign ambassadors."5  A diplomat corrobor-
ated this, stating that "The president is not pleased by this group.
They were, after all, appointed by the terrorists rather than by his
government and they are not within his system." '549 Accordingly,
Ambassador Vincent announced during the evening of December
20 that the ambassadorial mission was now completed, adding that
he remained "'committed to the safety and well-being of the
hostages."' 5  Vincent had also commented about his perceptions
of the rebels, stating "'They are very determined people, very well-
trained and, from what I saw, very well-disciplined."'5'' Ambas-
sador Vincent explained that the rebels had told him that "if
bloodshed was necessary, it would occur, but that they did not kill
unnecessarily. 55 2 Vincent also provided the world with his own
acute insight into the rebel leader, Nestor Cerpa: "'[Cerpa] is not
your arch-typical South-American, intellectual revolutionary at all.
He's calm, able to express himself in a not verbose way, he's
obviously deeply committed to his cause, is prepared to risk his life
and exerts full disciplinary control over his followers."'5 53
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G. The International Law Issue of Japanese Sovereignty Over Its
Embassy
Emphasizing the priority of human life in such terrorist situa-
tions, the Japanese continued to stress the need to save all the
hostages and not sacrifice any lives in the pursuit of a military
solution. The Japanese were also prompted by the fact that their
compound in Peru is regarded in international law as sovereign
Japanese territory. As such, the Peruvian government would
legally require the consent of Japan before it could attack the
building to free the hostages. Japanese analysts had estimated that
the casualty rate among hostages would be high in any military
attack"M and hence the government of Japan favored a negotiated
solution.
Interestingly, one of the compromise solutions surfacing in
diplomatic circles during the crisis attempted to take advantage of
Japan's position in international law. This solution was "an
arrangement in which the Japanese government would exercise its
sovereignty over the residence and would agree to transport the
rebels to a safe country if they free[d] the hostages.
555
An additional issue of international law concerns Peru's
responsibility to protect the person and property of foreign
diplomats stationed in that country. On a basis of reciprocity, such
protection is theoretically perceived as part of diplomatic tradition
and custom, although admittedly, in practice, it would be virtually
impossible for any nation to provide round-the clock safety for
every diplomat stationed within its borders. Terrorist kidnappings
of diplomats pose a particular threat, not merely to the individuals
victimized but to the very concept of diplomacy as it is exercised
globally. Carol Baumann's incisive analysis of diplomatic kidnapp-
ings aptly summarized the legal dilemmas raised by such hostage-
taking situations:
Legally, the diplonappings infringe upon the personal inviolabil-
ity, privileges and immunities of diplomatic representatives and
call into operation the indirect responsibility of states to provide
special protection for them and to prevent such violations ....
554. Calvin Sims, Peru Officials Admit to Plan For Commando Raid on
Embassy, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17, 1997, at 3 [hereinafter Sims, Officials Admit to
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TIMEs, Dec. 24, 1996, at A6 [hereinafter Sims, No Progress].
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Politically, the diplonappings impair the normal conduct
and flow of international diplomacy. and diplomatic contacts
between states upon which amicable and regularized interna-
tional relations rest. Morally, they are repugnant to such
human concepts as the freedom and dignity of life and liberty,
the rule of law and order, and the belief in 'fair play.'5
6
H. Offers of Asylum for the Rebels
Baumann also suggested that historic practice in such incidents
in Latin America has emphasized the concept of political asylum
for the perpetrators as one facet of a resolution of such crises and
indicated that the idea of asylum has its strongest advocates in
Latin America.5 7 On December 19, 1996, two days after the
assault on the Japanese Embassy, Abdala Bucaram, the President
of Ecuador expressed his readiness to offer asylum to the re-
bels."'
The possibility of providing a safe external haven for the rebels
appeared fairly early as a peaceful and viable solution to the crisis.
Ian Lewis of Southam newspapers wrote in a report published on
December 21, 1996, that the rebels wanted transportation to either
the Peruvian jungle or to "a Latin American country willing to
guarantee they won't be turned over to Peruvian authorities., 5 9
In addition, the possibility of refuge in Cuba for the guerrillas had
been proposed by the Japanese.56 However, one of the freed
hostages, Peruvian Congressman Javier Diaz Canseco, said that he
did not think that Cuba would "pay the enormous political price"
involved in providing refuge for the guerrillas. 561  Alejandro
556. CAROL ELDER BAUMANN, THE DIPLOMATIC KIDNAPPINGS 164 (1973).
557. Id. at 140.
558. Canadian Works to Free Peru Hostage, supra note 364.
559. Lewis, Terrorists Threaten Killing Today, supra note 365.
560. Krauss, Rebels Release 38, supra note 371.
561. Cool Response to Yeltsin's Offer, THE IRISH TIMES, Dec. 25, 1996, at 7.
Cuba does, however, have a unique history of accepting left-wing rebels involved
in terrorist activities. As Ross E. Butler commented, "Castro has repeatedly
voiced his support for guerrilla warfare in Latin America." Ross E. Butler,
Terrorism in Latin America, in YONAH ALEXANDER, INTERNATIONAL TERROR-
ISM: NATIONAL, REGIONAL AND GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES 47 (1976). In 1980, the
Colombian group M-19 attacked a party at the Dominican Embassy and took a
number of hostages. Calvin Sims, Peru Leader Says Castro Will Give Asylum to
Rebels, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 1997, at A10 [hereinafter Sims, Castro]. M-19 also
demanded freedom for imprisoned comrades and a large ransom, but eventually
settled for refuge in Cuba and a smaller monetary amount. Id Earlier, in 1974,
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Toledo, a former Peruvian presidential candidate and a freed
hostage, recounted that the rebels had considered and mentioned
the possibility of asylum in Denmark or Sweden; however, the
Swedish government denied any knowledge of this idea. 62
VII. Searches for a Solution
A. Fujimori Offers a Solution
On December 21 1996, President Fujimori, in his first public
statement to his nation on the crisis, proposed what he called a
"way out" for the guerrillas.5" He indicated that if the rebels
laid down their arms to a guarantor committee and freed all the
hostages, he would not authorize the use of force against them.56
Fujimori also condemned the guerrillas for wanting "a dialogue
while putting an AK-47 to the necks of the hostages."5" Journal-
ist Julian Beltrame believed that the Peruvian government had
"bowed to Japanese pressure by ruling out a commando raid to
free the hostages. ' '5' However, with respect to the Tupac Amaru
demand for the release of prisoners, President Fujimori made it
very clear that "freeing people who commit murders and terrorist
attacks is unacceptable."'5 67 Interestingly, Japanese Prime Minis-
ter Hashimoto supported Fujimori's firm stance and recalled
Foreign Minister Ikeda to Tokyo.
51
The same day, rebel leader Nestor Cerpa publicly announced
that he would gradually free all captives not linked to the Peruvian
government, stating: "The gentlemen connected to the government
we will treat in the best conditions, within our possibilities. Their
liberation will depend only on the willingness of the government to
reach a solution that could possibly be a milestone in the political
life of this country."569 Cerpa also included Japanese diplomats
Prominent among the rebels seeking haven with Castro was Daniel Ortega, who
toppled his adversary from power and assumed the leadership of Nicaragua five
years later. Id.
562. COOL RESPONSE TO YELTSIN'S PERU OFFER, THE IRISH TIMES, Dec. 27,
1996, at 7.
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566. Beltrame, Foreign Captives, supra note 373.
567. Gabriella Gamini, Tough Fujimori Spurns Demands of Rebel Gunmen,
THE TIMES (London), Dec. 23, 1996, at 7 [hereinafter Gamini, Tough Fujimori].
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569. Beltrame, Foreign Captives, supra note 373.
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and Japanese corporate businessmen among those who would not
be freed.57
True to his word, Cerpa released 225 hostages, including a
number of foreign diplomats571 just before 10:00 p.m. on Sunday,
December 22, 1996.572 Seven officials of the United States
Embassy were included in the release, an action welcomed by
President Clinton.573 Some of the "tired and wan" liberated
hostages smiled and waved as they left the residence.574 This
group of hostages "recounted an odd ending to their captivity,
saying some guerrillas had given quick hugs to some of the
departing hostages-a sense of shared experience felt by the
captives, too." '575 Canadian mining engineer Kieran Metcalfe was
among the released and commented that approximately half of the
freed hostages shook hands with the rebels, many of them wishing
them good luck.576 He did not participate in this farewell.5"
Among the hostages freed was Sando Fuente, former Labor
Minister for Peru, who read a statement from Cerpa which defined
the release as a "Christmas gesture" made despite the "confronta-
tional remarks" of President Fujimori.57 The statement reiterat-
ed the demand for the release of imprisoned members of the Thpac
Amaru, making this the pivotal condition for the release of the
Peruvian hostages. 79
The Japanese Prime Minister expressed reservations about the
consequences of the release." °  Far from feeling relief, Hashi-
moto felt that the tension had now increased. "'The fact that
they've released two-thirds of the hostages means, in effect, that
570. Diebel, 225 Hostages Set Free note 9.
571. Stott, supra note 360.
572. Id.
573. Sims, No Progress, supra note 555.
574. Rebels Free 225 Hostages, supra note 279.
575. Hostage Release Raises Tension, Japanese PM Says, supra note 313. One
could speculate that the relationship which grew between the hostages and their
captors was some variant of the Stockholm Syndrome, a term coined to refer to
the bond of identification that appears to develop in prolonged hostage situations
between the captives and their kidnappers. Aston, supra note 74, at 83. A 1973
hostage-taking incident in a bank in Stockholm, Sweden, concluded with the
victims expressing a "strong attachment to their captors, to the point of refusing
to testify against them." Marshall D. Bell, Hostage Negotiations, in CONTEMPO-
RARY TERRORISM 229-230 (John D. Elliott & Leslie K. Gibson eds., 1978).
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they've pared it down to a number they can control,"' explained
the Prime Minister.8
However, there were still approximately 140 Peruvian,
Japanese and other hostages remaining in captivity.5 2  Among
the diplomats still being held were the Ambassadors of Japan, the
Dominican Republic, Bolivia, Guatemala, Honduras, Uruguay and
Malaysia.58  Journalist Linda Diebel explained the political
implications: "The Peruvians stand for a government the rebels
despise, while the Japanese apparently represent a government that
has pumped over $2.6 billion to help President Alberto Fujimori
keep Peru under a tight grip.""s  From the perspective of the
rebels, while the Peruvians were "the real target," the Japanese
hostages could counter and curb Fujimori's "instinct to attack the
residence.
' 51
The newly liberated hostages sadly described "the looks of
wistful envy on the faces of those who remained captives.
''51
These men, forced by either their nationality or their professional
significance to continue as prisoners of the rebels, watched their
colleagues leave the mansion and return to normal lives outside.
One of the hostages scheduled for release refused to leave and
volunteered to remain behind.5" Catholic priest Juan Julio
Wicht, who normally works in a suburb of Lima, bravely offered
his place among the freed to someone else.5' Father Wicht re-
mained in the residence throughout the long ordeal.58
B. Hostages Appeal
For the rebels, one of the most politically significant catches in
this treasure trove of hostages was Peruvian Foreign Minister
Francisco Tudela. Ironically, this hostage crisis brought him world
attention and admiration for his grace and dignity under pressure.
Freed Canadian hostage Andre Deschenes described Tudela as "'an
581. Id.
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inspiration to all of us. A courageous, wonderful personality who
contributed greatly to our sense of well-being and to our confi-
dence."' s  Another hostage, Jose Diaz, Ambassador for the
Dominican Republic, praised Tudela for his attitude and his
courage and added that "'[a]ll Peruvians should be proud of their
foreign minister."' 91  On December 21, 1996, Lima television
aired an appeal from Tudela for direct communication between his
government and the rebels."9 Ambassador Aoki also publicized
his appeal for negotiations, emphasizing the "atrocious conditions"
inside the mansion and the fact that there were "many seriously
sick people" in his home. 93
Efforts at mediation by several ambassadors who had been
freed had failed.5" As journalist Clifford Krauss aptly comment-
ed: "What appears to be emerging is something akin to a high-
stakes chess game between Mr. Fujimori and Nestor Cerpa
Cartolini, the Tupac Amaru rebel commander, with each counter-
ing the other with purposefully ambiguous moves."'5 9
C. Two More Ambassadors Freed
The first country to come to amicable terms with the rebels in
Peru was Uruguay, which literally bartered its ambassador's
freedom in exchange for two Tupac Amaru rebels who were
incarcerated in that country.", Ambassador Tabare Bocalandro
of Uruguay was freed from the Japanese mansion during the
evening of December 24, 1996, a few hours after a judge in
Uruguay ordered the release of two suspected Tupac Amaru
guerrillas from a prison in Montevideo."l An infuriated Presi-
dent Fujimori recalled his Ambassador from Uruguay, commenting
that "'[i]t is despicable to give terrorists the idea that we are ready
to make deals with them. Such impressions signify a setback in the
crisis; I am not going to give in. '"'598
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Fujimori's rage at this release was echoed in Peru's media
which recalled that Uruguay was party to a Latin American
declaration not to yield to terrorist demands.599  Japan also
criticized Uruguay for making a deal with the rebels.' Prime
Minister Hashimoto expressed his apprehensions concerning the
release of the remaining hostages and concluded that the "'inevit-
able result [was] that negotiations [would] be even more diffi-
cult."' 01
However, Julio Sanguinetti, President of Uruguay, denied the
existence of any negotiations with the Tupac Amaru and rejected
the notion of a connection between the freeing of his Ambassador
in Lima and the release of rebels in Uruguay, insisting that
"[flreeing the Peruvians was strictly a judicial ruling."' There
was, however, a connection between the imprisoned rebels in
Uruguay and the guerrillas holding the Japanese residence in Lima.
The two released Thpac Amaru rebels were suspected of involve-
ment in the kidnapping of a former Bolivian Cabinet Minister. 3
The politician was released after payment of a ransom allegedly
negotiated for the Thpac Amaru by Nestor Cerpa.'
On December 26, 1996, the Ambassador of Guatemala, Jose
Maria Argueta, was released by the rebels as a Tupac Amaru
endorsement of the peace talks in Guatemala between the govern-
ment and leftist forces. 5 This release came a few days before
the signing of a historic accord between warring factions in
Guatemala, an agreement which would end a bloody and brutal
civil war which had raged for 36 years,' and brought death to at
least 140,000 people. °  The peace accord would bring former
rebels in the Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity movement
into "normal political life." 6 8
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In the Peruvian hostage crisis, some of the freed dignitaries
told reporters that the guerrillas inside the residence had spoken to
them "of longing to integrate into Peru's political system, the way
the Guatemalan guerrillas and so many other rebel groups have
done around Latin America in recent years."' The release of
the Guatemalan Ambassador reflected that desire.610 Peruvian
journalist Gustavo Gorriti expressed his belief that "the objective
of the rebels was to negotiate a new role in Peruvian society after
years of military defeats and the capture of most of their leaders
and members., 611  However, continued Gorriti, the guerrillas
probably felt that before such a settlement could be reached, an act
of force was necessary or no one would "concede them any-
thing."
612
There was also a reported attempt underway by the Malaysian
government to free its Ambassador Ahmad Mokhtar Selat.
613
The rumors were reinforced by the sudden arrival in Lima on
December 26, 1996, of the Malaysian Foreign Minister Abdullah
Badawi.614 Mr. Badawi's visit to Peru was very brief, and his
Ambassador was released by the rebels shortly after his own
departure from Lima.1 5 However, "there was no immediate
indication that a separate deal was reached between the rebels and
the Malaysian government for his release.,
616
D. International Offers of Help
Although there were apparently no Russian hostages held in
the Japanese Ambassador's residence,617 Russian President Boris
Yeltsin decided to become involved in the crisis by proposing in a
series of letters that Russia and the Group of Seven (industrialized
nations) send anti-terrorism security units to Peru if that govern-
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ment asked for assistance.618 The intended purpose of such a
multi-national force would be to liberate the hostages. 619  The
proposal also included the establishment of a joint headquarters
composed of the Group of Seven and Russia.6' The letters were
sent to President Fujimori and leaders of the United States, Great
Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Japan and Canada.621  Mr.
Yeltsin stated that "'[tihe situation in Lima requires that we should
show in practice how we are able to act in order to help defenseless
people who have become victims of terrorists.""'6
The United States deemed the Russian proposal "inappropri-
ate."6' The United Kingdom was cautious in its reaction because
its two nationals taken hostage had already been released.624 A
spokesman for the British Foreign Office suggested that "[i]f the
Russians feel they have something to contribute or to offer to the
Peruvians, then it is a matter for them and the Peruvians. ' ,6' The
Peruvian government did not officially respond to Yeltsin's sugges-
tion.62
It is rather hard to escape the conclusion that Yeltsin's action
was more an attempt to resume a key role internationally following
his quintuple bypass surgery627 than a well-thought out plan to
resolve the crisis. The sudden arrival in Lima of crack anti-terrorist
troops forming a multi-national force could have panicked the
guerrillas inside the compound and provoked violent reprisals
against the hostages. The situation in Lima was so delicate and
fragile that such gestures of political grand-standing were extremely
dangerous. Evidently, the Russian President was simply trying to
take advantage of a tense stand-off to gain some world attention
and publicity for himself.
Additional efforts to end the crisis were described by journalist
Linda Diebel of The Toronto Star: "The Japanese newspaper
Mainichi Shimbun reported yesterday [December 25] a group of
countries, including Canada, were contacted by Cuba about
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participating to end the crisis."6' However, the Canadian gov-
ernment denied any role in such a plan.629 Exile for the guerrillas
was being perceived as the only viable peaceful solution. Peruvian
media suggested that the guerrillas could be escorted by a delega-
tion of ambassadors to guarantee safe passage out of Peru.'
Argentinean President Carlos Menem said: "'I don't see any other
way out,"' and suggested that a commission of nations guarantee
"'the life and exit from Peru of these subversives."
' 631
The initiative for a resolution was soon taken over by Japan,
and gained support from a number of nations. Japanese Foreign
Minister Yukihiko Ikeda commented in letters to various govern-
ments that "'[ilt is necessary for the international community to act
as one to help resolve this crisis."'632 The Group of Seven and
Russia condemned the hostage-taking, expressed support for the
Peruvian government's efforts to resolve the crisis peacefully, and
confirmed that there should be no concessions to terrorists.
633
The Group of Seven also expressed its readiness to assist the
government of Peru in any appropriate manner.'
E. Christmas in Captivity
Sympathy for the plight of the hostages dominated the end-of-
year festivities in Peru. A young Peruvian woman, Nancy Dulando,
echoed the opinion of most of her countrymen when she told
reporters that "'[n]one of us in Peru can have a really happy
Christmas until these poor people are free."'635
Vigorous efforts were made to provide as cheerful a Christmas
as possible for the men in captivity. A sumptuous repast was
delivered to the Japanese residence by President Fujimori's
daughter Keiko Sofia, honorary First Lady of Peru.636  She
arrived in an armored black Mercedes leading a fleet of vans from
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which emerged 20 chefs. 637 Eight large turkeys, all the accom-
panying dishes, ample fruit and delicacies were sent inside.638
The Peruvian daily newspaper Ojo complained in a headline that
"The Poor Would Love To Dine Like The Hostages."639 One
Peruvian criticized Fujimori's "publicity stunt" to feed the hostages
because a Christmas party for poor children at the presidential
palace had to be canceled so that the palace chefs could take the
food to the Japanese compound.'
Peruvians sang Christmas carols outside the compound and
held silent prayers.64' The hostages expressed their gratitude with
a sign in Spanish posted in one of the residence windows. 42 It
simply said: "Thanks brothers, Merry Christmas."6'
That day the hostages were also visited for several hours by a
leading Peruvian churchman, Archbishop Juan Luis Cipriani of
Ayacucho. A former basketball star,6' Cipriani is a well-known
figure in Peruvian society. He is "'viewed as a brave figure who
stood up to terrorism and did not run and hide,"' commented one
Western diplomat to journalist Calvin Sims of The New York
Times.6" It was in his city of Ayacucho, (200 miles southeast of
Lima) that the infamous Shining Path terrorist movement first took
hold.6 6
Monsignor Cipriani celebrated Christmas Mass with the
hostages inside the residence and later departed, suggesting that a
peaceful solution was possible.6' Acknowledging that the rebels
were wrong in their action, Archbishop Cipriani felt that the
guerrillas also wanted a peaceful solution.6' He said, "'there is
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Significantly, the Archbishop is a close friend and ally of
* President Fujimori,6 ° a relationship which brought hope both to
hostages and to their families that Cipriani might well find a way
out of the crisis for everyone concerned. Although Archbishop
Cipriani denied any mediating role for himself, one Western
diplomat commented wryly of his visit:
"'That was a long Mass all right.' 651
E Fujimori Gets Tough
Both admirers and detractors of Fujimori have admitted to the
strength of will he exhibits in crisis situations. The hostage crisis
was no exception. He kept his own counsel through much of the
ordeal, largely ignored the international media circus, and was
seemingly impervious to criticism both in Peru and abroad about
his apparent vacillation in the search for a speedy resolution.
The critics, however, failed to see the serious dilemma facing
the Peruvian President. He had waged all-out war on terrorism.
He had resorted to dictatorial methods to bring a savage civil war
to an end. He had brought a measure of peace to Peru after long
years of violence by terrorist groups. It simply would not do for
Fujimori to appear weak in the instant crisis. Strength of will was
the key to his public image. By ruling with a combination of force
and selective brutality, he had attempted to make the case that his
actions were valid on the basis that the ends justify the means.
The dispatch of an assault team against the residence would
probably have been his initial and instinctive choice. That he did
not engage in this response and waited and searched for a way out,
negotiating with the rebels via Palermo, demonstrates two priorities
in his mind. First, had a number of Japanese hostages been killed
(especially the Japanese Ambassador) in a military assault, Fujimori
would forever have lost a significant foreign ally and financial aid
donor, Japan. Second, he may have had some lingering doubts
about the international fall-out from such a raid, particularly when
there were many Western aid workers, diplomats and others held
captive in the residence. This leads to the interesting question:
What if all the hostages had been Peruvian citizens from the
beginning of the guerrilla attack? Would Fujimori then have struck
650. Krauss, Envoy Released, supra note 600.
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of Christmas Day, Kenji Hirata, a Japanese diplomat, was released by the
guerrillas for medical reasons and taken away in an ambulance. Russo, supra note
599.
TERROR AT THE EMPEROR'S BIRTHDAY PARTY
immediately with the military? Military analyst Enrique Obando
speculated that Fujimori would not bargain with the Tupac Amaru
in such circumstances "because he would sacrifice the Peruvian
hostages" and suggested that Peruvians would support such a
move.
652
The seizure of the Japanese residence had unfortunate conse-
quences for a large number of Peruvians. According to the
Peruvian government Gazette, El Peruano, emergency powers were
extended to security forces in Lima and the port of Callao for 60
days.65 a These powers would allow "soldiers and the police to
enter homes without search warrants, to search cars at random and
to detain people without charges.'"6' President Fujimori had
apparently taken the decision to extend such powers a day after the
attack on the Japanese residence, but the decree took effect on
December 27, 1996.655 The police utilized these special powers
to make about a dozen arrests.
6 6
During the Christmas season, the Peruvian government
displayed further evidence of hardening its position when it refused
to allow the Red Cross further visits to imprisoned revolutionaries,
among them the very Tupac Amaru rebels whom Nestor Cerpa was
trying to free from prison.6 7
Fujimori's refusal to accede to rebel demands was supported
by the Peruvian Congress which met in closed session to discuss the
hostage crisis on December 27.68
In late December 1996, news reports mentioned the distinct
possibility of an imminent attack by Peruvian forces against the
guerrillas, alleging that "troops were training using a model of the
residence in case the government ordered an assault."69  The
preparations for an attack by 200 Peruvian troops on the Japanese
residence were reported to be completed by the end of December
1996.660
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G. Palermo Secures Freedom for More Hostages
All the doubts and misgivings about Domingo Palermo's lack
of experience as a negotiator evaporated on December 28, 1996,
when Nestor Cerpa ordered the release of 20 more hostages,
including two ambassadors (Jose Ramon Diaz from the Dominican
Republic and Ahmad Makhtar Selat from Malaysia). 661 The
release followed on the heels of a discussion between Palermo and
Cerpa inside the residence.662 Palermo was accompanied to the
meeting by Red Cross official Michel Minnig and by Monsignor
Cipriani.' The Archbishop served as a witness during the
meeting.66  "'Advances were made for a solution to this serious
situation,"' said Palermo, but he provided no other details.'
Most of this group of released hostages were Japanese businessmen
and "low-level Peruvian diplomats.
' 61
Minister Palermo apparently felt quite safe entering the
compound. This was perceived as a positive development in the
crisis. As Clifford Krauss of The New York Times commented:
"The very fact that he did not fear being taken hostage himself
demonstrated that the government and rebels had reached some
kind of understanding, at least to talk."667  As journalist Mary
Beth Sheridan reported, "the start of a dialogue raised hopes in
Peru that bloodshed would be avoided." 66
This face-to-face meeting between the two negotiators also
resulted in what appeared to be some flexibility in the position of
the guerrillas. In a Tupac Amaru statement read by one of the
freed hostages, the guerrillas did not refer to their demand for the
liberation of their imprisoned colleagues, but insisted that condi-
tions in Peruvian jails must be improved.69  The rebels also
showed a willingness to negotiate an exit from the Japanese
residence.67 The softening of their position was underscored by
661. 20 More Hostages Freed in Peru, THE EDMONTON J., Dec. 29, 1996, at AS.
662. Sims, Growing Optimism, supra note 144.
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666. Krauss, 83 Are Still Held, supra note 615.
667. Id.
668. Mary Beth Sheridan, Hostage Siege, THE OTTAWA CITIZEN, Dec. 29, 1996,
at A2.
669. 20 More Hostages Freed in Peru, supra note 661.
670. Id.
TERROR AT THE EMPEROR'S BIRTHDAY PARTY
Isaac Velazco, international spokesman for the Tupac Amaru
movement. Speaking from Hamburg, Germany, Velazco main-
tained an insistence on the liberation of the political prisoners but
expressed some willingness to consider an intermediate solu-
tion.67 Facets of this type of resolution appeared in a letter
purportedly written by 16 hostages (including Foreign Minister
Tudela) and published in Lima's newspaper La Republica.672 The
letter suggested exile for the rebels in a neutral country, a re-
grouping of all 400 Tupac Amaru prisoners in one institution
supervised and controlled by the United Nations and the Interna-
tional Red Cross, and peace negotiations to enable the Tupac
Amaru to lay down its arms and become a legal organization.673
The Peruvian government had confirmed that there were 458
Tupac Amaru prisoners in its jails.
674
Although there was no overt change in position between the
government's insistence that all hostages be released and the
guerrillas' demand that all Tupac Amaru prisoners be released, it
was evident that "both sides seem[ed] less insistent and more flexi-
ble., 675 The more realistic appraisal of each other's positions by
the two adversarial parties may well be credited both to the efforts
of Michel Minnig of the Red Cross and, more directly, to Archbish-
op Cipriani, who returned continually to the Japanese compound,
ostensibly to serve the religious needs of the hostages, but possibly
also to continue to negotiate with Cerpa and the rebels.
The meeting between Palermo and Cerpa was a major break-
through, both with respect to the ongoing hostage crisis and in
terms of Peruvian official policy. Andrew Cawthorne of Reuters
reported that "[w]ith the exception of several meetings in 1993 that
Mr. Fujimori had with Abimael Guzman, the imprisoned leader of
the Shining Path guerrilla movement, no government official had
held direct talks with Peruvian insurgents in 16 years of con-
flict.
676
Peruvian daily La Republica commented that the "'danger of
671. Cawthorne, Rebels Soften Stand, supra note 591.
672. Jane Diaz-Limaco, Talks Between Peru Government and Rebels Make First
Small 'Advances,' THE IRISH TIMES, Dec. 30, 1996, at 10 [hereinafter Diaz-
Limaco, Talks].
673. Id.
674. Peru Prays Standoff Ends Without Gunfire, THE TORONTO STAR, Dec. 30,
1996, at A13.
675. Sims, Growing Optimism, supra note 144.
676. Cawthorne, Rebels Soften Stand, supra note 591.
19971
78 DICKINSON JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 16:1
a violent way out is growing more distant."'' 6' Another daily,
Expreso, viewed the direct negotiations as "'a gigantic step forward,
which raises the prospect of a way out.'
67
On December 30, 1996, the Prime Minister of Peru, Alberto
Pandolfi, predicted an outcome which would preserve the lives of
the hostages.67 9 He based his assumption on the level of mutual
understanding then existing between the government and the
rebels.' Prime Minister Pandolfi indicated that the government
was working "'with prudence and dedication for the prompt
release"' of the hostages.68'
Although there was still some confusion about the figures, it
now appeared that the rebels had already freed over 450 hostages
but still held onto over 80 dignitaries, including the Ambassadors
of Japan, Honduras and Bolivia.' Also still in captivity were
two Peruvian members of Cabinet, several judges, Congressmen
and senior military and police officers.'
Prime Minister Hashimoto sounded a note of caution: "'It is
not time yet to get our hopes up, but reading the guerrillas'
demands, it seems possible to have a dialogue with the rebels.
' 68
The Japanese Prime Minister was obviously anxious about the
plight of the remaining hostages, many of them from his country.
These Japanese diplomats and businessmen wrote to Hashimoto
expressing their apprehensions about the danger they were facing:
"'If the situation, in which heavily armed soldiers keep a close
watch on us lasts for a long time, it will become extremely difficult
for us to keep the balance between mind and body."'"
On December 30, 1996, a bomb blasted the entrance of the
Peruvian Embassy in Athens, Greece.6 6 British Sky Television
reported that the blast was apparently a demonstration of support
for the Tupac Amaru rebels in Peru.' One woman passer-by
was slightly injured.68' The Tupac Amaru's international spokes-
677. Id.
678. Id.
679. Schemo, Peru's Premier, supra note 652.
680. Id.
681. Id.
682. Krauss, 83 Are Still Held, supra note 615.
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684. Cawthorne, Rebels Soften Stand, supra note 591.
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686. Johnson, Red Cross, supra note 478.
687. Id.
688. Supporters of Lima Siege Claim Bomb Blast in Athens, THE IRISH TIMES,
Dec. 31, 1996, at 8.
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man condemned the Athens bomb attack.689 Isaac Velazco told
Reuters that the Tupac Amaru rejected "'this sort of display of
solidarity, because it does not contribute to the solution of a
crisis.",691
H. The Tupac Amaru Press Conference
The first assault on the beleaguered Japanese residence was
made not by storm troopers but by news reporters. The prevailing
mood of confidence and optimism in the Peruvian government was
shattered when the guerrillas, in a bid for further international
public attention, invited a crowd of reporters into the residence on
December 31, 1996.691 The two-hour news conference which
followed had severe consequences with respect to the search for a
peaceful resolution.69 This "carefully staged propaganda coup"
by the guerrillas ended any hope that the crisis might be resolved
before the end of 1996.693 As author J. Bowyer Bell indicated,
"[tihere can be little doubt that the international communications
net is for any potential terrorist a new asset guaranteeing propagan-
da on a scale far beyond the imagination of the nineteenth-century
revolutionary anarchists."6'
The media circus around the Japanese compound became
increasingly frustrating for all concerned. There was little newswor-
thy information on a crisis which still remained a front-page story
in many parts of the world. The normally quiet and exclusive San
Isidro district of Lima became "a jungle of trucks, ladders, tripods,
cameras, cables and journalists, complete with generators that
churn[ed] 24 hours a day."695 Some residents rented rooms and
roofs to journalists who were seeking a good view of the Japanese
compound. 696  The going rate was $1000 per month per cam-
era.
697
On December 31, the Peruvian government allowed some
689. Signs of Movement Seen in Hostage Crisis, supra note 215.
690. Schemo, Peru's Premier, supra note 652.
691. Rebels' Demands Are 'Inflexible,' THE TORONTO STAR, Jan. 1, 1997, at
Al.
692. Peruvian Hostage Standoff Continues, FAcrs ON FILE, Dec. 31, 1996, at
971.
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694. Bell, supra note 114, at 19.
695. The Other Hostages: Lima Residents in a Media Maze, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
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photographers to approach the residence from a closer vantage
point to take a few pictures. 698 It was reported that this privilege
of crossing police barriers and approaching the mansion was based
on an agreement between the government and the guerrillas which
was brokered by the Red Cross.6' As they approached the
mansion, the journalists noticed a banner in a window welcoming
them inside.7' ° The photographer for Japan's Kyodo News
Service soon led a band of twenty journalists into the building.
70 1
Peru's government was so upset by this occurrence that it detained
many of the journalists after they had departed from the resi-
dence.702
Peruvian intelligence agents disguised as journalists also
attempted to enter the residence, but were denied entry by the Red
Cross.' Michel Minnig was later reported to have been indig-
nant because the entire group of photographers was only given
permission to approach the building.7' 4 The media ignored police
orders and swarmed into the residence where they were welcomed
by the guerrillas.7'5 In response to this infringement of their
agreement, Minnig temporarily withdrew the Red Cross from the
area, complaining that the lack of discipline by the media "just
hardened the situation.
,7°6
Inside, the reporters met Nestor Cerpa, dressed in military
gear, his face concealed by a red and while handkerchief' 7
During an interview with Reuters news agency, Cerpa had
indicated that "the MRTA already had achieved its aim of drawing
world attention to the bad conditions of Peruvian jails, and would
now concentrate on obtaining the release of prisoners."'  At the
impromptu news conference, Cerpa reverted to his original demand
for the release of imprisoned Tupac Amaristas and declared that
698. A Happy New Year as Seven Hostages Released, THE EDMONTON J., Jan.
2, 1997, at A5.
699. Id.
700. The Other Hostages: Lima Residents in a Media Maze, supra note 695.
701. Id.
702. Peruvian Hostage Standoff Continues, supra note 692, at 971.
703. Jane Diaz-Limaco, Hopes of Early End to Embassy Siege Dim as Guerrilla
Leader Shows His Defiance, THE IRISH TIMEs, Jan. 1, 1997, at 12 [hereinafter
Diaz-Limaco, Hopes of Early End].
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708. Id.
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the guerrillas were inflexible on that position.7°9 "'We are not
going to back down,"' Cerpa insisted.71 0  He also rejected any
option of leaving the country.
711
Cerpa pleaded with journalists to visit Peruvian prisons and
display the same concern for the inmates that they showed for the
hostages. 712 Key hostages were displayed at the news confer-
ence.713 Francisco Tudela, appearing relaxed, called for a peace-
ful solution.71" Ambassador Aoki took responsibility and apolo-
gized for the seizure of his residence which he credited to his "lack
of preparation and foresight.
715
Fujimori was said to be enraged with the publicity stunt pulled
by the guerrillas. 716 Evidence of his anger emerged when Paler-
mo was not sent to the Japanese residence on New Year's Day for
further negotiations, despite the fact that Cerpa had announced
that "the doors of the residence are open" to Palermo.717 Fuji-
mori "blamed the stalled negotiations" which followed on the news
conference, because it led to the sudden derailment of mutually
agreed-upon concessions.718  Prime Minister Pandolfi provided
details of the debacle. 9 The parties had apparently earlier
agreed that the guerrillas would hold a news conference in
exchange for a significant release of hostages.7 ° This agreement
collapsed as a result of the impromptu news conference.2
The Peruvian government then acted decisively to curb the
enthusiasm of reporters eager to get a story. On January 7,
1996,72 a Japanese journalist and his Peruvian interpreter were
held for some days after "sneaking past the security for an
709. Id.
710. Diaz-Limaco, Hopes of Early End, supra note 703.
711. A Happy New Year as Seven Hostages Released, supra note 698.
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unauthorized interview.'"" The journalist's tape was confiscated
and he was ordered out of Peru and the interpreter was forbidden
from speaking to the press.724
The spontaneous news conference underscores a vital element
of any guerrilla operation-the necessity for extensive media
coverage. As author David E. Long has written, "[v]ictims,
location, and timing of terrorist acts are all chosen with public
exposure in mind. Because publicity is so important, the advent of
mass and instant worldwide communications has influenced modern
terrorism possibly even more than advances in modem weapons
technology. ' '7"
I. Further Releases of Hostages
New Year's Eve brought freedom from captivity for two
hostages, Ambassador Jose Eduardo Martell Mejia of Honduras
and Consul General Juan Ibanez of Argentina.7 6 The following
day, seven more hostages were released, accompanied by Michel
Minnig and Monsignor Cipriani.727 This group included four
Japanese businessmen from Mitsui Co. and Matsushita Electric, two
Peruvians of Japanese descent working in the business and
development fields, and Juan Assereto Duaret, Director of Peru's
privatization program."
New Year's Eve for the remaining hostages consisted of a
candlelit mass and a dinner of Japanese salmon, sushi, and fruit
delivered by the Red Cross.729 The group, now down to 74
captives, included some Japanese businessmen, some senior
Peruvian government officials, the Japanese Ambassador and Mr.
Fujimori's brother, Pedro, as well as the Ambassador for Boliv-
ia.
730
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Rebels, THE CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Jan. 13, 1997, at 2.
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Is Hurt, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 14, 1997, at A9 [hereinafter Schemo, Rebels Fire Guns].
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J. Fujimori Replaces Captive Government Officials
In a possible attempt to minimize the significance to the
guerrillas of some of the key hostages still in captivity, Fujimori
made new appointments to their positions in his government. The
President of the Supreme Court, Moises Pantoja (a hostage) was
replaced by Victor Raul Castillo."' Similarly, the Chief of the
anti-terrorist police and the Peruvian Security Chief (both in
captivity) were replaced by new appointees.732 "It was not clear
whether the changes were routine or reflected official annoyance
with the officials for security lapses which allowed the rebels to
seize the residence," commented Reuters.733
In a speech delivered on January 2, 1997, Fujimori termed the
Tupac Amaru "terrorists" and refused to alter his economic poli-
cies-one of the demands of the rebels.3  The Tupac Amaru
retaliated by hanging a banner outside the residence on January 4,
1996, which stated: "Mr. Fujimori, with arrogant declarations and
without dialogue, there will never be a solution." '735
K. Stalemate
Negotiations between the two parties had ended abruptly
following Cerpa's press conference inside the mansion. On January
6, 1997, the guerrillas announced that there would be no more
releases until negotiations resumed.736 International Spokesman
Velazco said "'[w]e have made too many gestures. We have
released many people without receiving a single response from the
government.'
737
The government's answer was to adhere to its no-concessions-
to-terrorism policy and, in Fujimori's words, emphasize that the
incident was "an isolated event" that would not detrimentally
impact Peru's economy.73 The President continued to hope for
731. Peruvian Leader Replaces Captive Officials, THE TORONTO STAR, Jan. 3,
1997, at A14.
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a peaceful resolution.739
Meanwhile, calls for peace were coming from some unusual
sources. A group of Andean witchdoctors colorfully clad in cloaks,
ponchos and feathers descended on Lima to stage a vivid peace
ceremony at the Japanese residence.7' Their spells unfortunately
had no effect on either the rebels or the government. It would
take more than witchcraft to untangle this crisis.
L. Rays of Hope
The stalemate was finally broken on January 10, 1997, with the
resumption of discussions between Palermo and Cerpa."l The
conversation via two-way radio was "cordial," reported President
Fujimori, who also announced that face-to-face talks could resume
that weekend.742
Peru was making extensive efforts to locate a country which
would accommodate the rebels once the terms of an accord had
been worked out. The idea was to allow safe passage to the rebels
in exchange for the release of all the hostages. 743 The Peruvian
government had "acknowledged contact with third countries that
could provide asylum to the rebels once they release the host-
ages.",71 Prime Minister Pandolfi also confirmed that the search
was underway for an asylum country for the guerrillas.745 Al-
though the Tupac Amaru's international spokesman, Isaac Velazco,
expressed gratitude for the offer of safe haven for his comrades, he
reiterated the demand for the liberation of over 400 prisoners from
Peruvian jails.
71
The government was also working on the composition of a
guarantor commission which would monitor any agreement
between the parties. 747 Peru had proposed the inclusion of the
Red Cross and of Archbishop Cipriani in the Commission.
Cerpa proposed the inclusion of representatives from the Guatema-
739. Daphne Bramham, Peru's Role in Hostage Crisis Gets Support, THE
VANCOUVER SUN, Jan. 8, 1997, at A8.
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lan government and from a European country.749 Peru refused
the inclusion of a Guatemalan on the basis that this "would draw
a false parallel between the MRTA members, who were considered
terrorists by the Peruvian government and who lacked popular
support, and the leftist rebels in Guatemala.",
750
The Japanese government reacted optimistically to the news of
renewed contact.75 ' However, while there was now hope, Presi-
dent Fujimori was cautious, informing The Washington Post in an
interview that "he could imagine the siege continuing for another
three months.,
752
This cautious optimism faded when Cerpa insisted as a pre-
condition for talks that the government "proposal include provi-
sions for the release of more than 400 members of the rebels'
organization, the Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement, who are
being held in Peruvian jails.,
753
M. Police Provocation
It was evident that the prolonged crisis was beginning to fray
nerves. Associated Press reported that "rumors abound the
military and police are eager to avenge their humiliation, even if it
means sacrificing their captive commanders. '' 71 The police began
to provoke the guerrillas by infringing the 110-yard established
security perimeter around the residence.755 The guerrillas re-
sponded with a volley of shots on January 13, 1997, which injured
no one but caused considerable tension.756 Cerpa accused the
police of throwing sticks and stones into the compound in an
obvious effort to provoke the Tupac Amaru.757  Videocamera
crews broadcast a police commando making obscene gestures at the
residence.
75 8
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Police provocation continued as security forces threw debris
over the residence walls and piloted a helicopter equipped with a
machine gun over the compound.759 The guerrillas responded
with more gunfire.7" The psychological scare tactics continued
on January 22, 1997, with the arrival near the residence of SWAT
teams, large numbers of police, and special military forces. 61 On
January 24, 1997, in another show of force, the police drove
armored cars past the mansion. 62 The guerrillas responded by
chanting defiantly.763 After one provocation, they shot at a police
armored vehicle.7" Peruvian police began marching around the
compound to the tune of blaring martial music.7 By the end of
January 1997, the loud martial music was also accompanied by
blasting sirens aimed at the residence.7 6  President Fujimori
insisted that the police activities were routine,767 "not a prelude
to an assault but a tightening of security prior to talks and a negoti-
ated exit.
' 71
In order to protect its workers, the Red Cross insisted that
Peruvian forces stay behind a line drawn in the street.769  The
police agreed to refrain from such activity while Red Cross workers
were undertaking their duties for the benefit of the hostages.
7 °
However, President Fujimori told reporters on January 25, 1997,
that "security forces were under no obligation to respect a 'neutral'
zone" delineated by the Red Cross.
771
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N. Guerrillas Agree to Guarantor Commission
On January 15, 1997, the Tupac Amaristas accepted the
proposal for a Guarantor Commission which would guarantee the
implementation of a negotiated solution.77 2 Palermo had pro-
posed that this group include one representative from the govern-
ment, one from the guerrillas, one from the Red Cross, and one
from the Catholic Church.773 The roller-coaster of hope and
despair was once again riding high. As one Western diplomat
commented: "'Cerpa and Fujimori aren't walking down the aisle
yet, but it looks like they are ready to pick out the engagement
ring."'774 The rebels wanted all outstanding items of negotiation,
including freedom for their imprisoned comrades, on the agen-
da.
775
Casting a contradictory note to the progress being made,
Palermo continued to enforce the policy of allowing no visits to
Tupac Amaru prisoners in Peruvian jails, thereby ensuring that
there was no "outside monitoring of conditions and treatment. '776
This policy had been implemented since the beginning of the crisis
and Cerpa had asked that outside visits be reinstated.7 7
Human rights activists continued their protests against
Peruvian prisons. Bill Fairbairn, South America Coordinator for
the Inter-Church Committee on Human Rights in Latin America
visited several Peruvian prisons, and suggested that the hostage-
taking incident offered "an opportunity to begin correcting prison
abuses.,
7 8
0. The Propaganda War
Although the eventual outcome of this hostage-taking crisis
would be tragic for the guerrillas, they gained significantly on the
public relations front through the long months of the ordeal.
Because of the disciplined and calm approach of the guerrillas, not
was handling the hostage crisis in Peru. Id.
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a single hostage death has been clearly and unequivocally attribut-
ed to them. The physical discomfort of the hostages was soon
perceived more as the fault of the Peruvian government (which cut
off water, electricity and telephone service) than the responsibility
of the rebels who had turned a routine social celebration into a
126-day ordeal. The rebels sought at every opportunity to cultivate
the friendship of both the hostages and the world press. Journalists
were invited into the building by Cerpa and his colleagues.
Cordiality, courtesy and respect were shown to both Monsignor
Cipriani and to Palermo, the government's negotiator. The
continuing flow of hostage releases generated further favorable
publicity, as freed hostages spoke positively of their treatment at
the hands of the guerrillas. The rebels also kept up a war of
banners and signs posted in windows of the building. These signs
provided the media with the viewpoints, reactions, and bits of news
which formed headlines in papers across the world. When Cerpa
appealed for coverage of the miserable plight of Peruvian prisoners,
the inhumane conditions in those jails were made known to people
throughout the world.
In stark contrast to the obvious courting of the world's press
by the rebels was the heavy-handed media approach taken by the
Peruvian government. Peruvian authorities were clearly outraged
by the rebels' impromptu news conference and had even detained
a Japanese journalist for conducting an interview with the rebels.
Unlike the publicity-oriented Cerpa, the Peruvian government did
its utmost to "squelch media coverage-keeping an icy silence and
denying media access to the compound."77 9 In late January 1997,
the police also ordered photographers off their rooftop positions
near the residence and forced them to remain several blocks away
from the Japanese mansion.7" Sally Bowen, head of the Foreign
Press Club in Peru, commented that the "'government lost a major
opportunity to get its point across to the foreign press,"' which had
swelled to 700 members.8
P Two Peruvians Released
Luis Valencia Hirano, Chief of Operations of the Anti-
Terrorism Police was released on January 17, 1997, for health
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THE CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Jan. 17, 1997, [hereinafter Emery, Pistols to PR].
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reasons.71 On January 26, 1997, the Red Cross wheeled General
Jose Rivas Rodriguez (Deputy Chief of the Peruvian National
Police) out of the compound on a trolley.78 He was also released
on medical grounds.
8
Q. Organization for Negotiations
Anthony Vincent was proposed by the Peruvian government
as an observer on the mediation panel which would explore
solutions to the crisis.7 5 Palermo made this announcement and
added that Cerpa would be driven by the Red Cross to another
neutral locale near the Japanese residence for the discussions.7 6
In a significant gesture, President Fujimori indicated that "the issue
of rebel prisoners 'may be taken up' by the commission. ''7' He
was quick to add, however, that the government could not approve
of their liberation .7' This point was underscored by Palermo,
who insisted that liberation of prisoners was not contemplated.7 9
Clearly the Peru's position was "to offer an olive branch in one
hand and a club in the other. ', 790 It was also reported that the
Canadian government was prepared to guarantee the safe exit of
the rebels out of Peru.9
Although they accepted the selection of Ambassador Vincent
as Observer, the Thpac Amaru complained in a radio statement
about the government's refusal to consider their main demand for
the release of Tupac Amaru prisoners and commented: "there is
no possibility of starting conversations because in practice they are
asking us beforehand to drop our request, which signifies a formal
call to surrender which we will never accept.
782. Peruvian Rebels Release One Further Hostage, THE IRISH TIMES, Jan. 18,
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VIII. Further Efforts Toward a solution
A. Fujimori Garners External Support
Belatedly realizing the need for international support,
particularly in view of the favorable media response to the
guerrillas, President Fujimori became more accessible to the press.
He travelled to Bolivia on January 23, 1996, and met President
Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada "to discuss ways the two countries
could better coordinate their anti-terrorist efforts." "' Bolivia's
Ambassador to Peru remained a captive of the Tupac Amaru, and
Bolivia had rejected the Peruvian guerrillas' demand that their
comrades in Bolivian prisons be freed."M
B. The Decision to Hold a Japan-Peru Summit
Fujimori's no-concessions approach was apparently causing a
state of considerable anxiety in the higher echelons of the Japanese
government. Had an assault occurred and had many hostages lost
their lives, Prime Minister Hashimoto could expect severe condem-
nation on the home front. Furthermore, as the beleaguered
mansion was Japanese territory, Japan had a considerable stake in
ensuring a peaceful outcome to the crisis. Aside from the profes-
sional importance of the dignitaries whose lives were in potential
danger, there may have been a perception in the Japanese
government that Fujimori was an unpredictable wild card. It was
widely known that some of Fujimori's military advisors were
advocating an assault against the mansion to end the crisis once
and for all, regardless of the cost.79 It was the cost in human
terms which weighed heavily on Prime Minister Hashimoto's mind,
not least because such a carnage in a Japanese Ambassador's
residence would have diplomatic and political repercussions for
years to come. One-third of the remaining 72 hostages were
Japanese.796
In a telephone call on January 28, 1997, Prime Minister
Hashimoto reportedly said to President Fujimori: "'We recognize
the need to tighten the guard around the residence but want you
793. Sims, Peru's Police Yield, supra note 769.
794. Id.
795. See Sims, Leaders to Meet, supra note 186.
796. Cameron W. Barr, A Clash of Civilizations? Japan, Peru Debate Crisis,
THE CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Jan. 31, 1997, at 7.
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to take sufficient care that nothing unexpected occurs.""' The
Japanese leadership may have been more inclined to accept the
inevitability of a bloody confrontation had the guerrillas executed
a few hostages. In that circumstance, force would have been
perceived as defensive, retaliatory and justifiable, both in Japan and
throughout the world. However, Cerpa's relatively civilized
nonviolent behavior towards all the hostages made the resort to
official violence more difficult, at least from the Japanese perspec-
tive. While Fujimori could dismiss the rebels as terrorists, refuse
any concessions and prepare for a military solution, the Japanese
were clearly more reluctant to perceive the situation with that
degree of stark clarity.79 Although some journalists commented
derisively about the vacillation and weakness of the Japanese in the
face of terrorist threats, the issue was far more complex than such
news reports indicated. In similar situations of life and death
threats, the Japanese government had usually placed a high
premium on human life; this priority by and large echoed the
wishes of its people. The Japanese public would rather preserve
life and part with monetary sums than sacrifice a human life by
being overly dogmatic or pecuniary.
C. Joint Japan-Peru Summit
The Peruvian government was also on the horns of a dilemma.
To concede and yield to the somewhat milder Tupac Amaru could
stir up the far more dangerous Shining Path terrorists whose
rampaging acts of violence had caused havoc and mayhem for so
many years. For Fujimori, the situation was a Pandora's box.
Although he may have been inclined to want to save the hostages,
could he afford the price in terms of the credibility and strength of
his own regime and social order in Peru? He obviously felt that he
simply could not afford the long-term risk involved in a short-term
resolution which would cater to the guerrilla's demands.
These two differing perceptions dominated the tension-filled
days, weeks, and months of the long hostage ordeal. In order to
find some common ground, or at least a level of mutual under-
standing, the Japanese and Peruvian leaders decided to meet on
797. Stalled Peruvian Hostage Crisis to Be Discussed at Toronto Meeting, THE
IRISH TIMES, Jan. 30, 1997, at 11.
798. Whether this is weakness or rationalized prioritization is a matter for
individual judgment.
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neutral ground in Toronto, Canada.799 It would be unwise to
suggest that there was overt conflict between the differing view-
points. The reality was that both governments were jointly and
deeply involved in a complex drama. That Fujimori was ethnically
Japanese was not particularly significant in this matter. Fujimori's
perception of the entire crisis and his decisive action to resolve it
were not at all in the tradition of Japanese governmental handling
of such situations.
The Peruvian and Japanese leaders decided to meet on
February 1, 1997, for discussions about the crisis in the hope of
finding a peaceful resolution."° These discussions were apparent-
ly initiated by the Japanese.'O It was mutually agreed that
Canadian Ambassador Anthony Vincent would act as facilitator for
the Summit."° On January 28, 1997, Fujimori and Palermo met
with the international guarantor's committee (comprising Arch-
bishop Cipriani, Mr. Minnig of the Red Cross and Ambassador
Vincent).8o3
On the surface, Hashimoto seemed determined to insist on two
points deemed crucial to his government. First, that there must be
no yielding to terrorism and second, that President Fujimori ensure
the safe and early release of all the hostages."° It was obvious
that the second point was of greater priority, and that the first was
thrown in to secure international approval. Within the context of
the Peruvian hostage crisis, analysis would reveal that these two
approaches could, in the course of implementation, become
contradictory to one another.
Although this Japanese double-sided mantra was chanted and
echoed for media and public consumption by numerous world
leaders, no one could clearly explain precisely how President
799. The Summit could not be held in either Lima or Tokyo because the
diplomatic consequences would have further complicated this already tangled
crisis. Journalist Linda Diebel explained that Peru was "highly sensitive to any
hint that it's accepting orders from a colonial master in Tokoyo." Diebel, Japanese
Tighten Screws, supra note 122. Canada was selected as the venue because of its
easy accessibility from both Peru and Japan and conceivably, because it was
perceived as a country with "no particular axe to grind." Harper, supra note 758.
800. Id.
801. Id. Interestingly, Mr. Hashimoto stated on Jan. 29, 1997, that President
Fujimori had initiated the idea of a meeting in Toronto. Peruvian, Japanese
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at A12.
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Fujimori was to pull off this kind of miraculous feat. Barring some
dramatic change in the guerrillas' demands, the possibility of
implementing both Japanese priorities simultaneously was remote.
One could cynically suggest that world leaders were simply paying
lip-service to the type of response their media and public expected
to hear, leaving Fujimori to figure out the tedious details of
precisely how this conflicting set of options could be implemented.
That this caused some impatience in Peruvian governmental circles
is evidenced by a statement made by one official that Fujimori's
trip to Toronto was being made neither to apologize for police
provocations at the compound nor to seek Japanese permission for
an attack on their residence.8°5
Journalist Paul Knox of The Globe & Mail speculated about
the motives for the Summit: "Although the most urgent issue
appears to be Mr. Hashimoto's desire for restraint, it seems
unlikely that the two leaders would get together without exploring
possible offers to Tupac Amaru to end the crisis."'  The final
decision had to be taken by Fujimori; both the Japanese and the
Peruvians understood-this. Japanese spokesman Seiroku Kajiyama
commented that the "'meeting is not meddling with the Peruvian
government but is a discussion." '' 8° As the Editor of The Globe
& Mail explained, "Fujimori has to live with the consequences of
a deal with the rebels, and the Japanese do not. '
D. The Summitt in Toronto
Journalist Paul Knox of The Globe and Mail aptly described
the situation confronting both President Fujimori and Prime
Minister Hashimoto as they braved the rigors of a Canadian winter
to hold the Summit in Toronto on February 1, 1997. o9 Knox
commented: "Their decision to hold a summit on Canadian soil
betrayed their desire to demonstrate independence from one
another for domestic audiences, at the same time as they seek to
iron out apparent differences over strategy."8 10  The Summit
would include the two leaders of Japan and Peru and their aides,
805. Id.
806. Paul Knox, Canada Host For Hostage Summit, THE GLOBE & MAIL
(Toronto), Jan. 30, 1997, at Al [hereinafter Knox, Canada Host].
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with no Canadian officials present."'
Although Japan and Peru were overtly united on the crisis,812
the very fact of holding such a discussion in a third country was
indicative of the divergent positions and perceptions of the
Japanese and Peruvian leadership. A Japanese government source
commented that "Tokyo and Lima are divided over whether the
time had come to give ground on the demand to release the Tulpac
Amaru prisoners.,
813
Calvin Sims of the New York Times referred to Peruvian
government sources' comments that Fujimori had "requested the
meeting with Mr. Hashimoto to personally assure the Japanese that
Peru would not use force to end the crisis unless the rebels begin
killing hostages or a hostage died in captivity. 811 If this was
indeed the precondition for an attack on the Japanese residence, it
is interesting to note that Fujimori did not later abide by his
apparent assurance to the Japanese. There were no deaths of
hostages at the hands of the rebels before Peruvian forces stormed
the residence in April 1997. Therefore, this apparent assurance by
Fujimori to Hashimoto, said to be the motivation for the Summit,
would undergo a significant change after the two leaders met in
Toronto.
As the Toronto Summit drew near, it became evident that
although Fujimori was prepared to wait out the crisis, he would not
"give in to the terrorists' demands. 8 5 He further declared, "'as
time goes by, the offers made by the government are being progres-
sively reduced.'
816
There was obviously a chasm between the positions of Japan
and Peru, with the former demonstrating increasing anxiety and a
softening position while the latter appeared to become more rigid.
Andrew Reding, Senior Fellow For Hemispheric Affairs at the
World Policy Institute in New York, commented:
As the Japanese themselves are beginning to understand, just
about the only thing Japanese about Mr. Fujimori is his appear-
ance and surname. In every other respect, he is a classic Latin
811. Id.
812. Id.
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815. Id.
816. Id.
TERROR AT THE EMPEROR'S BIRTHDAY PARTY
American dictator by plebiscite-a Peron or a Pinochet with an
Asian face.8"
In the short-term, the Japanese power of persuasion (grounded
as it was in their financial commitment to Fujimori's liberalization
of the Peruvian economy) had some impact on the Peruvian
President. Equally, President Fujimori's strong will prevailed over
the Japanese Prime Minister's wishes regarding freeing the Tupac
Amaru rebels from prison. At the conclusion of their Summit, the
two leaders expressed agreement on various points: first, Peru
would not free imprisoned terrorists; second, Peru agreed to
negotiate directly with the hostage-takers and utilize the assistance
of Ambassador Vincent of Canada and the Guarantors Commis-
sion. The two leaders also admitted to discussing solutions such as
allowing the guerrillas to seek refuge in a third country, possibly
Cuba. 18 Ambassador Vincent commented that President Fujimori
was amenable to discussions on improving the conditions in
Peruvian prisons and allowing foreign observers at trials.81 9 As
a concession to Japanese anxiety, Fujimori also agreed that police
outside the residence would no longer provoke the rebels.'
According to The Toronto Star, in the joint communique issued
after the discussions, "Fujimori pledged to restrain from using force
to end the standoff, as long as none of the hostages are hurt or
suffer ill health." 1  President Fujimori was also quoted as
stating, "'to the extent that there is no harm to the hostages, no
force will be used,"' adding that "'[i]f a single hostage or several
hostages are taken ill,"' or were not cared for physically and
mentally, "'that would not satisfy the conditions that I have
set."" As it was widely known that most of the hostages were
unwell and in need of medication on a continuing basis, the fact of
ill-health as a precondition to an assault on the residence was now
established. The statement was a noticeable strengthening of
Fujimori's position from his earlier announcement not to use force
unless a hostage was killed by the rebels or died in captivity.
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One wonders whether the ninety-minute' secret discussions
between the two leaders resulted in a mutual and confidential
understanding that a forcible resolution would ultimately be
needed. Fujimori did refer to the Summit as a "'very important
milestone for our next step.' in resolving the siege.' Prime
Minister Hashimoto was equally vague, saying, "'Today we had a
frank exchange of views. We pray that the launching of dialogue
will bring about the earliest possible resolution of the crisis."' ' 2
A careful study of the Joint Press Statement of the Japan-
Republic of Peru Summit is more enlightening in terms of what is
excluded than with respect to its actual contents. In their joint
statement, the two leaders condemned the terrorist incident and
"reaffirmed their determination not to give in to terrorism. '
They expressed an intent to intensify efforts toward a peaceful
resolution securing the full release of all the hostages and placed
"the highest priority on respect for human life."' The statement
outlined the plan for dialogue with the guerrillas to be "conducted
in a manner consistent with full respect for the legal system of [the]
Peruvian state, as well as for all the relevant and applicable
principles of international law.""s  Both leaders rejected the
demand for the release of prisoners. Significantly, "[t]he Japanese
government endorsed the position of the Peruvian government that
the preservation of the hostages' physical mental health was an
indispensable element for the development of dialogue aimed at a
peaceful resolution." 9 The two leaders endorsed the efforts of
the Commission of Guarantors and added Japanese Ambassador
Terusuke Terada (who is fluent in Spanish and knowledgeable on
Latin America' 3 ) as an official observer to the Commission. The
Japanese Prime Minister announced his full confidence in the
Peruvian handling of the incident and pledged Japan's continuing
support in serving the release of all the hostages831
Any mention of Japan's rights over the residence on the basis
of international law principles and diplomatic practice common
among all nations was excluded. There was no indication that Peru
823. Id.
824. Thompson, supra note 818.
825. DePalma, supra note 822.
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would consult Japan or even inform Japan prior to launching an
attack to liberate the hostages. If Japan was internationally
perceived as the senior partner in any dealings with Peru because
of its wealth and investment, this was not evident in the official
version of the talks. Although it appeared on the surface that Peru
had given in to Japanese persuasion by agreeing to talk to the
guerrillas, in light of the April 1997 storming of the Embassy, it
would appear more realistic to view Fujimori as the lead player and
winner in these discussions.
The reaction of the Japanese government to the storming of
their Ambassador's residence leads to further speculation concern-
ing the precise nature of the talks held at Toronto and whether the
actual agreement between the two close trading and diplomatic
partners was really reflected in the official statement which was
issued for international dissemination. Unfortunately, the actual
content of the discussions remains a secret. It would, for instance,
be interesting to know whether President Fujimori confided to
Prime Minister Hashimoto his elaborate plans, then already
underway (as will be discussed later), for an attack on the mansion
via underground tunnels.
Following his meeting with the Japanese Prime Minister,
President Fujimori travelled to Washington, D.C., for a twenty-
minute discussion with President Clinton, who praised his handling
of the crisis.832 Fujimori confirmed that he was only prepared to
make "very narrow" concessions to the rebels and explained that
this "is very important, not only for Peru. This is important for
America, for the world, because these kinds of crimes cannot be
accepted." '833
Fujimori was also eager to show that the crisis had not taken
him hostage. After meeting President Clinton in Washington, he
travelled to the Dominican Republic," and prepared for a
journey to London to attend a Latin American investment
conference "to assure potential international investors that Peru's
economy" was still stable.835 He confidently asserted that "'[m]y
government is not paralysed because of the hostage crisis. I
832. Steven Lee Myers, Clinton Praises Peruvian Chief for Handling Hostage
Crisis, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 4, 1997, at A10.
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continue to function and I want to tell the world that this is an
isolated case. It could happen anywhere.
''836
E. The Tupac Amaru Responds to the Summit
Differences in opinion between Japan and Peru were not the
crucial issue in this crisis. Any peaceful resolution of this tangled
hostage-taking drama would occur not because of agreements
(secret or overt) between Japan and Peru, but on the basis of an
accord between the Peruvian President and the guerrilla leader
holding the captives in the mansion. The real issue was that
Fujimori and Cerpa had to reach an agreement on their basic
differences. The rest was largely public relations and posturing for
the media.
The essential demand of the guerrillas was freedom for their
imprisoned comrades. However, this was also the issue on which
Fujimori felt that he simply could not relent. Conceding on this
demand would have destroyed Fujimori's political credibility and
undermined his power base in Peru. It is extremely unlikely that
the military-his strongest pillar of support-would have agreed to
this type of concession. On the other hand, from Cerpa's perspec-
tive, yielding on the basic cause which had motivated the raid on
the residence-the liberation of his wife and his comrades-would
undermine Cerpa's own credibility and destroy any impression of
idealism which might have justified the mission. It was a terrible
tangle and there was apparently no one in the world who was
gifted or talented or brave enough to tackle this enormous problem
with an innovative solution which could enable both these leaders
to save face, walk away with some confidence of having mutually
won and achieve peace in the bargain.
The Tupac Amaru's International Spokesman, Isaac Velazco,
insisted that the guerrillas would stick to their position regarding
the liberation of Tupac Amaru prisoners, but agreed to negotiate
on other issues, saying, "'[i]n negotiation there have to be conces-
sions. We are not trying to impose on the government but nor do
we want the government to impose on us."'837 This position was
confirmed by Cerpa in a two-way radio interview with Worldwide
Television News of Great Britain, during which he reiterated that
the rebels had not dropped their key demand for the liberation of
836. Id.
837. Bate, supra note 271.
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their comrades.838
F Negotiations Resume
On February 6, 1997, Ambassador Vincent and Monsignor
Cipriani, along with a Red Cross official, met with the rebels to
arrange an agenda for talks.' 9 The Peruvian prelate commented
that the situation for all the hostages was "favorable."' Arrange-
ments were being made for a venue for the talks at a house across
the street from the Japanese residence.!"I Domingo Palermo
would continue to represent the Peruvian government, while Rol
Rojas Fernandez, Cerpa's second in command at the mansion,
would negotiate for the Tupac Amaru. 82
Rojas, alias El Arabe, was reported to be a 34 year-old former
bus conductor who joined the guerrillas while studying sociology at
university.' Police identification of Rojas as one of the rebels
resulted in reprisals for his family. Two of his siblings lost their
jobs.8 Rojas, who came from a poor family, fit "a profile of
educated people who become disenchanted with the system and
susceptible to leftist dogma." 5  Peruvian authorities believed
that Rojas' expertise was in explosives, specifically car bombs, and
connected him to attacks on a police headquarters and a bank.'
Procedural matters between the parties were ironed out in a
meeting on February 11, 1997, at the venue across the street. Rojas
was driven to the house in a Red Cross vehicle for the first face-to-
face discussions since December 28, 1996.' 4  He was accom-
panied by Michel Minnig and Anthony Vincent.'
Both sides were aware of the fact that time was running out
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for the prospect of a healthy safe conclusion for all the hostages.
The physical condition of the hostages apparently prompted the
Red Cross to increase its medical activities within the Japanese
compound. Steve Anderson, spokesman for the Red Cross,
commented that "the longer the crisis continues, the worse off the
hostages will become physically and mentally."'  All parties
involved were aware that a "hostage death from medical problems
would cause serious problems for both the government, which
would come under pressure to use military force to resolve the
crisis, and the guerrillas, who would be viewed as drawing the first
blood in the conflict.
' 850
Talks continued on February 15 to establish the agenda for
negotiations. 85 1 However, three meetings failed to produce a
mutually-acceptable agenda." 2 The Commission of Guarantors
agreed to draw up a set of proposals "to keep a dialogue alive on
setting the agenda for substantive talks., 83  The Guarantors'
agenda was apparently accepted by both parties as a foundation for
discussion, because Cerpa met with Palermo for the talks on
February 28, 1997, at the house across the street from the besieged
Japanese residence.8 4 Ambassador Vincent commented that the
"'discussions took place in a constructive atmosphere,"' and dealt
with a variety of important issues. 85 5 Cerpa's appearance at the
talks was seen as a positive indication of serious negotiating and as
a hopeful indicator that a peaceful resolution could still be found,
despite the wide divergence in position between the Peruvian
government and the guerrillas.
856
President Fujimori's insistence that the ongoing discussions
were not negotiations, but merely 'conversations,' only contributed
to the hardening of positions. 857 The guarantors were "hobbled
by Mr. Fujimori's refusal to acknowledge explicitly that negotia-
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tions were taking place." 8  Fujimori also deemed Minister
Palermo as an 'interlocutor,' rather than a negotiator, thereby
implicitly demeaning the rebels as unfit to be bargained with on
equal footing.8 9 However difficult this made matters for Paler-
mo, a poll demonstrated that 60 percent of Peruvians approved of
Fujimori's actions and 70 percent supported continuation of
talks." The siege at the Japanese residence had already set a
record as the longest such ordeal in the history of Latin Amer-
ica.
861
The discussions were a major boost for the Thpac Amaru,
which had succeeded in bringing a government as tough as
Fujimori's to the point of talking face-to-face. Cerpa emphasized
the significance of the event: "'We believe that an organization,
political and military like ours, needs not only military actions in
the jungles and cities, and slogans and speeches, but for us it's a
very important experience to be at a negotiating table with the
government.'
'862
G. External Asylum for the Tupac Amaru
President Fujimori undertook another whirl of travelling in
early March 1997, this time apparently to find a destination of
refuge for the guerrillas. He flew on March 2, 1997, to the
Dominican Republic and received a warm welcome from President
Leonel Fernandez, but concluded that the country "might not be




The next day, the Peruvian leader made a sudden trip to
Cuba81 "shopping for a country willing to grant asylum to the
Tupac Amaru rebels. ''8' Fidel Castro reportedly agreed to take
the rebels on condition that "the guerrillas and all other parties to
the standoff formally requested it.'' 81 Castro explained his
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position to reporters, saying "'[ilt's a moral duty, not a question of
convenience . . . . What are we meant to do, stop helping when
there are dozens of people's lives in danger?' '8 67  Victor John
Way, President of the Congress of Peru and a member of the ruling
Change 90 party, commented that Peru was now "'closer to a
solution to the hostage siege."'"
Although there was definite hope, the two sides were still miles
apart on their basic positions with respect to the freeing of Tupac
Amaru prisoners. Even as optimism grew on one front-the search
for a refuge for the rebels-hopes were dashed by indications that
a major stumbling block remained. Cerpa failed to attend
discussions on March 3, and no explanation was provided for his
absence.869 As one Western diplomat commented, "'[t]he history
of this crisis is one step forward, two steps back."'"8
Meanwhile, the rebels had unfurled a banner over a wall of the
mansion which proclaimed: "Surrender is not the way of the
Tupac Amaru."8  The guerrillas had reiterated throughout the
crisis that they were not particularly interested in living in another
country offering them sanctuary.8 Isaac Velazco, speaking from
Spain, said that the Tupac Amaru was "not thinking about leaving
Peru." 3
However, on March 4, 1997, Cerpa indicated that he had not
ruled out the possibility of asylum in Cuba. 4 However, lest his
position be misunderstood, Cerpa emphasized that the guerrillas
preferred "'not to make a statement in favor or against this offer
now because of the respect we have for Commandante Fidel
Castro, the Cuban government, his people, and his revolution.
' ' 875
Cerpa rejected any notion of asylum in the Dominican Repub-
lic.8
76
Undaunted by the rebels' reaction to his plans for a solution,
867. Sims, Cuba Asylum, supra note 862.
868. Sims, Castro, supra note 561.
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TON J., Mar. 4, 1997, at A6.
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Mar. 5, 1997, at A15.
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President Fujimori announced on March 4, 1997, the preparation
by his government of an "all-inclusive proposal" to end the
siege.' The parties exchanged their proposals and agreed to
further talks."8
IX. The Crisis Escalates
On March 6, 1997, the Tupac Amaru announced its abandon-
ment of negotiations because of a belief that the authorities were
digging tunnels beneath the residence in preparation for a military
attack. 9 Cerpa indicated that the rebels began to hear noises
beneath the floor three days before; those sounds intensified on
March 6.80 Cerpa concluded from the sound that a military
action was being planned and commented that "'[w]e don't believe
that it's correct for them on the one hand to speak of conducting
a dialogue to resolve the crisis and on the other hand to engage in
this type of activity.', 88' Cerpa requested the Guarantor Com-
mission to confirm his suspicions. The members visited the
mansion but departed without comment.8s
The media, hungry for a new angle on the story, responded
with frenzy to Cerpa's allegation about a tunnel. Peruvian
journalists reported seeing construction work at a house near the
residence and being prevented by police from investigating the
situation."s The Mayor of San Isidro was prevented by police
from observing the construction work." By March 7, despite
police dismissal of Cerpa's allegations, journalists were confirming
that "one or more tunnels had been dug beneath the besieged resi-
dence.""s  Peruvian newspapers reported that they had withheld
877. Hostage Proposal Prepared, THE VANCOUVER SUN, Mar. 5, 1997, at A8.
878. The Peruvian Government and Marxist Rebels, THE OTTAWA CITIZEN,
Mar. 6, 1997, at A7.
879. Calvin Sims, Peru Rebels Abandon Talks, Saying Police Are Plotting
Assault, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 7, 1997, at A10 [hereinafter Sims, Rebels Abandon
Talks].
880. Hostage-Takers in Peru Call Off Peace Talks, THE EDMONTON J., Mar.
7, 1997, at A17.
881. Sims, Rebels Abandon Talks, supra note 879. Journalist Calvin Sims
commented that "[i]f it is shown that the police are digging a tunnel underneath
the residence, Fujimori will be hard pressed to explain why the government
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the information in order to protect a raid to liberate the hostages
and explained that the loud music blared at the mansion and the
tank maneuvers outside were all part of a cover to camouflage the
noise of the digging.88 6 Additionally, the police sought to distract
the rebels by throwing stones at the residence and making obscene
gestures at the guerrillas.8" Journalists also saw truckloads of dirt
being carted away from a neighboring house "night after
night.""s The New York Times reported that the tunnel digging
had begun in January as President Fujimori journeyed to Canada
for his Summit meeting with Prime Minister Hashimoto.
889
Peruvian news sources indicated that the tunnel construction may
have begun as early as late December 1996.8"
The extent of Japanese knowledge of this plan to burrow
under their diplomatic residence and forcibly liberate the hostages
is unclear to this day. On the surface, Japanese officials expressed
some irritation, claiming to have been promised that "they would
be consulted before any police intrusion into the compound, which
is legally regarded as Japanese territory."91 President Fujimori
must have been aware of the repercussions to his close relationship
with Japan should he embark on a military attack without some
prior consultation. This of course raises some questions about the
actual content of the secret discussions between Prime Minister
Hashimoto and President Fujimori in Toronto. It seems unlikely
that Fujimori would have risked his ties with Japan by storming a
Japanese diplomatic compound without some prior mutual accord
that such action may have to be taken.
The tunnel issue became a significant obstacle to the continua-
tion of discussions between the government of Peru and the
guerrillas. Cerpa was afraid to leave the mansion, lest the attack
occur in his absence.
9
Nerves already frayed by the fear of an imminent attack were
further strained by reports that United States commandos would
participate in the assault on the mansion. The United States
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an operation.893
The Peruvian government responded to this tunnel crisis with
dogged dismissal of the matter,894 a tactic which only rattled
nerves further. President Fujimori made no public statements
about the tunnels,8 95 refusing either to confirm or deny their exis-
tence.896  The crisis was also exacerbated by Peruvian govern-
mental attempts to curb and control the media frenzy around the
compound. Foreign reporters were threatened with sanctions for
broadcasting interviews with Cerpa and one journalist, Miguel Real
of Worldwide Television News of Britain,"9 was expelled from
Peru for his role in the dissemination of the tunnel story.8 98 At
a news conference in Peru, Miguel Real said that he was threatened
with arrest and that he had been told that he was being investig-
ated on terrorism charges!"9 Some foreign news sources like The
New York Times came under special attack from Peruvian authori-
ties,' indicating that President Fujimori was unhappy with the
international news coverage being accorded to the Tupac Amaru's
viewpoint.
A. Guarantor Commission Acts to Avert Crisis
The explosive situation was now extremely dangerous for the
hostages because the minimal bond of trust between the rebels and
the government had dissolved with the confirmation that one or
several tunnels were being constructed. In an effort to stave off
imminent disaster, the Guarantor Commission met President
Fujimori, while Michel Minnig of the Red Cross spent considerable
time inside the besieged residence.91 The Commission succeeded
in obtaining a commitment from the Peruvian President to search
for a peaceful solution.9° These frantic efforts resulted in Cer-
pa's agreement to renew the talks on March 10, 19 97 .9 3
However, two days later, March 12, 1997, negotiations broke
893. Id.
894. Id.
895. Schemo, Peru Officials, supra note 890.
896. Peruvian Rebel Leader Reported to Be Ready For Negotiations, THE
VANCOUVER SUN, Mar. 10, 1997, at A6.
897. Schemo, Peru Officials, supra note 890.
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899. Schemo, Peru Officials, supra note 890.
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down again, "with both sides saying they had failed to reach
agreement on important points."'  Monsignor Cipriani called for
a period of reflection, during which the Commission would engage
in separate meetings to formulate a solution.9° The same day,
the United Nations Human Rights Commission, in a statement
from Geneva, condemned the Thpac Amaru as "terrorist elements"
and called the act of hostage-taking a violation of human rights.'
The passion for digging tunnels was contagious. On March 14,
1997, Peruvian police discovered a nearly completed escape tunnel
built by Thpac Amaru guerrilla Leoncio Lopez Lazo and his
comrades, who were being detained in a youth prison in Maranga,
a district of Lima.' °7 The abortive escape of the teenage rebels
was apparently scheduled for March 15, 1997. 9°'
B. Japanese Efforts
The hostages had spent three months in captivity with no
solution in sight and negotiations stalemated by the rebels'
apprehensions about an imminent government assault against them.
President Fujimori commemorated the ninetieth day of the crisis by
lamenting the plight of the captives in a short speech.'
Meanwhile, the Japanese government renewed its efforts by
sending Deputy Foreign Minister Masahiko Komura to Peru and
other Latin American states on a mission "aimed at gingerly
speeding a solution to the hostage crisis."91° Komura met Fuji-
mori and the Guarantor Commission on March 18, for discus-
sions.911 The fact that approximately 24 of the hostages were
Japanese citizens imprisoned within a Japanese diplomatic
compound in Peru was cause enough for concern on the part of the
Japanese government.9 2  News reports published around the
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world about the tunnels had certainly made for a more complex
situation as far as Japan was concerned. According to The New
York Times, "Mr. Fujimori did not tell the Japanese that any
tunnels were being dug ... and has not publicly confirmed their
existence."913  Komura's visit was indicative of the anxiety felt
within the Japanese leadership, not so much about Fujimori's next
move, but about the possible repercussions at home and abroad
should a number of those Japanese businessmen and diplomats die
in a bloody gun battle between Peruvian forces and the rebels.
Reuters reported that "Mr. Komura cautioned Peru's government
against using force to end the siege and pressed for a speedy
settlement to the crisis.
914
Komura also visited Cuba officially to request asylum for the
rebels in the event that a negotiated solution could be found. 95
He met with a favorable response there and fared similarly success-
fully with an asylum request made to the President of the Domini-
can Republic. In an apparent effort to keep some momentum
going in the search for a solution, Prime Minister Hashimoto
welcomed Cuba's offer of asylum for the rebels.916
With Peruvian efforts flagging, the Japanese probably felt that
it was time to seize the initiative and revitalize the desperate
situation. Komura's visit, however, only emphasized the very
limited impact that Japan had on the resolution of the crisis.
C Family Solidarity
While both the government of Peru and the rebels stuck to
their positions and made no moves, the desperate families and their
supporters staged a loud protest outside the Japanese residence as
a show of solidarity for their loved ones who were captives
inside.917  They tooted their car horns and sounded vehicle
alarms, banged loudly on pots, pans and bottles, blew whistles,
shouted, prayed and rang church bells to demonstrate moral
support for the hostages.98 Inside the besieged mansion, a few
hostages were seen raising hands at a window and waving a white
913. Id.
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handkerchief in response to the demonstration outside.919
The plight of family members was serious indeed. The wives
of the captives lived in constant terror of a violent denouement to
the crisis. Additionally, the "demands of managing a household
and children without their husbands" took "a physical and
emotional toll."9  There were financial difficulties as family
income declined.92 1 The lack of communication from their own
government was frustrating; many relied on each other and the
news media for information about the fate of the hostages. They
also found some mutual support in the shared activity of carrying
laundry, toilet articles, medicines and letters for their husbands to
the Red Cross Mission."
D. Fujimori Remains Tough
Despite Japanese diplomatic activities, family demonstrations
and the valiant efforts of the Guarantor Commission, it was
obvious that only one individual would eventually decide the
outcome of this crisis, and he remained firm on his position.
Fujimori's biographer, Luis Jochamowitz, said that "'[a]ny kind of
concession would be a first for Fujimori,"' and added that "'[hie
has never compromised with the opposition. ' 923
President Fujimori could have calculated that time was
definitely on his side in this crisis. Time would enable him to
prepare for a successful military assault; time might also serve to
wear out the guerrillas. Carlos Chipoco, a Peruvian opposition
Congressman, expressed his belief that the President was "'playing
the card of wearing them down by the passage of time."' 924
On March 20, 1997, Fujimori reacted vigorously to a Japanese
news report that he had decided to pardon the rebels, saying that
he "vehemently, overwhelmingly and definitively" denied any such
decision.9' He added: "'Since this incident does not end here,
but will set a precedent for Peru and the international community,
919. Id.
920. Calvin Sims, Wives of Hostages in Lima Embassy Fear Violent End to
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there can be no concessions to terrorists."' 9 6  He refused to
release any convicted "terrorists" with proven cause and empha-
sized that Peruvian security preceded any other issue.92 In an
effort to explain the depth of his commitment to his position, the
Peruvian President said:
'The security of the country comes before any other interest.
I'm sorry if that sounds hard....
Perhaps for other countries this might not have so much
meaning and they may seek solutions that don't take this into
account, but we Peruvians have suffered for 15 years and we've
had 25,000 deaths.' 2
E. A Proposal for Peace
On March 24, 1997, Archbishop Cipriani was reported to have
made an appeal to the international community for suggestions on
a peaceful solution to the hostage crisis in his country.9 9 At that
time, talks had been stalled since March 12.90 The Peruvian
prelate expressed his conviction that the international community
could help because it had "enough facts, enough moral
strength. 931
Despite evidence of acute frustration with the political chasm
which they were seeking desperately to bridge, the mediators
continued their efforts to find a solution acceptable to both parties.
Details of the carefully crafted agreement surfaced in the media
before the parties had even commented publicly on the matter,
indicating an attempt to gauge the validity of their efforts by world
public opinion, rather than relying on the obduracy of Cerpa and
Fujimori.
As early as March 21, 1997, correspondent Diana Jean Schemo
of The New York Times reported on some particulars of the deal,
citing an anonymous diplomatic source.932  This agreement
included exile for the rebels, freedom for the hostages, and early
926. Id.
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Mar. 24, 1997, at A8.
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A8.
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parole for some of the imprisoned Thpac Amaristas.933 The
tentative agreement would set the stage for review of the cases of
non-violent Tupac Amaru rebels utilizing the judicial review panel
which was already in existence.934
A few days later, on March 25, 1997, Associated Press reported
details of the proposal: a) review of Tupac Amaru prisoners' cases
and "freedom for those accused falsely;" b) improvement of prison
conditions for Thpac Amaru guerrillas; c) a "multimillion-dollar
payment" to the guerrillas; d) expenditures on behalf of poor
people in Peru; e) asylum for the hostage-takers in Cuba or the
Dominican Republic; f) a law of amnesty protecting the rebels from
future prosecution.95 The Peruvian newspaper La Republica
reported that the proposal also included early release for some
imprisoned Thpac Amaru guerrillas.936 Kyodo News Agency of
Japan indicated that Cuba would also benefit from the situation by
receiving economic aid from Japan in exchange for accepting the
rebels.937
Reuters reported on March 26, 1997, that the rebels had
accepted the Cuban offer of asylum and could take some of the
captives with them9 8 to guarantee safe passage.939 Bolivia's
Acting Ambassador Eloy Avila told a local radio station: "'We see
flexibility on the part of the government and the MRTA."'
94
The Bolivian Ambassador was still in captivity inside the Japanese
residence.91 President Fujimori indicated on March 27, 1997,
that a negotiated solution was likely.942 The hostages spent
Easter listening to radio broadcasts about their fate and heard
messages from their families.943
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F Rejection
All the optimism notwithstanding, freedom for imprisoned
Tupac Amaristas was still not guaranteed. As one diplomat ex-
plained: "'The core issue now is what to do about the prisoners.
That's the real area of contention.""'9
In an interview broadcast on Easter Sunday, March 30, 1997,
President Fujimori reiterated his refusal to release the imprisoned
guerrillas: "'The framework in which we're working is the same.
That is to say, to not accept the release of any of them."'945
Although the Guarantors had secured a compromise involving
parole for some non-violent prisoners and improved conditions for
the others, "as Peru's press got wind of this, many of Mr. Fujimori's
supporters expressed outrage and the plan was scotched." 94 This
indicated that Fujimori was under pressure, possibly from his
military advisors, not to yield to the main demand of the guerrillas
in any form. It seemed that the President's room for flexibility was
minimal. Having forged an alliance with the army-now the most
hawkish element with respect to the guerrilla crisis-to rule the
country with a strong degree of law and order, he could hardly
afford to alienate the one element on whose loyalty he knew he
could depend. With respect to the hostage-taking crisis, opinion
among Peruvians seemed to favor a strong governmental position,
with over 80 percent of Peruvians polled opposing freedom for
Tupac Amaru prisoners.947
Nestor Cerpa announced that he would not agree to asylum in
another country while his comrades remained in jail.94  He
indicated that the hostage situation would continue as long as the
government refused to free the prisoners.949 However, there was
some divergence in opinion among the hostage-takers, Cerpa being
willing to yield on the main demand of freedom for the guerrillas,
while two "middle-ranking Tupac Amaru guerrillas" remained
committed to the original demand.9 ° This information was
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confirmed after the attack, when liberated hostage Ambassador
Jorge Gumucio of Bolivia said that the guerrillas had "begun to
bicker" in the final days, as Roli Rojas, Eduardo Cruz, and another
guerrilla known as Salvador opposed Cerpa's inclination to "accept
less than the rebels' main demand: freedom for more than 400
jailed comrades."95' Raul Gonzalez, a Peruvian author, gauged
Cerpa's strength and weakness very perceptively when he said that
the rebel "'knows how to get in [to the embassy residence] but he
doesn't know how to get out. He doesn't know how to negotiate
at the political level.'
9 52
While Cerpa drilled his small band of guerrillas in preparation
for a military attack against the compound,953 Fujimori travelled
to Bolivia to discuss the crisis with President Gonzalo Sanchez de
Lozada, whose Ambassador to Peru was still a hostage in the
Japanese residence.9"
Archbishop Cipriani spent April 14 and 15, 1997, in a frenetic
round of meetings with both sides and with his colleagues on the
Commission.95 There was some indication that negotiations were
underway concerning the specific prisoners to be freed.956 How-
ever, it was more likely that the Archbishop, a personal friend of
President Fujimori, may have had some inkling that the govern-
ment was leaning in the direction of using force. The prelate was
reported to have written to Prime Minister Hashimoto "urging him
to press for a peaceful end to the crisis."957
G. Two Resignations and One Expulsion
Army General Juan Briones, Peru's Interior Minister, resigned
suddenly in April 1997, stating that he would assume responsibility
for the hostage-taking incident.9 8 Police Commander Lieutenant-
General Antonio Ketin Vidal also resigned. 959 On April 20, days
after these resignations, President Fujimori appointed "hard-liners"
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General Cesar Saucedo as Interior Minister and Fernando
Dianderas as Police Chief.9 °
Certain conclusions can be drawn regarding the significance
of these resignations and new appointments. It seems apparent
now that with the changes in personnel, Fujimori had yielded to
military persuasion to utilize the option of forcibly freeing the
hostages. Further, the changes in the Cabinet demonstrated strains
within the government.961 The resignations also indicate frustra-
tion, both within the upper echelons of government and among the
public in Peru, with the non-resolution of the crisis. The Lima
polling firm Imasen found that only 44 percent of Peruvians
supported their President's performance.962
A few days before the military attack on the residence, the
Peruvian government expelled a Red Cross official from Peru,
indicating Fujimori's apparent impatience with that agency's
humanitarian efforts during the crisis.96 On April 17, 1997, Jean-
Pierre Schaerer, second in rank at the Peru Red Cross office, was
ordered out of the country.964
X. The Rescue
A. Cerpa Provides the Excuse for the Attack
Given that Fujimori's actions indicated that he was determined
to forcibly end the crisis, all that was needed was an excuse.
Ironically, Cerpa unwittingly obliged, sealing his own fate and that
of his small band of rebels. According to journalist Sheryl
WuDunn, "the rebels ... threatened to reduce medical checkups
for the hostages from daily to weekly, and it is possible that this
may have been interpreted as a threat to their safety."965 Cerpa
conveyed this information to Ambassador Vincent, who inferred
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that the rebel leader was seeking to put more pressure on the
Peruvian government.9" As journalist Paul Knox commented,
"[i]t was the opening for which Mr. Fujimori had been wait-
ing. 9 67 Fujimori said that he "interpreted Cerpa's message as a
threat" and decided to act on the assumption that the situation was
deteriorating.' "With hindsight," said former hostage and
journalist Sally Bowen, "the MRTA may have dug its own grave.
On top of his intransigent demands for the release of prisoners, the
guerrilla commander, Nestor Cerpa, gave President Fujimori the
pretext he sought."969
B. Attack on the Residence
Analysis of the military operation which rescued the hostages
will likely go on forever, as historians, political scientists and
experts on terrorism study and research this subject in years to
come. That it was a brilliant military operation is obvious; that it
was an extraordinarily lucky one is also clear. Its inevitability at
that moment in time is debatable. Arguably, there was no middle
ground between Fujimori and Cerpa and one of them had to give
in to the other. For Fujimori, the end clearly justified the means.
A detailed study of the events of the fateful afternoon of April
22, 1997, raises some questions about the extent of violence used
against the rebels and whether all the deaths were justifiable.
However, these doubts aside, it was definitely "a military operation
that was long in planning, precise in execution and remarkably
fortunate in that almost nothing went awry.""97
About 18 days before the attack,971 the bored young rebels
had taken to playing fulbito,9 2 a type of soccer, daily inside the
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at A4. After the successful attack on the residence, President Fujimori confirmed
that his decision to attack the rebels was based on Cerpa's threat to restrict
medical visits for the hostage. Id. The President explained that '[w]e thought
that the situation was deteriorating very quickly so that at any time anything could
happen."' Calvin Sims, A Signal, and Hostages Opened Door to Raid, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 24, 1997, at A12 [hereinafter Sims, Signal].
969. Bowen, Uphill Task, supra note 166.
970. Hostages Tipped Off Before Raid, THE VANCOUVER SUN, Apr. 24, 1997,
at A10.
971. Douglas Farah, Peru Drilled 'Best of the Best' to Free Hostages, THE
TORONTO STAR, Apr. 27, 1997, at A12.
972. Bruce W. Nelan, How They Did It, TIME, May 5, 1997, at 15.
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mansion,9 3 using a ball made of tape and cloth for their
game.9 74 This apparently harmless activity would be their undo-
ing. They had developed the habit of playing this game in the
afternoon, leaving the hostages lightly guarded.975 This activity
dictated the timing of the attack.7 6 Many of the younger rebels,
particularly the teenagers, had become increasingly frustrated at
being confined inside the residence.' They had also become
careless. Even Cerpa was playing soccer on the afternoon of the
attack.978 "'The hostage-takers showed a terrible lack of appreci-
ation of the danger they were facing,"' commented William T.
Corbett, a retired U.S. Army expert on anti-terrorism.979 They
were naively unaware that their activities inside the mansion were
being tracked by sophisticated electronic monitoring equip-
ment.980
Cerpa apparently concluded that the problem was outside, and
totally underestimated his hostages, who were surreptitiously
assisting Peruvian authorities from inside the mansion.91 Listen-
ing devices were everywhere in the residence, inside a guitar, in a
thermos, in a chess piece, inside a Bible and even in crutches
supplied to rebel Eduardo Cruz, who was wounded in the initial
assault. 9 2 Microphones were reportedly installed in buttons on
clothing delivered to hostages.9" Additionally, commandos used
973. Tupac Amaru Vow to Retaliate For Attack, THE GLOBE & MAIL
(Toronto), Apr. 23, 1997, at A12.
974. Paul Knox, Canadian Envoy Faced Pitfalls in Peru Role, THE GLOBE &
MAIL (Toronto), Apr. 24, 1997, at A9 [hereinafter Knox, Canadian Envoy].
975. Gerardo Reyes, The 10-Minute Warning, THE EDMONTON J., Apr. 23,
1997, at A4.
976. Id.
977. Peruvian Rebels Divided, supra note 950.
978. Christopher Torchia, How Peru Pulled Off its Amazing Rescue, THE
TORONTO STAR, Apr. 24, 1997, at Al.
979. Philip Shenon, Raid Stuck to Rules With a Few Twists, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
24, 1997, at A13 [hereinafter Shenon, Raid Stuck to Rules]. Ambassador Vincent
(the last outsider to talk to the rebels) even commented that discipline had begun
to crumble among the rebels. Linda Diebel, Last Man to Meet Rebels, THE
TORONTO STAR, Apr. 24, 1997, at Al [hereinafter Diebel, Last Man]. He had
urged Cerpa to take a realistic view so that a solution could be produced quickly.
Id.
980. Knox, Canadian Envoy, supra note 974.
981. Joshua Hammer, Liberated, NEWSWEEK, May 5, 1997, at 39.
982. Knox, Canadian Envoy, supra note 974; Nelan, supra note 972.
983. Schemo, 126 Days, supra note 283. It was later revealed that while
providing health-related services, some of the physicians had simultaneously been
involved in passing messages to the hostages and had even planted "a listening
device behind a curtain." Id. The Red Cross was quick to deny knowingly trans-
porting any listening devices into the compound. Id. It was eventually revealed
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periscopes to look into the first floor and received the assistance of
a CIA spy plane in detecting the precise location of people and
rebel-planted mines and booby traps in the compound. 9' Agents
also sifted the garbage discarded from the mansion for indication
of rebel plans.9'
At approximately 3:30 p.m. on Tuesday, April 22, 1997,
Operation Chavin de Huantar, named after a pre-Incan culture,
986
began when a crack Peruvian force of approximately 150 troops98
(comprising officers9' from army, navy and air force98 )
stormed the Japanese residence and succeeded in liberating all but
one of the hostages. The hostage fatality was Supreme Court
Judge Carlos Giusti Acuna, 99° who was reported to have been
shot by a stray bullet991 but later died in the hospital of a heart
attack.99  All the 14 rebels, including Cerpa and two teenaged
girls, were killed.9 3  Two soldiers, Commander Juan Valer
Sandoval and Lieutenant Raul Jimenez Chaves,99 were reported
to have died,99 and about six soldiers were wounded.996 Both
the dead soldiers were hailed as heroes, especially Valer, who was
fatally wounded protecting Foreign Minister Francisco Tudela from
a rebel.997 A few days after the raid, one more commando died
of his wounds.998 About 25 of the hostages were slightly injured,
that some of the visiting 'physicians' were actually Peruvian intelligence agents
who used the opportunity to smuggle in the devices supplied to Peru by the CIA.
Nelan, supra note 972.
984. Paul Haven, Peru Officials Used Tiny Hidden Mikes to Spy on Guerrillas,
THE VANCOUVER SUN, Apr. 28, 1997, at A8.
985. Id.
986. Ian Lewis, Hostages Freed in Bloody Raid, THE OTTAWA CITIZEN, Apr.
23, 1997, at Al.
987. Shenon, Raid Stuck to Rules, supra note 979.
988. Farah, supra note 971.
989. Lewis, Hostages Freed in Bloody Raid, supra note 986.
990. Blitz Frees Hostages, WINNIPEG FREE PRESS, Apr. 23, 1997, at B1.
991. Sims, Signal, supra note 968.
992. Allan Thompson, Right to Storm Compound: Chretien, THE TORONTO
STAR, Apr. 23, 1997, at A16.
993. Lynn Monahan, Peruvian Troops Free Hostages, THE GLOBE & MAIL
(Toronto), Apr. 23, 1997, at Al; 71 Hostages Rescued in Peru as Troops Kill All
14 Rebels, THE VANCOUVER SUN, Apr. 23, 1997, at Al.
994. Hostages Tipped Off Before Raid, supra note 970.
995. Clifford Krauss, Peru Troops Rescue Hostages; Rebels Slain as Standoff
Ends, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 22, 1997, at Al [hereinafter Krauss, Peru Troops Rescue
Hostages].
996. Lewis, Hostages Freed in Bloody Raid, supra note 986.
997. Hostages Tipped Off Before Raid, supra note 970.
998. Haven, supra note 984.
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two quite seriously:?9  Tudela was reported to have been
shot,1  and Ambassador Aoki's elbow was injured. 1  In re-
sponse to media queries whether he had ordered the commandos
to take no prisoners, President Fujimori said his direction was
"'simply to free the hostages and keep as many of them alive as
possible.""'1 2  Commenting on his decision to use force to re-
solve the crisis, Fujimori insisted that "'there was no other way
out,""' ° as he surveyed the scene, standing on the roof of a car
outside the Japanese residence." °  He explained in a speech
after the attack that the guerrillas were "'armed to the teeth, and
we had to act to save the hostages."'" 5
The ordeal, which had begun in the middle of December and
dragged on for over four months ended in less than half an hour
"in a blur of exploding gunfire." 1 ' A day later, details emerged
about the brilliant rescue operation which apparently had been
planned almost from the beginning of the hostage-taking inci-
dent.1 0
A model of the Japanese mansion had been constructed on the
outskirts of Lima, and there a force of carefully selected comman-
dos practiced regularly for an assault against the rebels."' °
Meanwhile, the perimeter around the actual mansion, which was
guarded by military troops, was pushed back one block, allowing
more space for the attackers." Hospitals operated by the
police and army were made ready to receive casualties. °1 °
The role of the hostages would be pivotal in ensuring the
success of the raid. A calculated gamble to provide them with
advance warning paid off for the commandos and for the captives.
Bolivian Ambassador Jorge Gumucio provided the details: "'Ten
minutes before the attack, the police gave us a sign, and one person
among each group of hostages gave the order to get down on the
999. Peruvian Troops Free 71 Hostages, THE TORONTO STAR, Apr. 23, 1997,
at Al.
1000. Hostages Tipped Off Before Raid, supra note 970.
1001. Soldiers Blasted Way Into Compound, THE EVENING TELEGRAM (St.
John's, Newfoundland), Apr. 23, 1997, at 2.
1002. Sims, Signal, supra note 968.
1003. Krauss, Peru Troops Rescue Hostages, supra note 995.
1004. Peruvian Troops Free 71 Hostages, supra note 999.
1005. Id.
1006. Long Lull Suddenly Exploded, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 23, 1997, at A15.
1007. Sims, Signal, supra note 968.
1008. Id.
1009. Id.
1010. Reyes, supra note 975.
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floor and don't move."""' Later reports indicated that the
warning came just three minutes before the attack.0 12 The signal
was relayed to Luis Giampetri Rojas, a retired Admiral 3 who
was a hostage and who had managed to conceal his two-way radio
throughout the ordeal. 1 4 The pre-warned hostages pretended
to be napping, as they waited for the attack to begin.'015 Ambas-
sador Gumucio said those few minutes of waiting "seemed like for-
ever."1
016
Forty-five of the hostages were high-ranking members of the
Peruvian Security forces, and had received particulars of the assault
in family messages written in code.1017 These messages stated
that the loud playing of a marine anthem by a band stationed
nearby would be the warning of the impending attack. 1 8 Resi-
dents of San Isidro reported hearing the particular music shortly
after 3:00 p.m. 19
Informed quietly about the impending raid, another hostage,
Catholic priest Juan Julio Wicht, thought it was a joke."°2 He
had, however, noticed more military activity outside.1°2' Not all
hostages received the advance warning; at least two Peruvian
government Vice-Ministers were sitting on portable toilets when
the attack came and Congressman Luis Chang Ching was sponging
himself in the bathtub when the attack came.l °2
Meanwhile a group of hostages imprisoned in Ambassador
Aoki's bedroom had furtively opened a bullet-proof metal door to
a balcony." This enabled the commandos to enter from the
balcony, using ladders to reach the second floor in order to rescue
the captives inside."° 4
The final decision to attack was made by President Fujimori.
He told reporters that he was testifying in a court case initiated
1011. Sims, Signal, supra note 968.
1012. Tipoff, Tunnel Were Keys to Hostage Rescue, CHRONICLE-HERALD THE
MAIL STAR (Halifax), Apr. 24, 1997, at A12.
1013. Knox, Canadian Envoy, supra note 974.
1014. Sims, Signal, supra note 968.
1015. Id.
1016. Torchia, supra note 978.
1017. Gabriella Gamini, Sound of Martial Music Heralded Doom For Rebels,
THE TIMES (London), Apr. 24, 1997, at 16.
1018. Id.
1019. Reyes, supra note 975.
1020. Torchia, supra note 978.
1021. Id
1022. Hammer, supra note 981.
1023. Sims, Signal, supra note 968.
1024. Id.
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against him by his former wife when "he received a telephone call
from his intelligence agency saying that listening devices planted in
the residence indicated that most of the rebels were on the first
floor playing their routine game of soccer." 1  The President
said, "'At that second I knew the time was right and told them to
proceed with the raid immediately.""'1 6
A day after the raid, the Peruvian government finally con-
firmed the existence of a number of tunnels and provided particu-
lars of how they were used in the operation.1 "7 The digging of
tunnels to the Japanese mansion began in January 1997, with "four-
man teams working in four-hour shifts,"'  around the
clock. 1°29 As the miners worked, the police blared loud martial
music to hide the sound of digging."' One tunnel reportedly
caved in, injuring several miners.' °3' The steel-braced tunnels led
to three strategic exits in the Japanese compound: the main
reception area, the kitchen, and under the tent erected in the
garden for the Emperor's birthday party.1 "2  One group of
attacking commandos emerged from a tunnel dug under the
garden.
103
The ventilated and lighted1" tunnels were four feet in
diameter,1"5 three meters underground,1° 6 and 170 meters in
combined length.10 37  Inside the six-foot-high tunnels
1°38
"troops could walk upright, two abreast," 9 on the carpeted
floor." A month before the military operation, offices and
1025. Id.
1026. Id.
1027. Farah, supra note 971. Indeed, the code name Chavin de Huantar was
more than appropriate. This refers to a pre-Inca archeological site (situated in a
remote area of the Andes region of Huaraz) which is about 3000 years old and
consists of a sophisticated system of stone tunnels. Gabriella Gamini, Pre-Inca
Ruins 'Inspired' Lima Raid, THE TIMES (London), Apr. 28, 1997, at 14 [hereinafter
Gamini, Pre-Inca Ruins].
1028. Tipoff, Tunnel Were Keys to Hostage Rescue, supra note 1012.
1029. Farah, supra note 971.
1030. Hostages Tipped Off Before Raid, supra note 970.
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1032. Nelan, supra note 972.
1033. Torchia, supra note 978.
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1035. Sims, Signal, supra note 968.
1036. Rebel Leader Executed in Lima Raid, Paper Says, THE VANCOUVER SUN,
Apr. 25, 1997, at A14.
1037. Farah, supra note 971.
1038. Gamini, Pre-Inca Ruins, supra note 1027.
1039. Nelan, supra note 972.
1040. Gamini, Pre-Inca Ruins, supra note 1027.
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command units had been established inside the tunnels.1°4 After
the military operation was over, President Fujimori (who was an
engineering professor prior to becoming Peru's Head of State)
explained that he had been inspired by the Chavin de Huantar
ruins to devise and design a similar system of tunnels in San Isidro
leading into the Japanese mansion."° 2
A troop of commandos was stationed on April 20, 1997, in the
tunnel under the living room floor. 3' Upon receiving the signal
to attack, they detonated a bomb under the living room on the first
floor where about nine of the guerrillas were enjoying their soccer
game.10" "With a boom, the floor suddenly buckled beneath the
rebels." '' °4 That bomb appears to have killed at least four
rebels. 0 6 Cerpa and other rebels grabbed their weapons and
rushed toward the staircase to reach the second floor (where all the
politically significant hostages were located).1° 7  However,
another troop of commandos entering via the open balcony door
waylaid them after killing the few rebels guarding the top floor cap-
tives." Journalist Calvin Sims described the next moments
graphically:
A gunfight ensued and the rebels retreated down the staircase
where they were ambushed by more commandos who entered
the residence through the hole blown in the floor, the front
door, and holes blown in the windows on the left side of the
residence. The government said that all the remaining guerrillas
were killed in the ambush.10"
The fearful hostages lay on the floor, covering their faces so
that the guerrillas could not identify the most important among
them. ilO Ambassador Aoki warned them, "'Don't move, don't
move. 1"" They choked as smoke from all the explosions filled
the mansion.' 52 A second-floor room housing a number of
captives "exploded in a blast of falling plaster, choking dust and
1041. Id.
1042. Id.
1043. Sims, Signal, supra note 968.
1044. Id.
1045. Tipoff, Tunnel Were Keys to Hostage Rescue, supra note 1012.
1046. Id.
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terrifying confusion.""1 3  Father Wicht, the 65-year-old priest
who had voluntarily stayed on in captivity to comfort the hostages,
told reporters later that "'[ilt was incredible-the noise, the
screaming, the bullets whizzing just past my head,"' and added, "'It
was worse than anything I could possibly have imagined from
anything I'd ever seen on TV."""' The priest saw a soldier's
boots and heard a shout, "'Go! Go! You're free! You're
free!""'1 5  On his hands and knees, Father Wicht followed the
soldier's boots to the door and out to freedom.05 6
Meanwhile, other rescuers on the second floor were carefully
leading the hostages to safety via the roof of the mansion.0 57
Some commandos "organized a parade of hostages on their hands
and knees-like a trail of ants." They crept to the balcony and
down an exterior staircase to freedom." 8  As they left, the
commandos exchanged gunfire with rebels on this top floor and
threw grenades at them.05 9 One hostage fled in his underwear,
clutching his trousers."
Japanese hostage Akira Miyashita, a 55-year old businessman,
rushed out to the balcony as soon as the attack began.1" 1
Troops below urged him to jump.1" 2 He did and broke his foot,
but he was finally free and could only express his relief and his
desire to return to Japan and be with his family."° 3
Agriculture Minister Rodolfo Munante Sanguinetti had a
narrow escape.'0° He was lying on the floor of one of the second-
floor bedrooms when a rebel rushed into the room.'w Mr.
Munante later recounted that the rebel was going to shoot him but
lowered his gun, turned and walked out of the room to his own
death a few minutes later. 1" "'He could have done it. But he
1053. Molly Moore, Screaming Bullets Filled the Air, Freed Hostage Says, THE
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didn't,"' said Minister Munante. °6s
Counter-terrorism experts commented that this hostage rescue
in Peru "would very likely be mentioned in future years in the
same breath as the Israeli rescue of 105 hostages from a hijacked
jet in Entebbe, Uganda, in 1976, and the West German rescue of
86 passengers and crew from an airliner in Mogadishu, Somalia, in
1977.
''1°6s The Peruvian rescue had followed most of the usual
procedures in such situations1 "9 but the use of tunnels was
innovative, as was the judicious application of eavesdropping
equipment10 °0 Video cameras filmed the military assault and
broadcast the dramatic events immediately around the world.
XI. The Peruvian Reaction
Fernando Rospigliosi, an analyst for the Institute of Peruvian
Studies in Lima, commented that this victory would "'probably help
... [Fujimori's] popularity ratings and allow him to cover up
human rights abuses within the military.""" Indeed the Presi-
dent' ratings shot up right after the military operation. A poll
taken on April 24, 1997, showed his approval rating at 67 percent,
a considerable improvement on his rating of 38 percent before the
raid.1° 2 Eighty-four percent of 420 residents of Lima who were
polled supported the decision to use force against the rebels and
almost nine out of ten approved of the military's performance.11
3
Political analyst Alfredo Barnechea voiced the general Peruvian
reaction when he said of his President: "'Politically, this will give
him a new lease on life.', 1 4  As journalist Sebastian Rotella
explained, "in one stroke of brilliance and luck, Fujimori's image
rocketed upward. He regained the mantle of the anti-terrorist
1067. Id.
1068. Shenon, Raid Stuck to Rules, supra note 979.
1069. Id. "Attack at a moment when terrorists are relaxing or asleep, send in
large numbers of marksmen trained as snipers and use explosives in the early
seconds of a raid to create chaos." Id.
1070. Id.
1071. Peter Grier and Alex Emery, Peru's Raid on Terror, THE CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR, Apr. 24, 1997, at 6.
1072. Anthony Faiola, Suddenly, Peru's President Is Mr. Popularity, THE
VANCOUVER SUN, Apr. 25, 1997, at A23.
1073. Trembling Rebel Decided Not Kill Him, Freed Hostage Says, supra note
1064.
1074. Andres Oppenheimer, Daring Raid in Peru Saved Fujimori Too, THE
OTT'AWA CITIZEN, Apr. 23, 1997, at A6.
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warrior who has brought order to Peru.""1 ° 5
The military operation was clearly aimed as much at reinforc-
ing Fujimori's popularity as at liberating the hostages. The military
was reported for some time to have been prodding the President to
take military action against the rebels and Correspondent David
Adams, writing in The Times (London), explained that "[t]ime
began to run out for the President. In the past two weeks, the
Peruvian Army had been shaken by political and human rights
scandals to the point that there were wide-spread rumors of a
military coup in the making."1" 6  The question which arises is
whether Fujimori bowed to military pressure and undertook a
spectacular operation which would simultaneously rehabilitate his
flagging image and that of the military. More cynically, one could
wonder whether he had much room to maneuver if his only viable
options were either facing a military coup or staging a military raid
on the Japanese compound.
Jorge Santistevan, Peru's Defender of the People, believed that
the guerrilla's decision to restrict medical visits to the hostages had
justified the use of force."°7 Though saddened by the deaths, he
viewed the outcome as positive."WS However, Carlos Tapia, a
sociologist, commented that "'real pacification is never achieved
through military action.'
1 079
Shortly after the raid had concluded, President Fujimori,
protected by a bullet-proof vest, entered the Japanese compound
"to congratulate his troops and proclaim victory."1 °  Peru's
national anthem was played during the victory ceremony.' °8'
Peruvian troops cheered loudly." 2 Shaking hands with the freed
hostages, Fujimori "beamed as befits a man who had slain a
fearsome dragon, seen it rise again and strike at the center of his
1075. Rotella, Fujimori Reconquers Peru, supra note 167. However, a cautionary
note was struck by Peruvian political analyst Giguanna Pena Flor who did not
view the surge in President Fujimori's popularity as a long-term gain and argued
that it would take more to keep the people happy. Faiola, supra note 1072.
1076. David Adams, President Salvages Iron-Man Image in Dramatic Flourish,
THE TIMES (London), Apr. 24, 1997, at 17.
1077. Sally Bowen & William Dawkins, Embassy Hostages, THE FIN. TIMES,
Apr. 24, 1997, at 17.
1078. Id.
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1080. Calvin Sims, A Gamble Pays Off, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 23, 1997, at Al
[hereinafter Sims, Gamble].
1081. Krauss, Peru Troops, supra note 34.
1082. Knox, Negotiation, supra note 923.
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claim to greatness, and then dispatched it once more.' '1083 Carry-
ing the Peruvian flag, the President joined two busloads of liberated
hostages for a trip to a military hospital, saying "'[w]e've received
72 friends alive and well.""'
On a later tour of some of Lima's slums, he told Peruvians:
"'I will protect you from the terrorist threat. Peru will not be at
the mercy of terrorism and I mean to fight it with an iron fist. I
will make this into a better and safer place to live."'15
Isaac Velazco threatened retaliation by the rebels, saying,
"'[t]here are economic and military targets that will be at-
tacked.'''1° 6 Velazco vowed to "'continue the war against ... a
brutal system of repression.""'  Another rebel was quoted by
Reuters: "'We are not afraid that our comrades have died. The
MRTA is not going to die.
'''l1°8s
Although guerrilla violence in Peru since the hostage release
has not been dramatic enough to excite world attention, the
economic and political problems which breed hostility to estab-
lished structures continue to haunt that nation. Until those
problems are resolved or at least alleviated, the Peruvian govern-
ment is permanently held hostage to the potential for guerrilla
violence. Correspondent Robert Russo defined the essential
problems facing Fujimori in the aftermath of his great victory:
"poverty and the lack of basic services in many parts of the country
are still his political Achilles' heel." '' t 9  Former opposition
Congressman and lawyer Javier Valle-Riestra cautioned that "'[a]t
all costs, we must avoid triumphalism,"' and listed the priorities for
Peru: "'We have to make Peru more democratic, demilitarize the
country and be more self-critical.""'
B. The Japanese Reaction
The initial Japanese governmental reaction was relief, mingled
1083. Id.
1084. Lynn Monahan, et al., Fujimori Greets Freed Hostages, THE GLOBE &
MAIL (Toronto), Apr. 23, 1997, at A12.
1085. Gabriella Gamini, Fujimori Basks in Backing For Lima Attack, THE TIMES
(London), Apr. 25, 1997, at 19.
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1089. Robert Russo, Canadian Ambassador Describes Last Meeting With
Doomed Rebels, THE VANCOUVER SUN, Apr. 24, 1997, at AT.
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with an attempt to distance itself from the military operation.
Prime Minister Hashimoto emphasized that he had received no
prior warning of the attack and called that "regrettable.'
091
Hashimoto said: "'I told [President Fujimori] I understood his
choice although I did inform him of my regret that we had no prior
information.""' A Japanese government source suggested that
the failure to inform Hashimoto in advance "means that maybe
they [Peruvians] were afraid the Japanese side would not have
given approval for military action.""'' This view was also ex-
pressed by others: "It is widely believed that Peru did not alert
Japan precisely because Mr. Hashimoto would have vetoed such an
attack, as was its right under international law."1 94 In ordering
the attack on the residence, Fujimori "acted on his own even
though he had signed an agreement with the Japanese pledging to
consult with them before taking any military action." 10 95 There
was no indication of any such agreement in the joint statements
following the Japan-Peru leaders' Summit in Toronto on February
1, 1997. Japanese government spokesman Press Secretary Hiroshi
Hashimoto of the Foreign Ministry publicly denied that there was
any document signed between the Japanese Prime Minister and the
Peruvian President at the Toronto meeting. According to the
spokesman, "'we expected that prior notification would be given if
President Fujimori were to take military action; this was not the
case. However, Prime Minister Hashimoto expressed his under-
standing of the situation where President Fujimori could not
provide prior notification."'10 96 With reference to the deaths of
the MRTA guerrillas, the spokesman said bluntly, "'they deserve
to be killed.""'1 97
After the raid, President Fujimori reportedly admitted to
breaking a promise made to Prime Minister Hashimoto to warn
Japan prior to a rescue operation.' 98 He admitted that Japan
1091. WuDunn, Words of Praise, supra note 965.
1092. Japan's PM Not Notified of Plan to Attack, TIHE TORONTO STAR, Apr. 23,
1997, at A16.
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1094. Barrie McKenna, Muted Response Hints that Tokyo Changing Its Stance,
THE GLOBE & MAIL (Toronto), Apr. 24, 1997, at A9.
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had demanded to be notified in advance of any resort to force, but
said, "'I did it because in a rescue of this nature, the factor of
surprise is fundamental."'1 9 However, Japan's daily newspaper
Yomiuri Shimbun felt that Peru could not compromise the secrecy
of the military operation by confiding in Japan."n ° On the other
hand, the non-consultation was perceived by some Japanese as
humiliating for their country. Former Japanese government advisor
Hideaki Kase commented that "'[t]his affair will only perpetuate
Japan's image as a country lacking a will to resist terrorists.""101
New York Times correspondent Sheryl WuDunn reported after the
military raid that "[a]lthough the government in Tokyo had
received a promise from Peruvian officials that they would not use
force, Japanese officials were also aware that force was ultimately
a possibility." ' 2
Significantly, the Japanese newspaper Asahi Shimbun reported
that a manual on crisis management circulating among senior
government officials provided two options in the Peruvian hostage
situation, and both contemplated the use of force by Peru against
the rebels."' a In an analysis after the attack, journalist Sebastian
Rotella commented: "Unless Fujimori received some sort of secret
or tacit approval from Japanese officials,.. . he apparently decided
the chances of a successful operation merited the risks.""'
For Japan, Fujimori had provided a highly satisfactory solution.
Not only had he liberated the hostages and destroyed the rebels,
but he had provided the Japanese government with a guilt-free con-
science in the event that any Japanese hostages had been killed.
Prime Minister Hashimoto received the marvelous gift of deniabil-
ity. He could plead 'no prior knowledge' and leave Fujimori to live
through either the blame or the adulation, depending on the
outcome of the raid.
Japan also gained by jumping immediately on the Fujimori
bandwagon in support of his strong move. It made the Japanese
Prime Minister appear decisive to his own public and to a small
extent, he could overcome the negative global reputation of Japan
as being soft on terrorism and therefore an easy prey. One writer
1099. Freed, THE EDMONTON J., Apr. 23, 1997, at A16.
1100. McKenna, supra note 1094.
1101. Robert Whymant, Japanese Firms Were Set to Pay Ranson, THE TIMES
(London), Apr. 24, 1997, at 17.
1102. Sheryl WuDunn, Japan Cheers Release of Captives, THE OTTAWA CITIZEN,
Apr. 23, 1997, at A6.
1103. McKenna, supra note 1094.
1104. Rotella, Fujimori Reconquers, supra note 167.
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was highly critical of Japan's position during the crisis and speculat-
ed that the choice by the Tupac Amaru of a Japanese target might
have been because the rebels "suspected that Japan, more than
another adversary, would be willing to cut a deal." ' Another
was more blunt, commenting that "Japan's reputation for pusillani-
mous capitulation to terrorism has won it little respect
abroad." °
The Japanese government likely calculated that with all
Japanese lives intact, their most graceful reaction would be to
ignore the violation of their diplomatic rights involved in the
storming of their Ambassador's residence. Accordingly, Prime
Minister Hashimoto supported the Peruvian President's decision to
take military action and told journalists in Tokyo that "'[t]here
should be no one who can criticize President Fujimori for this
decision."'1 "0 7 Mr. Hashimoto reportedly told Mr. Fujimori: "'I
might have done the same thing."'110" He vowed in a message
to the Japanese House of Representatives to "'continue to battle
terrorism in the future without ever yielding..' '' u °
Prime Minister Hashimoto also dispatched Foreign Minister
Yukihiko Ikeda to Peru to formally thank President Fujimori and
to visit the former hostages."" Ambassador Morihisa Aoki,
enjoying freedom after 126 days of captivity, "praised the way the
crisis was resolved."' ' " Even Japanese corporations, which have
often been the victims of terrorist kidnappings and ransom
demands, cautiously lauded Fujimori's bold stance.
111 2
Kosaku Inaba, Chairman of the Japanese Chamber of
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23, 1997, at A26.
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1111. Cameron W. Barr, Japan Gains A Vicarious Victory-And Likes the Taste
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Commerce and Industry, considered the raid unavoidable."h 3
Japan's gratitude to Peruvian President Fujimori took tangible form
a few days after the raid. On April 28, 1997, Peru received $11.5
million in aid "as a good-will gesture" from the Japanese govern-
ment. n4 The money was directed to the improvement of medi-
cal care and facilities for the poor and the repair of rural hydro-
electric plants." 5
Although many Japanese citizens were relieved that the crisis
was over, they had qualms about the alleged executions of some of
the young rebels who were apparently shot during the raid after
they had surrendered. This action was perceived by Japanese
television commentators as tainting the operation with vengeful-
ness. Kazuo Ohgushi, a professor of Latin American politics at
International Christian University near Tokyo, found such
executions unacceptable 11 6 Professor Ohgushi wondered wheth-
er "enough was done to talk the hostages out of the rebels'
clutches, rather than blast them out.
1117
C. International Reaction
Kofi Annan, Secretary General of the United Nations,
regretted that force had to be used but applauded the "'determined
efforts by the government of Peru over past several months to find
a negotiated solution."'1"1 From Geneva, the Red Cross, which
had played so effective a humanitarian role throughout the crisis,
reacted with relief but deplored the loss of life involved in the
attack." 9 William Cohen, the Defense Secretary of the United
States, commented that the Peruvians had "'acted respons-
ibly.' m1120  Although the United States apparently knew that a
raid was imminent, Defense Secretary Cohen denied American
participation, insisting that it "'was entirely a Peruvian government
operation.' '1121  Paul Bremer, former U.S. Ambassador-at-large
for counterterrorism commented that the raid "'was absolutely
1113. Bowen & Dawkins, supra note 1077.
1114. Mother Convinced Rebels Executed, THE EVENING TELEGRAM (St. John's,
Newfoundland), Apr. 29, 1997, at 7.
1115. Id.
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magnificent-a model.' 1122
An editorial in the New York Times was more measured,
calling the use of force legitimate and explaining the favorable
international reaction as a reflection of the global attitude that "the
security of diplomatic facilities is a unifying principle and a
common responsibility." However, cautioned the editorial, "Mr.
Fujimori called the rescue a victory for democracy. He must be
careful to insure that its aftermath continues to be so."11 The
Christian Science Monitor questioned whether Fujimori "persisted
long enough in the peaceful hostage negotiations," but concluded
that "the deed is done, the time for healing is at hand.'
1124
Canadian Foreign Affairs Minister Lloyd Axworthy expressed
pleasure that the crisis was over, but said that he would have
preferred to see a peaceful resolution.1 ' Canadian Ambassador
Vincent, who played a pivotal role throughout the crisis, had visited
the residence just 2 and 1/2 hours before it was stormed1 26
After the raid he confirmed that he had no prior warning about the
attack and had left the mansion about two hours before the
operation began.1 27 He further stated that he had played no
role in planning the military attack and, although he knew about
the rebels' routines, he had not divulged that information to the
police.' Vincent first heard about the attack from his wife,
who saw the operation on television and was afraid that he was still
inside the mansion.
1129
Canadian press coverage of the liberation of the hostages was
extensive. The Globe & Mail, in an editorial, lauded Fujimori's
"coup de force," and commented that he had "set an example to
other leaders," by sending a "clear, discouraging message to
prospective violent groups.'1 130  An editorial in The Vancouver
Sun described the operation as "[b]rief, bloody and almost
surgically perfect in taking down adversaries and sparing inno-
1122. Shenon, Raid Stuck to Rules, supra note 979.
1123. Editorial, A Justifiable Rescue, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 24, 1997, at A26.
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cents, 113' The Editor of The Edmonton Journal believed that
Fujimori was justified in refusing to release imprisoned guerrillas,
warning that "To do otherwise would have sent a dangerous
message across the world and ultimately put other innocent lives at
risk.
1 132
The Editor of the Financial Times expressed concern about the
arbitrariness of the Peruvian government and the weakness of
democratic institutions and commented that Peru's government,
including its armed forces, needs modernization, transparency and
democratic accountability. For all his excellent attributes, Mr.
Fujimori does not seem interested in bringing this about.... Peru
is still too much of a one-man show for comfort."' n 33 Lauding
the military attack, The Times (London), called the operation "a




The Economist viewed the crisis as one in which violent
liberation fighters/terrorists met a violent response and death, even
for some who were ready to surrender, saying "In a better world
that would not have happened. But it did, and in the real one it is
hypocrisy to shed many tears: the guerrillas took to the sword and
they perished by it.""n 31 It also concluded that "Mr. Cerpa's folly
ha[d] done Peru's less-than-robust democratic institutions no good
at all."" 36
Saul Carlos Menem, President of Argentina, praised Fujimori's
"'spectacular courage,"' and added that he himself would "'have
acted in the same way, the same manner."'91 37 However, Presi-
dent Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada of Bolivia commented that the
attack was "'a highly risky operation which fortunately had a happy
outcome."'' 1 38 His Ambassador to Peru had remained in captiv-
ity in the Japanese mansion until April 22, 1997." 39
Economically, the favorable outcome of the hostage crisis was
seen as a justification for investor confidence in Peru. It was
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assumed that with the crisis behind him, President Fujimori could
pursue his policy of economic reforms, including the privatization
of electric-generating companies and a large bank. Rolando
Davila, a senior executive with Industrial Papelera Atlas S.A., a
leading pulp and paper manufacturer, felt that the "'business
community and more relevantly the government can now focus
more attention on stimulating economic growth.'
1140
D. Reaction of the Guarantor Commission
Having shuttled for hours, days and weeks between the parties
in a desperate effort to find some common ground between their
disparate positions, the members of the Guarantor Commission
must have had strong emotions about the entire matter. One of
the most active of the Commission members was Canadian
Ambassador Anthony Vincent. After the military raid, he reflected
on the situation during those final days in which the rebels "'forgot
who they were, and what they were doing. '"1 141  Vincent ex-
plained that the Tupac Amaristas lacked realism by sticking to a
demand that the Peruvian government could not meet.1
4 2
Additionally, their strong sense of discipline crumbled after four
months inside the mansion during which "the rebels gradually
turned into hostages themselves."' 43 Vincent admitted that
"'[flor those of us who knew them, the deaths of these people
[rebels] is very distressing."""
Archbishop Cipriani publicly showed his distress, weeping after
reading a brief formal statement. 45 "He begged God's mercy
on the souls of those who had perished and pardon for Peru.""'
Ambassador Vincent acknowledged "'that in hindsight, some
believed that the commission of guarantors had served as little
more than a cover to give the President time to put in place the
physical and political elements for a raid."""'47 However, Mr.
Vincent "believed that at the last stage, both sides were close to a
settlement," because Cerpa had trimmed his demand considerably
1140. Matt Moffett and Thomas T. Vogel, Jr., Peru Looking Better to Investors,
THE GLOBE & MAIL (Toronto), Apr. 25, 1997, at B8.
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and wanted only 20 of the Tupac Amaru prisoners to be re-
leased.
114 8
E Criticism of the Raid
Correspondent Bruce Nelan of Time suggested that Fujimori
"gave the negotiations a try, if only to mask preparations for the
assault."'149 Nelan went on to report that Fujimori had contem-
plated a much earlier attack on the mansion, with February 15,
1997, being the initial date.' This was canceled because people
were shifting within the mansion."' The next selected time was
early in March, but this was postponed after Cerpa, hearing noises
of tunnel construction, halted talks.
152
In a rather macabre spectacle to emphasize his victory,
Fujimori, accompanied by television cameras toured the mansion,
stopping briefly to see the body of his adversary, Nestor Cerpa,
lying face up on the staircase.""' The corpses of the rebels were
not covered when the television crews took their pictures."' 4
One of the rebels on the staircase appeared to be clad in his under-
wear.1155  Grisly newsphotos showed the Peruvian President
surveying the dead rebels inside the now-demolished Japanese
mansion.11 56 There were indications that some of the corpses had
been mutilated; one body lacked a head and arms.115 An army
officer told Time that every time a commando passed one of the
corpses, he "'would pump another bullet into it to make sure,'
figuring that "'[e]ach terrorist must have had 500 bullets in him
when it was over.
'' 1 58
There was some international criticism soon after the attack
with respect to the degree of violence used by Peruvian military
commandos against the guerrillas. Given the odds-140 to 150
crack troops from various branches of the armed services, ranged
against 14 guerrillas, many of them teenagers, two of them
1148. Id.
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teenaged girls-the outcome was inevitable. The great miracle was
not that the soldiers won, but that only one hostage died.
The press speculated about the motivation for the death of all
the guerrillas. Journalist Sally Bowen (who was at the Japanese
party on December 17, and who managed to obtain the first
interview with Cerpa) wryly commented that all 14 guerrillas were
"polished off in the first minutes," thereby "pre-empting problems
with subsequent trials and sentencing.
'11 59
A few days after the raid, news reports around the world,
including Peru, raised disturbing questions about whether the
guerrillas were killed in combat or deliberately executed. Lima's
La Republica said that Cerpa had died on the stairs of the mansion,
his face and body riddled with bullets" 6° Significantly, he also
"had an execution-style bullet wound in his forehead. 1 1 61 The
bodies of other rebels also showed similar wounds."62 Military
sources reportedly acknowledged that the commandos were "under
orders to take no prisoners. ' ' 163 Hence, each rebel was "given
a final 'coup de grace' shot in the forehead" to ensure his
death." 64 However, President Fujimori stated that the overriding
objective was "to free the 72 hostages, not one less." 65
There was particular concern about the way the two young girl
rebels died. La Republica asserted that the two girls had shouted
"We surrender! We surrender!""'  They cowered in terror in a
corner and according to "impeccable intelligence sources," were
shot a few seconds later.
1 67
The hostages provided pertinent information about the fate of
other guerrillas. Japan's Asahi Shimbun quoted "unidentified
hostages saying two rebels were killed after surrendering. One
hostage said a guerrilla was shot dead as he raised his hands. 'I
saw a slaughter,"' was the comment of the hostage to the news
1159. Bowen, Uphill Task, supra note 166.
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reporter." 68 A Thpac Amarista in Lima told Reuters that, using
a short-wave radio, he heard four of the youngest rebels (who were
all in one room) surrendering because they were frightened.
1169
They were subsequently shot.1170
There was also some indication that at least one guerrilla was
captured alive. A hostage claimed to have seen him being led
away and "was surprised when he heard all the rebels were
dead.', 1 71 The Peruvian Minister of Agriculture, Rodolfo Munan-
te, was quoted by media to the effect that one rebel tried to
surrender to the hostage judges but was gunned down along with
other rebels in that room. 1172 Munante later denied the state-
ment.
1 173
President Fujimori's response to the critics was to insist that
"'facing an armed terrorist, none of the commandos was going to
leave himself exposed.", 1174  As he told Kevin Whitelaw of US
News & World Report, "'this was not an operation to rescue the
captors. The target was to rescue the hostages .... The most
dangerous people had to be eliminated from the beginning."
'1175
He vigorously denied as "completely false" any allegations of
executions." 76  Associated Press reported that Fujimori had
admitted that he had ordered that all the rebels be neutral-
ized.
1 7 7
Unconvinced by the President's explanations, the Canadian
Inter-Church Committee on Human Rights in Latin America and
Amnesty International called for an impartial inquiry into the
killings during the hostage crisis, including "the possible execution
of two young female guerrillas who tried to surrender.,
1171
Journalist Philip Shenon voiced international concern about the
1168. Rebel Leader Executed in Lima Raid, Paper Says, supra note 1036.
1169. Raid Called 'Slaughter,' supra note 951.
1170. Id.
1171. Rebel Leader Executed in Lima Raid, Paper Says, supra note 1036.
1172. Raid Called 'Slaughter,' supra note 951.
1173. Jane Diaz-Limaco, Military Strike Frees Lima Hostages, GUARDIAN
WEEKLY, May 4, 1997, at 3.
1174. Rebels Killed After Giving Up: Report, THE EVENING TELEGRAM (St.
John's, Newfoundland), Apr. 25, 1997, at 7.
1175. How to Stare Down Terrorism, Fujimori Interview with Kevin Whitelaw,
U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, May 26, 1997, at 41.
1176. Peru's President Denies Rebels Executed in Raid, THE WEEKEND SUN
(Vancouver), Apr. 26, 1997, at All.
1177. Peruvian Police Arrest Wives of 2 Jailed Rebels, THE VANCOUVER SUN,
Apr. 29, 1997, at A10.
1178. Southam Newspapers, Rights Groups Urge Probe of Killings, THE
WEEKEND SUN (Vancouver), Apr. 26, 1997, at All.
TERROR AT THE EMPEROR'S BIRTHDAY PARTY
rescue operation when he wrote: "Putting aside the obvious
questions of human rights and the rule of law--can the execution
of a surrendering criminal ever be justified?" '79
Arguably, the rebels knew the stakes were high and were
probably prepared to some degree to die for their demands. On
the other hand, many of them were very young. With the mis-
placed idealism of youth, they ventured with almost pathetic
naivete into this tragic situation and lost their lives in the deadly
game they initiated.
E Contrasting Funerals
Peru paid glowing tribute to the judge and soldiers killed in
the raid. Army Lt. Raul Jimenez and Naval Commando Juan
Valer were buried side-by-side in a moving ceremony attended by
President Fujimori and his son Kenji, who kissed Valer's coffin in
farewell to his former bodyguard."' s The military read glowing
tributes and families wept during the emotional funerals."l
Justice Giusti was similarly honored and lay in state at Peru's
Palace of Justice as friends paid their final respects1 82
The contrast between these dignified farewells to the dead and
the treatment of the rebels' bodies is indicative of the vengefulness
which followed the guerrillas even after they were no longer a
threat to the Peruvian authorities. Fujimori had initially stated that
the bodies of the rebels would be returned to their families;
Peruvian Ombudsman Jorge Santistevan had indicated that there
would be governmental assistance to the families to help pay for
their funerals.1 83 Despite these commitments, "[flamilies of the
rebels were not allowed to arrange funerals-or even open the
coffins to see the bodies. They weren't allowed to authorize
autopsies; for example, the family of Roli Rojas (the rebel who had
negotiated for the MRTA in the initial days of talks) was not
allowed to hold a Roman Catholic burial for him, and his mother
barely had time to utter a brief prayer before the casket was placed
in a chamber above ground.
11 4
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Cerpa was reportedly buried in a cemetery in the slum district
of Lima.1185 The gravedigger Alberto Vuocc said the casket was
lowered into a trench in the presence of Cerpa's aunt, Irma
Cartolini. 86 However, according to one news report,: none of
Cerpa relations were allowed to see the body.11 The soldiers
who carried the coffin joked that the body "was heavy from all the
lead.", 8 8 They dropped the coffin into a trench and left after it
was covered with dirt.11 89 Irma Cartolini said she had to fight to
get her nephew's name scrawled on a small black cross."'
Other relatives were directed to the wrong cemetery by morgue
officials. 19'
The Pro Human Rights Association indicated that it would
seek the exhumation of the bodies of guerrillas buried without
prior identification by family members."9  Twelve of the four-
teen dead rebels were interred in unmarked graves around Lima
and police would not release particulars about the locations." 93
The Peruvian government stationed armed guards and intelligence
officers at the various cemeteries where the rebels were buried.
Visitors to the gravesites were questioned by police. Fernando
Rospigliosi, member of rights group Aprodeh, alleged that the
police were attempting to frighten relatives away from visiting the
gravesites. 194 Two women who brought flowers to Cerpa's grave




This analysis began with a question about the validity of using
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violence to achieve a particular goal. It has explored in detail a
saga which began and ended in violence. Inevitably, any analyst of
this hostage-taking must wonder whether the 126 day ordeal
achieved any tangible gains for any of the participants. On the
surface, the answer would have to be in the negative. Consider
first the perpetrators, the Tupac Amaru. Already a spent force
thanks to the loss of its leadership, it gambled all its remaining
resources on this one large operation, in which it lost fourteen
members. The demands for the liberation of their imprisoned
comrades failed.
It could be argued that the Tupac Amaru experienced some
success in a variety of ways, but these gains were made because
they undertook quite deliberately to mitigate the damaging impact
of their initial violent action. First, the guerrillas exhibited a
degree of restraint, and even courtesy, toward the hostages, which
won them considerable sympathy in the world press. Second, they
brought the miserable conditions of Peruvian prisons to the
attention of the entire world. Although they have died, the torch
of that cause-prison reform-will be carried on by others both in
Peru and outside. Third, they generated international awareness
concerning the plight of the poor in Peru. It would be too much to
suggest that they prodded the conscience of the world, but they did
succeed in arousing sympathy for the poor and dispossessed of
Peru. If they were perceived as being wildly unrealistic in their
demand for the liberation of their comrades, they were equally
viewed as being idealistic in risking their lives for that goal. While
they could not be called martyrs, the impact of their message about
economic deprivation and injustice cannot be underestimated.
They evoked understanding of the nexus binding extreme poverty,
gross injustice, human rights violations and retaliatory violence in
a manner few terrorists/guerrillas have equalled.
Although they resorted to violent means to accomplish what
they perceived as a laudable end, their behavior after the capture
of the mansion evoked a remarkable degree of understanding.
When the guerrillas could have killed hostages during the military
attack, they refrained. Was it the famous Stockholm Syndrome in
reverse? Had they identified so closely with their captives that
they could not destroy them? We will never know.
On the public relations front, the Thpac Amaru won more
understanding outside Peru than within that country. News
reporters from Canada and the United States noted frequently the
lack of Peruvian support for the Tupac Amaru. There can be little
doubt that the joy in Peru and the applause for Fujimori after the
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raid were very sincere. Ironically, the Tupac Amaru voiced the
concerns of the poorest and most deprived of Peruvian society but
failed to secure the respect and support of the very group whose
cause they were championing. Although there may have been
some sympathy for their cause, there was little regret about their
death. Leaving aside fears of authoritarian reprisals, there was
hardly any indication of popular support for the guerrillas. The
various demonstrations outside the mansion were in support of the
hostages and showed public solidarity with the captives. Clearly,
for Peruvians, the rebels' violent means did not justify the end they
sought.
The Tupac Amaru badly miscalculated Peruvian public opinion
regarding the take-over of the Japanese residence. In appeals by
radio and on handwritten banners hung down the residence walls,
the Tupac Amaru made frequent references to their interest in
advertising the misery of the poor. But the poor of Peru were not
responsive to these appeals. Indeed, Peruvian history appears to
demonstrate that although Fujimori's regime may not garner a
great deal of support, there is scant sympathy for the type of
violent dissent practiced by any terrorist or guerrilla groups.
Christopher Dobson and Ronald Payne may have been comment-
ing about Peru when, referring generally to Latin American
politics, they observed:
It is one of the maxims of terrorism that if a government can be
forced to overreact and impose anti-terrorist measures which
are so draconian that the lives of ordinary citizens are made
impossible, then those citizens will rise against the government,
which will thus bring about its own downfall. Nowhere has that
maxim been more vigorously pursued than in Latin America,
and nowhere has it failed so signally-despite the area's
historical addiction to revolution and guerrilla warfare."' g
However authoritarian the Peruvian system may be, there can
be no doubt that had there been a wellspring of sympathy for the
rebels, the numerous members of the world's media who were
covering events in Peru would have caught the story and broadcast
or published it immediately.
Accordingly, Peruvians, who have for years personally suffered
the violence generated by guerrilla warfare, displayed little
sympathy for the rebels and even exhibited severe anxiety about
1196. CHRISTOPHER DOBSON & RONALD PAYNE, WAR WITHOUT END: THE
TERRORISTS: AN INTELLIGENCE DOSSIER 208 (1986).
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the likely breakdown in law and order which could follow on the
heels of this crisis. If they wanted a negotiated peace, it was
mainly to ensure the safety of the hostages, who garnered the lion's
share of respect and public affection for enduring such a long
ordeal so bravely. Were the Tupac Amaru in a frame of mind to
learn from this debacle, the lesson might well be that in the long
run, any amount of violence and criminal action does not generate
public sympathy or support. The Editor of The Vancouver Sun
commented that the small band of guerrillas were "[t]ragically
confused idealists, as so often is the case, lured by the ever-false
premise that ends justify means.
1197
Some of the liberated hostages revealed that Cerpa desired
above all to convert his guerrilla force into a legitimate political
party and become a part of the established structure, rather than
remain an outsider seeking forever to destroy the system.
Although somewhat unrealistic in Fujimori's Peru, this aim was not
altogether fantastic. While the hostage-taking ordeal was unfolding
in Peru, Guatemala was implementing peace between its warring
factions. The history of Nicaragua shows the Sandinista 'terrorists'
becoming the government in power after a revolution in 1979. It
is not unthinkable to assume that fringe groups could be incorpo-
rated within the ambit of a diverse political society.
However, in making this assumption, Cerpa did not reckon
with his chief adversary. President Fujimori has built his entire
reputation on the destruction of terrorism and on the reinforcement
of strong governmental institutions. He believes that Peruvian
democracy is too fragile to tolerate a multiplicity of opposing
viewpoints from vastly different perspectives. The restrictive
democratic system in Peru allows only for a limited range of
dissent, and Fujimori's personal inclination is to perceive diver-
gence of opinion as an inherent threat to social order. Until the
democratic system in Peru matures sufficiently to allow for a more
extensive range of public opinion, it will be virtually impossible for
former guerrillas to don the mantle of respectability and become
players within the process. The problem is circular. Dissent is
viewed as threatening to the existing political system and is
therefore repressed, often brutally. That very brutality and the
accompanying human rights violations provoke violent opposition.
The challenge in countries like Peru is to channel dissent into non-
violent directions and to allow it latitude to utilize the tools of
1197. A Brilliant Win in Pert, supra note 1131.
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democracy-the media, the justice system, non-governmental lobby
groups-to seek to effect change in society. Where governments
are flexible enough to accept change gracefully and peacefully,
there is little incentive for the formation of terrorist groups whose
aim is to destroy the political system.
And what about President Fujimori? Again, on the surface, he
played a deadly game of brinkmanship with Cerpa and won
resoundingly. He did not blink in the face of the threat to kill the
hostages, did not waver to placate his Japanese allies and ultimately
pulled off one of the most successful military operations of this
nature in history. Although his detractors have dubbed him
dictatorial and arbitrary, his political methodology is far more
complex and multi-faceted than one would imagine.
There is, for example, Fujimori the power-hungry politician,
whose only apparent aim is reelection in the year 2000. To achieve
that long-term goal, he has undertaken some notoriously undemo-
cratic actions, and it seems likely that his wish for another term will
be fulfilled, unless he has a falling-out with his military supporters.
However, for the immediate present, the dominant persona is
the Fujimori who rules with the firm support and backing of the
Peruvian military. A survey taken by Peruvian pollster Apoyo S.A.
in July 1997, demonstrated that 53 percent of the population
believe the military is the "real power in Peru. Only 38 percent
said Mr. Fujimori holds the reins. '  General Nicolas Bari de
Hermoza, known to be a close advisor of the President, stated
during a ceremony of military support for Fujimori: "Mr. Presi-
dent, you can be absolutely convinced that, in the armed forces and
national police force, you have the firmest pillars to defend
democratic and constitutional institutionaity.' ' 9  So close is
Fujimori's connection to the military that it is unclear who the
senior partner is. If it is indeed Fujimori, then clearly the decisions
to rule with an iron fist and to allow human rights violations spring
from his personal methodology of governance. If, on the other
hand, he is a front man for the military, then the range of his
maneuverability is limited to what is acceptable to the armed forces
and the police. Even were he inclined to remedy the human rights
violations, he could do little, given that the perpetrators are alleged
to be the military, police, and prison guards on whom he depends
for support. Ironically, the more he bends to accommodate this
1198. Andrew Cawthorne, Protests Put Pressure on Peru's President, THE GLOBE
& MAIL (Toronto), July 18, 1997, at A8 [hereinafter Cawthome, Protests].
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group, the more he alienates popular support throughout the
country. A consequence is that the people of Peru then perceive
him as a dictator, whereas he prefers the reputation of being a
democratically-elected President who is in touch with his people.
This is the Fujimori who courts public opinion and who is said
to be keenly aware of the rise and fall of his political persona in
the polls. Before the military raid, his popularity ratings were
abysmally low. After the attack, they soared. Some time later,
when further political problems plagued his government, his
popularity dropped again. If he learned anything from this hostage
crisis and its aftermath, it could be that the public is at best quite
fickle and will fluctuate as each new issue is brought to its
attention. As Anthony Faiola of The Washington Post suggested,
"[allthough he won the praise of Peruvians by ending a painful
stalemate, his dealings with the even harsher problems of Peru,
including unemployment and poverty, are more likely to be the
ultimate gauge of his popularity.""'
There is also Fujimori the President of contradictory policies.
He maintains hellish prisons in which inmates are sentenced for
years to a life of physical and psychological anguish. Then, he
appoints a governmental commission to review penal cases and
liberate innocent prisoners. On June 25, 1997, a little over two
months after the conclusion of the hostage crisis, the government
of Peru released 114 prisoners jailed on terrorism charges. 1 '
The government also resumed the judicial review of hundreds of
cases of imprisoned Peruvians. 2  However, the inhumane
prison conditions continue. Amnesty International USA alleged in
late August 1997 that there are at least 600 innocent prisoners
languishing in these jails. It also confirmed that secret military
courts with anonymous judges hidden behind screens are the form
of justice meted out to those who are brought to trial."u 3
Although we have seen that President Fujimori rules with the
extensive backing of the military and the secret service, he acted
decisively in early August 1997, appointing a public prosecutor to
investigate the secret service agents who had allegedly tapped the
telephones of nearly two hundred businessmen, politicians, artists
1200. Faiola, supra note 1072.
1201. Peru Frees 114, THE GLOBE & MAIL (Toronto), June 26, 1997, at A10.
1202. Id.
1203. Amnesty USA Criticizes Peru, THE GLOBE & MAIL (Toronto) Aug. 22,
1997, at A10.
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and journalists.1" One prominent Peruvian who has accused the
government of spying on him is Javier Perez de Cuellar, former
Secretary-General of the United Nations. He revealed that the
eavesdropping by government agents apparently occurred when he
ran unsuccessfully for the Presidency of Peru in 1995. The story
was reported on Peruvian television."2 5
The President of Peru is a complex political personality who,
like politicians in every country, perceives his survival in office as
a primary goal and who directs his actions with that end in sight.
Unlike the leaders of more mature democracies, he has to walk a
tightrope between an aggressive, power-hungry military establish-
ment which has nurtured his rule and the millions of Peruvians who
want democratic rights and economic betterment.
The hostage-taking crisis demonstrated the degree of resistance
to authoritarianism among the people of Peru. Although they had
scant sympathy for the rebels, it was interesting to note how freely
they communicated their distress about the economy, the military,
the police and the government to outside reporters. Some of the
most scathing revelations about the crisis emerged initially in
Peruvian newspapers and were then carried by the international
press. Peruvian television has not hesitated to reveal scandals
involving the Fujimori government. 1 O°
Although they inhabit what can at best be described as a
struggling or fledgling democracy, the people of Peru have consis-
tently displayed a remarkable and encouraging resilience in
withstanding the authoritarian inclinations of their President and
his military supporters. As Juan Jose Gorriti, Secretary-General of
the General Workers' Confederation, said, "'[i]t's a good thing
there are Peruvians who have the dignity to reject all this ill-
1204. Phone-Spying Investigated, THE GLOBE & MAIL (Toronto), Aug. 6, 1997,
at A8.
1205. Fujimori Regime Accused of Spying, THE GLOBE & MAIL (Toronto), Aug.
5, 1997, at A8.
1206. Peruvian Court Upholds Crackdown on Dissidents, THE GLOBE & MAIL
(Toronto), Aug. 16, 1997, at A13. Frecuencia Latina Television of Peru has
exposed torture, corruption and illegal wiretapping of the government. Id. For
displaying such audacious courage, its owner, Israeli-born Baruch Ivcher, was
stripped in July 1997 of his Peruvian citizenship. Id. In a massive display of
public support for their station, thousands of Peruvians regularly gathered outside
the beleaguered television compound which was surrounded by soldiers. Calvin
Sims, TV Station Fears Fujimori's Heavy Hand, THE GLOBE & MAIL (Toronto),
July 23, 1997, at A10. Fujimori's popularity rating sank to approximately 20
percent. Peruvian Court Upholds Crackdown on Dissidents, supra. This low figure
prompted him to offer wage hikes, a favorable ploy which raised his rating to
nearly 36 percent. Id.
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treatment from the Fujimori government."' 1
Their individual and collective courage has largely acted as a
brake on the ambitions of the military of Peru. The tremendous
success of the elite military force which stormed the Japanese
residence was a boost to the flagging reputation of the military, but
the goodwill dissipated soon after the euphoria had subsided. The
rebels were hardly laid to rest when Fujimori's governmental
apparatus was besieged with scandals and other crises. In July
1997, five Cabinet Members submitted their resignation.1"8
Prominent among those quitting the Cabinet was Foreign Minister
Francisco Tudela, who inspired his fellow hostages with his courage
and dignity during the long ordeal inside the Japanese man-
sion. 12°9 On July 17, 1997, about 5000 Peruvians marched and
protested outside the presidential palace shouting "Down with the
dictatorship."'' " This two-hour protest was one of the largest
since Fujimori assumed the Presidency in 1990 and was a response
to "public anger over widespread poverty and allegations of corrup-
tion and rights abuses by his government and the security forc-
es.91
2 1 1
Fujimori was also criticized when the government dismissed
three judges who had attempted to bar him from running for a
third term in 2000.1212 The Peruvian constitution allows an
individual to run only for two successive terms as President. One
of the judges alleged: "They want to remove us because we are a
political obstacle. 121' 3  The Economist commented that "Mr.
Fujimori, who could send in troops to deal with the Tupac Amaru
hostage-takers, may find his new foes harder to winkle out. More
widely supported too.
1214
Although initially relieved and excited by the successful
liberation of almost all the hostages, Peruvians apparently soon
concluded that when 140 crack troops attack 14 rebels-many of
them teenagers-the odds are heavily in favor of the soldiers. The
great victory soon lost its lustre and with this, Peruvians contem-
1207. Cawthome, Protests, supra note 1198.
1208. Calvin Sims, Documents Threaten Fujimori Rule, THE GLOBE & MAIL,
July 25, 1997, at A10 [hereinafter Sims, Documents].
1209. Cawthorne, Protests, supra note 1198.
1210. Id.
1211. Id.
1212. Diana Jean Schemo, Peruvians May Have Had Enough of Fujimori, THE
GLOBE & MAIL (Toronto), June 11, 1997, at A7.
1213. Peru: Court Crisis, THE ECONOMIST, May 24, 1997, at 35.
1214. Id.
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plated another crisis-that their President may have misrepresented
his Peruvian birth.
Opposition Congresswoman Lourdes Flores and journalist
Cecilia Valenzuela alleged that they had discovered documents
which raised doubts about President Fujimori's date and place of
birth.1211 The accusation was that Mr. Fujimori was not born in
Peru and thus was not eligible to hold the office of Head of
State.12 16 The documentary evidence consisted of a 1934 immi-
gration form in which the President's mother stated that she was
entering Peru with two children under the age of 10.1217 Fuji-
mori's birth certificate and his authorized biography date his birth
on July 28, 1938, but indicate that he is the second of five chil-
dren. 121' However, "a 1948 baptismal certificate for Mr. Fujimori
lists his birth date as Aug. 4, 1938, and in the space on the certifi-
cate marked birthplace there is a glaring alteration. In what
appears to be different ink and different handwriting, the words
Miraflores, Lima, were written over a visible erasure to the
document." 1219 Calvin Sims of The New York Times explained
that "[fjor years, rumors have circulated that the biggest skeleton
in Mr. Fujimori's closet was that he was not Peruvian-born and that
his closest adviser, Vladimiro Montesinos, who heads the intelli-
gence agency, had skillfully concealed that fact." The Peruvian
weekly Caretas concluded that Fujimori's claim to be Peruvian-born
was highly dubious and that he was probably born in 1934 in
Japan." So frenzied was the political storm when this news
erupted publicly that Fujimori's mother gave a television interview
to counter the allegation. She stated that she had come to Peru in
1934, months after marrying the President's father, and that
Alberto Fujimori was born four years later.' President Fuji-
mori denied all the allegations and agreed to cooperate with an
independent investigation. Political scientist, author, and professor
Jorge G. Castaneda predicted that Fujimori "may either be forced
to resign from office or see his current freefall in the polls and in
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political legitimacy dramatically accelerate.""
It would also be useful before concluding to trace the post-
hostage fate of two of the Ambassadors involved in this tragic
drama. First, Anthony Vincent, the Canadian Ambassador who
played a significant albeit unsuccessful role in negotiations between
the Peruvian government and the guerrillas, was named Ambassa-
dor to Spain."m He won international praise for his dedicated
efforts on behalf of the hostages and for his courage in entering the
besieged compound regularly in an effort to find a peaceful
solution.
Unfortunately, Japanese Ambassador Morihisa Aoki did not
fare as well with his government. Shortly after the crisis was over,
the Japanese Foreign Ministry spokesman expressed appreciation
for the fact that Aoki had "carried out his responsibility very
successfully," and said, "we are happy that we have that kind of
responsible, calm and confident ambassador."'" 4 However, this
praise was short-lived. Ambassador Aoki was subjected by his own
government to an ordeal as terrible as the one he had endured in
captivity. He faced a "hostile Japanese news media, a grilling by
a parliamentary committee, an internal inquiry by his bosses at the
ministry of foreign affairs and finally, ... dismissal. '' " He was
made to bear the brunt for the security lapse which had enabled
the guerrillas to gate-crash his party. While some nations would
have given their diplomats medals of courage for behaving with
grace, dignity and courage in the face of imminent death, this was
not to be Aoki's fate. During the ordeal, he had become an
inspiration to fellow hostages and was lauded as a hero in the news
media, particularly in the countries of the West. However, his
efforts to cheer up the hostages and to tell them jokes, frequently
at his own expense, won him no respect in Japan. Journalist David
Hamilton commented wryly that Aoki's dismissal "speaks volumes
about the cultural divide that can lie between Japanese and
Western perceptions of the same event.""
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XIII. Conclusion
Finally, the saga we have explored from so many angles and
facets evokes a series of images, none more poignant than the
moment of freedom for various groups of hostages, those released
initially, the groups liberated later, and the captives who endured
the entire ordeal and raced to freedom dodging bullets and
grenades as they rushed out of the mansion. The ultimate
philosophical questions about the crisis will reverberate for years
to come. Were the guerrillas justified in taking these hostages to
gain the freedom of their imprisoned comrades? This analysis
would indicate an answer in the negative. However idealistic the
goal, the means were criminal and unworthy. However restrained
and civilized their behavior, they captured and held a large number
of people against their will and exposed them to psychological
trauma, if not physical abuse.
On the reverse side of the question, did Fujimori's use of
force-the means-justify the end of freeing the hostages? Again,
I must conclude negatively. First, Fujimori was clearly uncomfort-
able with negotiating his way out of the crisis, and he involved
himself in this protracted dialogue largely to placate his Japanese
allies and to buy time to prepare the assault. A military operation
was more to his taste and more in line with his political image.
Second, given this mindset, Fujimori did not negotiate in good
faith, to free the hostages peacefully. While the discussions were
proceeding, his corps of miners was feverishly tunnelling its way to
the Japanese compound. It was Cerpa's suspicion about the
tunnels which derailed the talks. In a situation which called for
frank communication from both sides, Fujimori preferred the path
of deceit and subterfuge and sacrificed the peaceful alternative.
It could, of course, be argued that the two sides were far apart
on the issue of prisoner release. However, Ambassador Vincent
had indicated that towards the end, Cerpa had whittled the demand
from 450 prisoners to only 20. Had Fujimori really wanted a
negotiated solution, there might have been the possibility of
dispatching the rebels to Cuba and reviewing the cases of the most
non-violent innocent prisoners (like family members of guerrillas)
for early release and air tickets to Cuba. In response to apprehen-
sion that any negotiated deal involving release of prisoners would
be anathema to Peruvians, one could argue that prior to the
hostage-taking, the government had already released a number of
innocent prisoners and has undertaken this activity since with no
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public repercussions and no dramatic upsurge in guerrilla violence.
To appease Fujimori's apprehension, Cerpa might have been
persuaded by the Guarantor Commission to provide the President
with a face-saving time period of some months to enable the
prisoner release to be accomplished, not by the Executive, but by
his duly appointed Commission in accordance with Peruvian law.
By distancing himself from the release, Fujimori would not have
demonstrated any degree of weakness to his military supporters.
Had skilled, experienced negotiators been involved in this crisis, the
finer points of a peaceful resolution might have been accomplished
with a sufficient degree of face-saving for all involved parties. This
is not to underestimate the efforts of the Guarantor Commission,
which were noteworthy, but the Commission was hamstrung by
Fujimori's adamant refusal to contemplate freedom for any
prisoners and by Cerpa's negative reaction to all the alternate
solutions they proposed to him. What the crisis desperately needed
was the expertise to bridge the chasm between the sides and
demonstrate the feasibility of a solution which would allow the
government and the guerrillas each to feel that they had gained.
Regretfully, in this hostage crisis, neither the Peruvian govern-
ment nor the guerrillas were over-concerned about the nexus
between means and ends. It was their unfortunate task to find
ways out of the ordeal, given a narrow range of possibilities and all
the inherent baggage of ideology, political persona, prejudices and
partialities which they bring to the fine art of decision-making.
Both parties felt that their ultimate aims justified and even
sanctioned the resort to violence. This contributed to the inflexibil-
ity of their positions and the inevitable denouement in a blaze of
gunfire and explosions. So convinced were both Fujimori and
Cerpa about the righteousness of their cause that methodology and
means were secondary. The morality of 'means' was not an
argument likely to impress either the President or the revolution-
ary.
However, those who analyze such crises and ultimately offer
some assessment have to weigh the series of actions against some
universal values. This is easier said than done. At the end of this
century, we have been unable to find clear decisive answers to life's
toughest questions. We can analyze, define, explain and assess
issues from every angle and from every viewpoint, but finding
appropriate ethical solutions with the easy confidence of a Gandhi
is next to impossible today. We wish for clear ethical solutions to
life's dilemmas and then remember that perhaps Cerpa and
Fujimori, in less complex times, could also have had that same
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longing. In such complicated times, it is worthwhile to remind
ourselves of the words of another great thinker, Aldous Huxley,
who wrote:
Our personal experience and the study of history make it abun-
dantly clear that the means whereby we try to achieve some-
thing are at least as important as the end we wish to attain.
Indeed, they are even more important. For the means em-
ployed inevitably determine the nature of the result achieved;
whereas, however good the end aimed at may be, its goodness
is powerless to counteract the effects of the bad means we use
to reach it.
1227
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